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

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

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Contents: Page:

AGRARIAN REFORM
Causes and Cures of Agrarian Unrest in Asia 1
by W. Klatt

THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT
Soviet and Chinese Policies Towards South-East Asia in the Early '70s ... 11
by Marie-Luise Näth

INDIAN OCEAN
The People's Republic of China and the Indian Ocean Imbroglio 23
by Leslie R. Marchant

HONG KONG
Sources of Stability and Instability in Hong Kong 42
by Peter Harris

BURMA
Change or the Same: The New Constitution of Burma in Action 51
by Josef Silverstein

REVOLUTIONARY THEORY
Doctrinal Perceptions of the Hanoi Leadership 58
by Robert F. Rogers

EDUCATION
Philippines: The Case for Non-Formal Education 66
by Gelia T. Castillo

Notes on Contributors

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AGRARIAN REFORM: *"It is tempting to believe that agrarian unrest is caused merely by the activities of political extremists (but) if urban radicals succeed in penetrating the closely-knit communities of Asian villages and in leading rural dwellers into acts of violence, the underlying grievances can be taken to be gross and of long standing.....A properly conducted agrarian reform can well achieve the dual aim of increasing production and improving distribution and thus provide vital elements for a cure of agrarian unrest in Asia".*

Causes and Cures of Agrarian Unrest in Asia

W. Klatt

THE EUPHORIA caused by the so-called "green revolution" has given way to gloom and despondency about Asia's chances of successfully overcoming the shortcomings of its food and farming industries. In Asia a fall in overall production of a mere 5 per cent—as happened in 1972/73—equals losses of 20 million tons of grain, 1 million tons of sugar and 1/2 million tons of vegetable oils, not counting any of the other farm products. These are orders of magnitude large enough to disrupt the normal workings of the world markets and of the producer countries most affected by such shortfalls, which are by no means exceptional occurrences. In recent years droughts in some of the States of the Indian Union and in some parts of Mainland China, floods in Pakistan and Bangladesh and typhoons on the shores of the Western Pacific have served as reminders that for most of the time Man is still at the mercy of Nature in large areas of Asia. This year in Burma, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh *per capita* food supplies from domestic production amount at best to nine-tenths of the meagre resources available ten years ago. As some manage to retain or improve their living standards, there must be others who are worse off. Thus, year after year, millions of cultivators and consumers suffer serious hardship.

Less than a decade ago, Pakistan and the Philippines encountered certain difficulties when they tried to place small domestic grain surpluses abroad. Now there are not enough cereals available to meet dire needs. To make matters worse, Russia and China required exceptionally large grain imports in 1972/73 and 1973/74 respectively. They thus helped to reduce world wheat stocks to less than half of what they were at the end of the last decade. The situation has been aggravated by the rapidly growing demands of the live-stock industries of North America, Western Europe and Japan, which have greatly depleted the world reserves of feed grains. In Asia these trends are felt most immediately when the monsoons fail. India, the second most populous country in Asia, increased its grain harvests to record levels in five consecutive years of ample rainfall, but last year, when world stocks were exceptionally low, almost 5 million tons of wheat and milo (sorghum) had to be imported to meet at least some part of the domestic shortfall. At the same time China, which also suffered setbacks, placed record import orders for 9 million tons of wheat, maize and soyabeans with various surplus-producing countries. Due to the shortages thus caused in the world markets, early this year grain prices were approximately twice as high as a year ago. The world market for rice, which absorbs less than 5 per cent of world production and is thus highly susceptible to even small changes in stocks, could not be protected against these trends. The situation was aggravated by the rapidly rising cost of mineral oils, and in particular diesel fuel, on which irrigation and transport equipment depends. Last, but not least, Asia's need for over 10 million tons of imported

fertilizers created additional strains on the over-stretched reserves of foreign exchange. The implications of this situation can be far-reaching indeed. They can easily extend even to Asia's prosperous communities which produce surpluses of rice and commercial crops.

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TO those who had hoped to forestall red revolutions by means of the "green revolution", it must have come as a shock to see no end in sight to agrarian disorder. In fact, as technological changes in farming began to become effective, the instances of insurgency, instead of diminishing, actually increased. To give only one example, a report by the Minister of Home Affairs of the Indian Union on the causes and nature of current agrarian tensions (New Delhi, 1970) spoke of widespread unrest in many of the States of the Union, including some of those where the technological innovations of the 'sixties seemed to have been highly effective. The insurrection in the Naxalbari area of West Bengal early in 1967 was only the most publicized instance, but there were others of a similar kind on the Indian Sub-Continent and in South-East Asia. Though less advertized, they were equally indicative of a state of tension which cannot easily be ignored if open revolt on a large scale is to be avoided.

It would be tempting to believe that agrarian unrest is caused merely by the activities of political extremists. Indeed in the case of Naxalbari, the insurrection was sparked off by the West Bengal Marxist Revenue Minister's support for land distribution among poor tenants and landless labourers. However here, as in other instances of agrarian disturbance, the outward manifestation of unrest ought not to be mistaken for its cause. If urban radicals succeed in penetrating the closely-knit communities of Asian villages and in leading rural dwellers into acts of violence, the underlying grievances can be taken to be gross and of long standing. For a time, the suppression of violence by the forces of law and order may well dispose of the outward signs of discontent, but police action is unlikely to cure the underlying causes of agrarian unrest. If the malaise is to be treated in a prophylactic manner, a more comprehensive knowledge of the rural body politic is required than the practitioners of agricultural development normally have at their command.

It must be admitted that the art of development is still an under-developed subject, though it is being approached nowadays with growing understanding. Even so, the multi-disciplinary assessment, though highly fashionable, is being applied in inverse relation to the vigour and frequency with which it is advocated. Matters continue to be judged primarily from the position of professional isolation. Economists and technologists rarely consult sociologists, anthropologists and political scientists before passing judgement on the most appropriate ways and means. Not infrequently agriculture is treated as an abstraction, and the economic "models", which of necessity can take into account only quantifiable determinants, are at best simplified versions of reality and at worst lack any recognition of conditions as they exist in the Asian countryside.

The times when ruling and non-ruling elites alike saw in Asia's industrial development the panacea for all ills passed a decade or so ago; it therefore need not detain us here. The phase of rapid industrialization was followed by a period during which—to borrow a Maoist term—agriculture became "the foundation" of modern development. The methods used to meet the situation were chiefly adapted from market economies in which a maximum return from the capital used was the prime consideration. Models of this type clearly do not fit many of the Asian situations where of the factors of production only labour is ample and therefore cheap. By comparison, land suitable for farming is scarce and capital for the purchase of technical know-how is even less readily available.

Conditions in rural communities are so disparate that any global assessment must be made with the utmost caution. In particular, it is to be borne in mind that border areas held by hill-tribes, who live by shifting cultivation, and tea and rubber plantations, which were once set up by foreigners as commercial enclaves manned by indented labour, are vital parts of a landscape which is chiefly shaped by subsistence agriculture of a highly conventional type. In fact, a map of the location of rural unrest in Asia would invariably show hilltribes and plantation workers at least on the fringes, if not close to the centres, of agrarian disturbances. However, as these groups form minorities, the main causes of discontent have to be sought in the heartland of subsistence agriculture. This

then is the area which deserves the special attention of those concerned with the orderly processes of modernization.

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THOUGH generalizations must not be taken to imply uniformity, certain characteristics emerge when the villages which engage in the traditional pattern of subsistence agriculture are examined. Invariably the subsistence cultivator grows his crops primarily so as to meet the food requirements of his family. Thus production and consumption decisions are closely interrelated. The cultivator's marginal return from the family's labour on his land counts in terms of satisfaction of family needs, and the volume of family labour available at the peak periods of the season determines his decisions concerning the use of his land and of the money he has saved or can raise. Only in the light of these facts can such questions as the marginal productivity of labour and the price and income elasticities of individual crops and foodstuffs produced, marketed and consumed, be judged. As to the technique applied in subsistence agriculture, it is bound to seem static when seen from the outside, but it has to be acknowledged that it has been found suitable after having been tried for centuries. This is as true of the iron sickle produced for harvesting the paddy crop as of the split bamboo stick used for cutting the umbilical cord of the newly-born buffalo calf.

In subsistence agriculture risk is at a discount, as the whims of Nature have the force of deities. Crop yields can vary from one year to the next between abundance and zero. In this situation the cultivator thinks in terms of seasons. Beyond the season, his time-scale is geared to his obligation to provide for his daughters' dowries and his sons' inheritance of the land. The government's five-year plan is beyond his ken. It is a concept which has no meaning in the village setting except in so far as it threatens the cultivator with a tax increase or promises him financial aid. On the whole, the idea of the State is alien to the village community; and so is the civil servant who, unlike the cultivator, travels by jeep rather than by bus or on foot.

Again unlike the outsider, who is accustomed to asking questions, the cultivator is born into a set of circumstances not to be challenged. Though his station in the rural society is not entirely unalterable, it is circumscribed by rules which may seem irrational to the outsider. Thus economic reality can be found side by side with seemingly irrational behaviour. After all, innovations are known to have their non-economic cost, as when a holy tree has to give way on the access road to a government project. At times, these costs prove too high. Even so, the traditional mode of production has a built-in capacity to allow for change.

Even though village society has its democratic features, on the whole it is marked by hierarchical structures and autocratic rule. As to the women of the rural society, it is the fate of the daughters to leave the cultivator's community and that of the wives to join it. They have geographical mobility, but seldom do they also have social mobility. Even where they are assured equal status in law, they are mostly denied it in education and inheritance. Landed property is normally not for them. In some societies they wield, nonetheless, considerable influence, particularly on the way supplementary income is earned and spent. Children provide not only joy, but also labour at peak periods of the season and insurance cover in old age. When land is promised for redistribution, children are counted as claimants by those who fear to lose and by those who hope to gain. Where rice and cloth are still allocated, as in China, children are welcome as additional holders of ration cards. In short, whatever family planners may think, in prosperity and in distress the large, rather than the small, family tends to be seen as an asset.

The cultivator's ultimate goal lies in satisfying a variety of needs, including such intangibles as social and religious obligations. In so far as he produces a surplus beyond his subsistence needs or a commercial crop grown exclusively for sale, he enters the nexus of the market. To that extent his behaviour is similar to that of the farmer who is motivated by the desire to maximize his profit. However, when offered the opportunity of becoming entirely geared to the market, as in a vegetable experiment at Comilla (Bangladesh), he is likely to insist on retaining some part of his paddy acreage. Thus the market crop remains subsidiary to the subsistence economy. Playing safe in subsistence and taking risks in commercial crop farming can exist side by side.

The built-in capacity for change has allowed

traditional subsistence agriculture to become more and more a market economy. Extended transport and communication systems, conditioned by the rapid growth of population and urban habitation, have been the prime movers in this respect. In the colonial era plantation farming had a certain indirect effect in so far as it induced the international exchange of goods and know-how. Since the end of colonial rule, the drive in favour of import substitution, though often harmful to the country's foreign exchange earnings, helped to create and widen domestic markets. The overland bus and the transistor radio became the chief carriers of material goods and political thoughts. Universal suffrage completed a process of change in largely illiterate societies to which the historical precedent of Western industrial modernization of the 18th and 19th centuries had surprisingly little guidance to offer. New modes of life bred new types of ruling elites who asked for new approaches within a setting which to a large extent had remained traditional. Every attempt to discard the legacies of the past brought a sharp reminder that large sections of society had not yet had an opportunity to participate in the process of modern development.

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IN the rural areas of Asia the traditional patterns of the ownership and use of cultivated land provide the main barriers against change on a broad front. Although a distinction has to be made here between the overpopulated areas of, say, Central Luzon, Java or Bangladesh and the less densely inhabited parts of South-East Asia, well-watered land, suitable for successful farming, is scarce even in areas with a favourable man/land ratio. Whilst in traditional subsistence agriculture the crop pattern is adjusted to the flow of water available, in modern farming the supply of water is dictated by the needs of the crops. Thus—now as in the past—land and water have to be considered together. When Persian landowners denied the beneficiaries of the Shah's agrarian reform access to the *qanats,* the underground channels of irrigation water, and thus slowed down the redistribution of land, they showed a better understanding than those who designed the reforms of the close interdependence of the two main sources of rural wealth and prosperity.

The innovators of the "package programme" which led to the "green revolution" were well aware of the dependence of improved crop yields upon the regulated supply of water, which only a well-designed system of irrigation and drainage can provide. Supplemented by the use of appropriate high-yielding crop varieties and adequate supplies of chemical fertilizers and insecticides, the package of technological innovations proved highly successful. In spite of certain setbacks, in selected areas of sufficiently irrigated farm land crop yields increased substantially. The programme disappointed, however, in that it was designed to replace, rather than accompany, overdue institutional changes. As it was specifically directed at the potential innovators in the rural areas, it favoured those with access to land, labour and capital to the detriment of those lacking one or the other, if not all, of these essential resources—and that meant the majority of small-scale cultivators, tenants and labourers.

The "package programme" has been praised for its preference for biological and chemical inputs, which are known to be neutral to economies of scale and thus open to small and large cultivators alike. In fact, though, the programme proved to be biased in favour of the large owner-cultivator specializing in commercial production for the market, whilst leaving out of account the small cultivator who, particularly when operating as a tenant, was bound to find the financial outlay for the package of technological innovations too costly in relation to the likely return from his expenditure. Moreover, instead of creating additional employment in, say, multiple cropping, the programme in fact often laid the foundations for the use of labour-saving devices. To give only one example, a four-wheel tractor used in conjunction with a combine harvester is capable of displacing at least 20 men for two months without creating any alternative opportunities of employment. Whilst the farmer cultivating an area large enough to accommodate equipment of this kind can draw substantial benefits from this form of modernization, the small cultivator and farm labourer are easily deprived of their livelihood by this type of operation. As a rule, the price and support policies which accompany the "package programme" also tend to add to the wealth of the rural bourgeoisie whilst at the same time hurting the poor in town and country. In the outcome, the "package programme", far from changing outmoded institutional structures of land tenure, has strengthened them by widening existing disparities in

wealth, status and power. Recent efforts to give technical aid to small subsistence cultivators are unlikely to achieve more than the creation of yet another enclave of favoured village minorities.

On the evidence available, the view, widely held a decade or so ago, that technical and economic innovations can act as substitutes for social and political changes can no longer be upheld. Neither can rural communities be treated any longer as if they were homogeneous entities. In fact, the ownership of land forms the great divide. For all practical purposes, land ownership is synonymous with the control not only of land, but also of men and money, the prerequisites of economic prosperity, social prestige and political power. Thus the ownership of land gives the proprietor and his family a degree of security and continuity which, in Asian conditions, is beyond the reach of those who pay rent or earn wages. The statistical records are usually imprecise, if not silent, about the numbers involved, but in almost every country in Asia tenants and farm labourers form the majority of the population on the land. They would thus seem to be entitled to more than a passing reference in any examination of the rural scene. The statistical records are even less forthcoming when dealing with questions of ownership. Here the definitions used and the data obtained are cloudy, if not downright misleading. At times tenants are listed as owners and labourers as tenants. The number and size of farm units operated are usually recorded in some detail, but these data do not tell anything relevant about the structure of landed property. Yet, without this information no effective reform of land tenure conditions is feasible. Even if it cannot be documented statistically, as a rule a high degree of dispersal of operating units goes together with a great deal of concentration of ownership.

Whilst it was not the intention of the innovators of the "green revolution" to intensify the polarization which had been a prominent feature in the villages of Asia for a long time past, this is precisely what happened. As the prospects of cereal production improved, a good many owners availed themselves of their right to resume their land for personal cultivation. As a result, considerable numbers of tenants have been turned into labourers without any security of employment and without any access to land. In the outcome, the markets of land, labour and capital, which are never perfect in Asian conditions, have become even more distorted than they were in the past. These developments could hardly have been foreseen by those who accepted the new technological approach as a matter of policy. On the contrary, it is the publicly stated intention of almost every government in Asia to simultaneously raise the level of production and to broaden the spread of public welfare. In predominantly agrarian communities this explicitly includes programmes designed to improve crop yields and to bring agrarian conditions into line with egalitarian requirements.

In fact, however, policies directed at a less uneven distribution of wealth and income than is common in Asia tend to be treated as residual, rather than indispensable, elements of any development programme. When economies in government spending become necessary, redistributive action is invariably shelved. It is sometimes argued that wealth and welfare are conflicting policy concepts and that equitable distribution has to await increased production. This view, seemingly supported by 19th century experience in the West, does not necessarily hold good in present-day conditions of Asian communities. Here economies of scale tend to be of little relevance, owners to fare better than tenants, small-scale cultivators to have higher yields than large farmers and high population densities to favour labour-intensive farming techniques.

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SINCE the end of colonial rule, almost every country in Asia has introduced agrarian reforms of some kind. With a few exceptions, however, the implementation has been disappointing. On the Indian Sub-Continent, the land tenure system introduced under British rule was abolished without any resistance, but the government revenue collector, who took over from the *zamindar,* failed to replace him as financial, social and commercial intermediary. Subsequent reforms introduced in South and South-East Asia aimed primarily at creating some degree of security of tenure by reducing rents and by introducing leasehold contracts. In some instances, a transfer of land above a fixed ceiling was also intended. It was to go to those whom Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Republic of China, called the "tillers of the land" and Mao Tse-tung, the creator of the People's Republic of China, called the "village poor".

An apparently identical aim was to be reached by diametrically opposed means. In China, the evolutionary approach lost out to the revolutionary. Outside China, all-embracing agrarian reforms were only carried out in Japan and Taiwan, where indigenous landowners were induced by outside forces without a personal stake in the land, i.e. by the US army of occupation and the *Kuomintang* respectively, to surrender some of their land and thus some of the power derived from landed property. On the Mainland of China, the distributive type of reform was carried out so as to secure the cultivators' support for the cause of the revolution. It was followed by a policy, the wisdom of which may be questioned, of re-amalgamating the distributed land in collectives and communes. The setbacks which these institutions suffered during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution do not recommend them for imitation elsewhere.

Pakistan, which was a member of SEATO until November 1973, is among those countries which recently amended their land reform legislation. Under Martial Law Regulation No. 115, decreed by President (now Prime Minister) Ali Bhutto in May 1972, any individual who in December 1971 owned more than 150 acres (60 hectares) of irrigated or 300 acres (120 hectares) of unirrigated land, became liable to expropriation of the area in excess of the ceiling. This legislation replaced Martial Law Regulation No. 64, introduced by President Ayub Khan in February 1959, which set ceilings of 500 and 1,000 acres for irrigated and unirrigated land respectively. Under the original law, some 1.5 million acres of land were distributed among approximately 200,000 tenants and small cultivators. Under the new law a similar amount of cultivated land may become available, but as the ceiling is imposed on individuals rather than families, many properties registered under the previous law as joint (family) enterprises are likely to escape expropriation. Clashes between landowners and cultivators in the area around Hyderabad (Sind) over evictions suggest that the conditions imposed under Ali Bhutto's martial law, like those operating under Ayub Khan's system of "basic democracy", are far from congenial to the implementation of a reform designed to spread land ownership and political influence.

Of the two present Asian members of SEATO, the Philippines, where the disparities in wealth and income are particularly glaring, has a long history of agrarian reforms. As in Pakistan, the reform programme culminated recently in a new decree, issued by President Marcos in September 1972, a few days after he had declared martial law throughout the islands. This decree is designed to turn all tenants into leaseholders in accordance with the provisions of the legislation issued in 1971. Previously the Land Reform Act of 1955 and the Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963 were promulgated with the intention of clarifying the legal position of landowners and tenants, making some land available to tenants and turning tenants first into lease-holders and eventually into owner-occupiers. However, so far the effects of this impressive volume of legislation have been marginal. Loopholes, such as the exclusion of land under commercial crops, led to protracted litigation, evasions on the part of landowners and eviction of tenants. The Land Reform Authority, operating under the President, admitted that the majority of *barrios* had not been affected by the reform. In the years following the promulgation of the Code, only about 5 per cent of the 1.5 million tenants had become leaseholders. Thus the Code remained largely a statement of intent. Meanwhile the Huks and other rebellious groups, though decimated by police action, continued to find new recruits among alienated sections of tenants and labourers in and around Pampanga in Central Luzon. The new legislation extends over the whole country, and it is intended to bring about one-third of the agricultural area within reach of the Reform Code. However, in view of the power exercised by the landowning classes and the tenants' lack of a power base, the success of this latest attempt at reforming the agrarian structure of the Philippines remains in doubt.

Finally, in Thailand the position is fluid at present. The Rent Control Act, which has been in force in the paddy areas for more than two decades, has been largely ignored by both landowners and tenants. As the demand for land was not as pressing in Thailand as in, say, Central Luzon, the Government paid little attention to agrarian questions. However, the pressure on paddy land led to an increase of tenancy in the Central Plain, which in the past had been regarded as owner-occupied territory *par excellence*. According to recent Press reports (*Bangkok World* and *Voice of the Nation* of 13 May 1974), plans are afoot to introduce a ceiling

of 50 rai (8 hectares or 20 acres) and a redistribution of land in excess of this ceiling. There is no indication, however, that at this juncture—whilst a new constitution is being prepared—the Government of Prime Minister Sanya Dharmasakti and the National Legislative Assembly will give their attention to the question of agrarian reform. In the meantime, the activities of insurgents in the North, North-East and South of the country and the tensions known to exist in some parts of the Central Plain would suggest the need for creating, as a matter of priority, secure tenancy conditions, even if a programme of land distribution is not practical at this point in time.

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THE ultimate purpose of any genuine agrarian reform lies in the transfer of land titles—and of the advantages which go with the ownership of land—from a small privileged minority to a broad section of society. Thus a conflict of divergent interests has to be faced. Where land reform succeeds, as in, say, post-war Japan, it opens the way towards the dispersal of wealth and authority and therefore widens the scope for economic opportunities and the application of technical innovations. It creates thereby the preconditions for greater social equality than is customary in Asian rural communities. Changes of this kind also make possible truly representative civilian government in place of traditional patron-client relationships in the villages and rule by self-appointed elites at national levels. Agrarian reform is thus an all-embracing concept, which is bound to have far-reaching consequences, and it has therefore to be approached with both caution and determination. Neither of these virtues has been prevalent in recent attempts at land reform.

In the densely populated areas of South and South-East Asia, more than two-fifths of the cultivated land is under one or other of a baffling variety of tenure arrangements and well over two-fifths of the cultivators have less than 1 hectare (2.5 acres) at their disposal. These are orders of magnitude which no politician can afford to ignore. Thus agrarian reform features prominently in the political programmes of almost all ruling as well as non-ruling elites. However, since landowners are invariably associated with the organs of government at national and regional level, vested interests tend to succeed in diverting, distorting and defeating government measures designed to reform existing patterns of ownership and tenure. If the owners of land and the holders of power co-operate in this way to direct scarce national resources away from their less fortunate fellow countrymen, they can expect to be attacked by their opponents, the most extreme of whom will aim at the revolutionary overthrow of the established order.

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THE foremost requirement of any orderly change to patterns of land tenure consistent with the structure of modern society is the creation of power bases for those who are underprivileged and unrepresented. Where the sharing of power is unacceptable to the ruling elites, any attempt at effective agrarian reform is bound to fail. Government servants, whose motives are always suspect in village communities, are unsuited to represent the interests of small cultivators, tenants and labourers. Governments genuinely set on implementing promised reforms can, nevertheless, further the creation of smallholder-tenant associations and farm workers' unions as the legitimate spokesmen for interests which are not represented in any other way.

Where land reform is put into effect, it should benefit, as a matter of policy, a large enough number of applicants to make the operation politically defensible, whilst it should aim at the same time at not hurting more landowners than is absolutely inevitable. In this way the area of friction can be narrowed.

Priority ought to be given to security of tenure, and no tenants should be allowed to be evicted while the reform is in progress. Tenants should be given the option of acquiring the land previously rented by paying, in annual instalments over a period of not more than ten years, a price fixed by government which is preferably lower and definitely not higher than the rent previously paid.

Owners ought to be compensated for any loss of land in bonds issued by government for expansions in the industrial sector. In this way expropriated landowners can be turned from an aggrieved opposition into prime movers of industrial and commercial enterprise. Where the question of ceilings of ownership, i.e. the maximum size of farms, features in a reform programme, ceilings should be fixed for families rather than

for individuals so as to inhibit the creation of joint family farms which otherwise escape the grip of the legislator.

On completion of agrarian reform the possibility of a temporary decline in production cannot be ruled out, but this need not happen. As on small farms the yield per unit of land is high and labour is ample, the prospects for increased production are fairly good, provided the financial and commercial functions of former landowners are taken care of by banks and by merchants not involved in any transfer of land. On the other hand, the market supply of foodgrains may well decline to the extent to which a previously distorted pattern of distribution between town and country is corrected. However, if the cultivator eats better, he is likely to perform better. In any event, it ought to be possible to correct a decline in market supplies by a change in investment from a cash-intensive to a labour-intensive pattern.

Changes in revenue policy are also highly desirable. If the tenant's rent, which, as a fixed proportion of the gross return, acts as a disincentive, is replaced by a tax based on the acreage, a favourable response from the cultivator can be expected: his crop and its marketable portion are likely to increase. If, moreover, the tax is spent in part on such infrastructure projects as feeder roads and a network of irrigation and drainage canals, this is likely to have a salutary effect on the use of labour and thus on earnings during off-peak periods of the season.

Other possibilities of increased production lie in double cropping, but as this entails the loss of grazing grounds following the first crop, the question arises of replacing draught animals by the "iron buffalo", a small tractor used in Taiwan and Thailand. In Japan, silk worm and fish farming helped to intensify and diversify agriculture. Similar opportunities exist in South-East Asia where vegetable production, in conjunction with pig and poultry breeding, can increase the productivity of the land and at the same time improve a still rather monotonous diet.

Thus a properly conducted agrarian reform can well achieve the dual aim of increasing production and improving distribution and thereby provide vital elements for a cure of agrarian unrest in Asia.

Appendix

TABLE 1: REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS AND INSURGENTS, 1973

Country	STATUS AND NAME OF ORGANIZATION	STATE OF LEGALITY	MEMBERSHIP	LEADERSHIP	AREA OF UNREST
Thailand					
	Communist Party—CPT	Illegal	1,000	Prasert Eiewchei	North
	Thailand Patriotic Front	"	500	Phayom Chulanonda	North-East
	Thai People's Liberation Army	"	5,000	-	Malay border
	Farmers' Liberation Association	"	-	-	
Philippines					
	Communist Party -PKP (M-L)	"	1,000	Jose M. Sison	Central Luzon
	Hukbalhap (Huks) - HMB	"	-	Cmdr. Sumulong	Central Luzon
	New People's Army	"	-	Cmdr. "Dante"	Northern Luzon

TABLE 2: DISPARITIES IN RURAL COMMUNITIES IN THAILAND, 1960

	SIZE OF HOLDINGS AND CROP HECTARAGE - PER CENT OF TOTAL		YIELD IN TONS PER HECTARE		
	Farms under 2.4 ha.	*Farms over 22.4 ha.*		*Farms under 2.4 ha.*	*Farms over 22.4 ha.*
Groundnuts	48.1	1.7	Rice	2.0	1.2
Cotton	34.7	1.8	Sugar Cane	26.2	23.9
Kenaf	21.5	2.1	Groundnuts	0.8	0.7
Cattle	31.8	0.9	Cotton	0.4	0.5
Pigs	42.8	0.8	Kenaf	0.8	0.7

TABLE 3: DISPARITIES IN INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE PHILIPPINES, 1965

	FAMILY INCOMES *(per cent of all families)*		FAMILY INCOMES *(per cent of all incomes)*		
	Under 500 pesos	*Over 10,000 pesos*		*Under 500 pesos*	*Over 10,000 pesos*
Manila	0.8	14.3	Manila	0.1	50.9
Other Cities	6.5	5.1	Other cities	0.5	26.2
Urban Areas	4.5	7.9	Urban Areas	0.3	37.3
Rural Areas	14.5	0.4	Rural Areas	2.6	3.4
TOTAL	11.6	2.6	TOTAL	1.4	20.8

TABLE 4: LAND OWNERSHIP AND TENURE, 1960

THAILAND				PHILIPPINES			
Farm Type	*Holdings (per cent of total)*	*Area (per cent of total)*	*Average Size (ha)*	*Farm Type*	*Holdings (per cent of total)*	*Area (per cent of total)*	*Average Size (ha)*
Ownership	81.9	85.1	3.6	Ownership	44.7	53.2	4.3
Tenancy	4.1	3.8	3.2	Tenancy	39.9	25.7	2.3
Others*	14.0	11.1	2.8	Others*	15.4	21.1	4.9
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	3.5	TOTAL	100.0	100.0	3.6

* part owners/part tenants and other forms of tenancy.

TABLE 5: FARM SIZES (OPERATIONAL UNITS), 1960

THAILAND *				PHILIPPINES			
Farm Sizes	*Holdings (per cent of total)*	*Area (per cent of total)*	*Average Size (ha.)*	*Farm Sizes*	*Holdings (per cent of total)*	*Area (per cent of total)*	*Average Size (ha.)*
Under 2 ha.	47.9	15.5	1.0	Under 2 ha.	41.2	11.8	1.0
2-4 ha.	27.5	26.6	3.3	2-4 ha.	32.8	23.2	2.5
4-10 ha.	19.2	35.6	6.5	4-10 ha.	20.4	31.8	5.6
10-20 ha.	5.1	18.6	12.7	10-20 ha.	4.6	15.3	11.9
Over 20 ha.	0.3	3.7	37.7	Over 20 ha.	1.0	17.9	66.2
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	3.5	TOTAL	100.0	100.0	3.6

* size groups: under 2.4 ha.; 2.4-4.8 ha.; 4.8-9.6 ha; 9.6-22.4 ha.; over 22.4 ha.

TABLE 6: AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, 1971-1973 (1961-65 = 100)

Production	THAILAND			PHILIPPINES		
	1971	1972	1973	1971	1972	1973
Total Production	139	126	148	127	130	138
Production per capita	107	94	107	97	96	99

THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT: *Progressive US military withdrawal from South-East Asia will intensify the already severe "Cold War" competition in the area between China and the USSR. For the countries of the region, national and regional security questions will become accordingly more complex. The US has an obligation – and a new capability – to work to reduce the consequent tensions in the region.*

Soviet and Chinese Policies Toward South-East Asia in the Early '70s

Marie-Luise Näth

TWO major repercussions for political power-relations in South-East Asia flowed from the Vietnam cease-fire on 27 January 1973 and the ensuing withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam and Cambodia.

Firstly, most South-East Asian governments were increasingly bewildered about their countries' political future. Consequently, their diplomatic and political reactions to the new challenges arising from the changed situation have so far been somewhat inconsistent and incoherent. It has been clear that these governments need longer than a year in which to readjust to the changes which have occurred—and are constantly occurring—in the region.

Secondly, the two other major Powers in the area, the USSR and the People's Republic of China (PRC), are trying to step up their involvement, but to highly differing degrees, and so far with no striking success.

Yet, while these repercussions are clearly recognizeable, the impact of the Vietnam cease-fire upon the strategies of the two rival Communist Powers has been less comprehensive than most observers would have expected. The crucial date for the formulation of strategies and policies which the Soviet Union and China are attempting to enact in the region of South-East Asia, was not January 1973, but rather the winter of 1968-69. At that time, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the border clashes between regular forces of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China and the Soviet Red Army put China's foreign political priorities to a test—which they did not pass. Ever since that crossroad the Peking leadership, perceiving as real military and political threats from the Soviet Union, has put national security in command over world revolution in its dealings with the outside world and in particular with countries in the areas surrounding China. The Soviet leadership, on the other hand, has been convinced by the reconsolidation of the Chinese domestic scene after the trials and tribulations of the Cultural Revolution that chances of a sudden return of China to the folds of the Soviet bloc are no longer imminent.

The USSR began to perceive its inter-State conflict with China as a protracted one. It became, therefore, increasingly aware that it would have to seek allies in the area close to the new enemy.

More than one year after the Paris armistice agreement, and more than five years after the Cultural Revolution and the Sino-Soviet border brawl, it appears justified to attempt a preliminary evaluation of:

- the strategies and policies which the Soviet Union has developed to increase its presence on China's southern flank;
- the Chinese perceptions of these Soviet moves;

- possible counter-strategies, which China may have developed as a remedy for the new dangers its leaders see arising in South-East Asia;

- the reactions of the South-East Asian governments to the application of these strategies and counter-strategies.

- (tentatively) future perspectives on the roles of the two super-Powers and China in the area.

* * * * * * * *

AS the pacification of Cultural Revolutionary turmoil in China greatly diminished the chances for Soviet *subversion* within the realm of Moscow's main enemy, the Soviet leadership realized that it had to turn to a strategy of containment. Alliance with China's neighbours had to substitute for infiltration of China's realm (just as alliance substituted for infiltration in Europe after the failure of the Berlin blockade).

Although no documentary evidence is available on the underlying strategic principles employed by the Soviet Union in this move, numerous indications tend to support the assumption that the Soviet Communist Party leader Brezhnev and his colleagues intended to build their containment network around a Moscow—Delhi—Tokyo axis. This would not need to be a fully fledged military alliance; an *entente cordiale* comprehending regular consultations, mutual use of base facilities, and exchange of intelligence would suffice. Such an *entente* would then extend guarantees and political influence to the comparatively smaller countries in the regions of South and South-East Asia. For arrangements of that sort, Soviet statesmen and diplomats almost two decades ago had devised the idea of "collective security systems". Like most Soviet political moves in all areas bordering the Soviet realm, this one, too, was first designed for the European scene. Whatever Soviet failures in world politics can be registered during the last decade may have been the result of this Eurocentric strategic thinking.

A Soviet-style collective security system is based upon four elements:

1. The recognition of the doctrine of peaceful co-existence, which allows Soviet ideological subversion in open societies, while precluding even the wafting of breezes of change into the closed society ruled by the Kremlin leaders;

2. The exchange of statements of renunciation of force and military threats. Such statements have of course to be governmental. They do not cover clandestine support for indigenous parties and movements nor do they allow any attempts to change the bureaucratic and repressive nature of Soviet-style political systems by means of free exchange of ideas and persons, which in Soviet perception constitutes an application of force.

3. The agreement that within the "collective security system" all other partners would turn against one partner—or, for that matter, against any Power outside the system—which should attack one of the members. This, of course, would—as for the system as a whole—only apply as long as the preconditions for "peaceful co-existence" exist. There is no "peaceful co-existence" between Socialist countries. Here, the doctrine of "Socialist Internationalism" and its logical consequence, the 1968 Brezhnev Doctrine of the "limited sovereignty of Socialist countries" have to be applied.

4. The gradual development of a large area of economic co-operation, through which the Soviet Union buys raw materials in its own unconvertible currency, thus forcing its partners to buy more and more industrial goods for roubles. And that means at prices averaging 15-25 per cent above world market levels.

Given these four basic elements of the Soviet concept of a collective security system, it is not at all surprising that the Soviet Union has continuously called for the inclusion of China in the proposed system in Asia[1]. If China would agree to join, this would, firstly, mean an unnegotiated Chinese recognition of the current Sino-Soviet borders. It would, secondly, mean that China thereafter could only admit that it is no longer a "Socialist country" by claiming the principles of peaceful co-existence in its relations with Russia[2] or offer itself as prey for a Prague-type intervention by insisting on its status as a "Socialist country". If, on the other hand, the PRC refuses to join a Soviet-designed "collective security system"[3] it would give the impression of leaving the fold of peaceful nations and would seem

to validate all Soviet warnings about it. In this more likely case, the system in Asia could be used as an effective force for the containment of China.

With a strategy designed in this manner, the Soviet Union, beginning in the summer of 1969, has promoted its concept in three stages. During the first, Moscow applied a policy of increasing involvement in South Asia and in the Far East, combined with a friendly yet mostly non-committal attitude towards South-East Asia.

At the end of May 1969[4] and again on the occasion of an international Communist Party meeting early in the following month[5] the Soviet leadership began to introduce the collective security concept into discussions on international peace arrangements for Asia. The new initiative seemed to be backed by a fresh experience of Chinese aggression-the first Ussuri incident of 2 March 1969.

While China had apparently revitalized its border dispute with the USSR, and therefore most likely would revitalize its territorial dispute with India too, Moscow's role in the Indian Sub-Continent seemed to be fully devoted to safeguarding peace and the balance of interests between India and Pakistan. No preference was given to either side. On the contrary, although Moscow's preference for India had been clear in the late fifties until Soviet peace mediation on the Sub-Continent in the winter of 1965-66 (and was re-established during the Bangladesh crisis of 1971-72) in the late 'sixties, Pakistan was apparently treated on an equal footing with India. This allowed the completion of a major Soviet road-building project across Afghanistan, linking the USSR with the Indian Ocean via Pakistan[6]. The Delhi Government, which felt concerned that the new highway might facilitate Soviet military support for Pakistan, had already granted Moscow naval facilities on the Andaman and Nicobar islands.

Sri Lanka (Ceylon) was next approached—unsuccessfully—to grant similar privileges to Russia.

While establishing and enlarging its military presence in the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Union simultaneously attempted to strengthen diplomatic links with Japan. First detailed information on the collective security system was released by a Soviet visitor to Tokyo in November 1969[7]. Georgij Sadoroshnyi, member of the Academy of Sciences and Professor at the Institute for International Relations in Moscow, presented a plan, according to which an international organization similar to the United Nations was to be established. It would operate through a Security Council consisting of permanent and non-permanent members and including the United States, Australia and New Zealand. According to Professor Sadoroshnyi, this organization had to be a universal one and, hence, to accept as members not only the PRC but also the Republic of China (Taiwan). This suggestion, in particular, was intended to keep China away from the organization. Tokyo, on the other hand, was explicitly mentioned as a permanent member of the projected Security Council, from which it may be concluded that the Soviet leadership hoped to exploit Japanese misgivings about the country's exclusion from permanent representation in the UN Security Council.

These proposals never again reappeared. They were a trial balloon which quickly fell flat in Japan. The Japanese Government was suspicious that Soviet collective security would not only imply the renunciation of Japan's claim to the four Soviet-occupied Kurile islands but also seriously hamper Tokyo's *rapprochement* with China.

Only Mongolia, the closest Soviet ally among the Socialist countries directly concerned, fully supported the idea of a collective security system for Asia. Neither North Korea nor North Vietnam were willing to applaud[8].

On 9 August 1971 this stage of testing the concept and simultaneously intensifying Soviet political and military activities in Asia was completed with the conclusion of the Sino-Indian Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation.

Only a couple of weeks later, the Soviet Union revised its formerly neutral position between the two rival Powers on the Indian Sub-Continent. In retrospect, a new stage in the promotion of the collective security system for Asia can be seen to have come into being.

Now, the South-East Asian countries had to be convinced that neither the PRC nor the United States were really able to guarantee peace in

Asia and to safeguard their allies from dismemberment. Using Pakistani atrocities in East Bengal as a welcome pretext, the Soviet leadership encouraged India to wage war for the independence of Bangladesh. This tactic proved highly successful. Not only was Pakistan "cut to size"[9] and the United States and China at least temporarily reduced to a spectator-role in a major political development in South Asia, but the Soviet Union won a new State which would be sympathetic towards the more far-reaching Soviet designs for security in Asia[10].

The third stage was earmarked for the promotion of the collective security system proper among Asian nations. In March 1972, Brezhnev enumerated five essentials of his security concept[11].

- renunciation of the use of force among all Asian countries;
- respect for sovereignty;
- inviolability of frontiers;
- non-intervention in internal affairs;
- extensive development of economic co-operation on the basis of equality.

The Soviet leaders began to collect statements supporting these essentials wherever they could acquire them. Such statements, differing in wording but reconfirming the essence of the Soviet concept, have been included in the communiques between the USSR and Afghanistan of March 1972, and between the USSR and Iran of October 1972. They have furthermore been included in the mutual declarations of the USSR and Bangladesh of March 1972 and of the USSR and Turkey of June 1972.

In South-East Asia, too, Soviet diplomats began to promote Brezhnev's collective security system. But this is still a somewhat remote goal of their endeavours. While sounding out the South-East Asian governments about their concepts for regional security, they are at the same time quietly laying the groundwork for a stronger Soviet position by a number of different devices. Among these, Soviet polemics against Chinese subversion in the region play an important role. None of the South-East Asian governments so far have been absolutely convinced by Prime Minister Chou En-Lai's personal assurances that all support for Communist terrorists in the area has been stopped.

Significant Soviet moves towards the non-Communist countries of South-East Asia began in March 1972, when Mrs. Imelda Marcos visited Russia on the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Ministry of Culture. The Philippines' First Lady reported that Prime Minister Kosygin had promised "any and all forms of assistance" to her country, and that she had received assurance of Soviet aid and co-operation, in the event that Moscow and Manila decided to set up diplomatic relations[12]. Tun Abdul Razak, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, visited Moscow in October 1972. On this occasion a programme of cultural and scientific exchanges (for sports and artistic groups and delegations of journalists, writers, teachers and students) was agreed upon[13]. News reports from Djakarta in December 1972 stated that the Soviet Union had indicated at least a partial change in its attitude towards the Malacca Straits question[14]. According to these reports, the Soviet Ambassador to Indonesia pointed out that the Soviet Union recognizes the 12-mile territorial waters limit claimed by Indonesia and Malaysia. Although Moscow did not officially support the claim of the two countries to regulate shipping in the Straits, Soviet-Indonesian relations began to improve during Summer 1973, after the visit of an Indonesian parliamentary delegation to Moscow. The Soviet Union was reported to be interested in restoring and promoting relations with Indonesia. Neither the issue of political detainees, that of the ban on the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), nor that of Djakarta's relations with China had been raised during the delegation's political talks in Moscow. The Deputy Speaker of the delegation, Mr. Domo Pranoto, pointed out that this was a new attitude, which could be related to the Soviet collective security concept[15]

Indeed, if each of these activities and offers is viewed in isolation, it seems to indicate nothing more than an increasing de-ideologization, international political responsibility, and altruism on the part of the Soviet Union. But all these moves have to be viewed against the background of Moscow's policy of containment towards China. For the Peking leadership at

least, the validity of this perspective seems to be beyond doubt.

* * * * * * *

CHINESE perceptions of the Soviet policy of containment towards their country throughout its three stages are manifest in the epithets they employ to describe Soviet attitudes. During the first stage the Chinese leadership was mainly influenced by the "Czechoslovak-shock" and by the possibility of an imminent Soviet military attack under the impact of a remarkable Soviet military build-up along the disputed border-lines to the north-east and north-west of China.

Consequently, the thrust of Chinese propaganda shifted from domestic themes to international politics. While the Soviet leadership until then had been called "the Soviet revisionist renegate clique", it now became "social-imperialist"[16] aiming, the Chinese claimed, no longer at the restoration of capitalism in Socialist countries by means of subversion and infiltration but rather at the establishment of Soviet hegemony over all "Socialist countries".

When, in the second stage, China was forced to watch helplessly the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan through Moscow-supported intervention, China created a new propaganda stereotype. Chinese leaders and diplomats started to talk about the fight against "one or two super-Powers" [17]. indicating that China had abandoned the policy of simultaneous conflict with both the United States and the USSR. Instead China claimed to be concentrating on the fight against one of them—the currently more powerful and more dangerous to be sure.

A number of editorials in *People's Daily, Red Flag and Liberation Army Daily* during 1972 and the first half of 1973 made it clear that for China the Soviet Union had become this more powerful and more dangerous Power. This perception was most probably not undisputed among the Chinese leadership. But Prime Minister Chou nevertheless confirmed it at the Tenth Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress with the remark that China had to be on guard against aggression by imperialism, and, in particular, against a surprise attack by "Soviet revisionist social-imperialism"[18]. It was evident that at least those people among the Chinese leadership who manage foreign policy considered the Soviet Union to be China's main enemy.

Chou En-lai and his group today no longer expect an imminent Soviet military attack. If one studies their perception of Soviet policy, one has to distinguish between the arguments which are used to legitimize their policy and the analyses on which this policy is based. As far as the latter are concerned, three major considerations can be detected from Chinese pronouncements:

- The danger of an imminent Soviet attack appears minimized by the USSR's continuing preoccupation with European affairs. Although the Chinese leadership time and again declares that the Soviet policy of working for a relaxation of tensions in Europe serves the purpose of relief on the Western front to enable Russia to attack China, it warns at the same time, that Moscow's real aim is Soviet supremacy in Europe[19]. This is less of a contradiction than it appears, because Soviet policy is regarded by China as the policy of the "new Tzars"[20] following the guiding principles of traditional Russian expansionism. According to these principles the immediate Soviet goal is supremacy in Europe.

- The intermediate goal appears to China to be expansion towards the south, i.e. towards Central and South Asia. Only the final goal, then, would be expansion towards the Far East and supremacy over China. It is not only the Soviet leadership that has repeatedly indicated an interrelation between collective security in Europe and in Asia; China also recognizes the interdependence between the future of Europe and its own national security.

- National security appears particularly endangered if a foreign Power gains control over South and South-East Asia as Britain did during the 19th century, or (partially) the United States during the 'fifties and 'sixties or now possibly the Soviet Union[21]

> In the Chinese view, China's very existence is threatened if a foreign Power controls the Southern rather than the Northeastern areas of the Asian continent. The danger appears all the more threatening if this foreign Power begins to dominate the sea from West Asia to Vladivostok, and thus achieves ample leverage without having to fight wars of attrition against China's neighbours or against China itself.

The Chinese leadership seems to think, according to the logic of these three considerations, that the Soviet Union is fast approaching its intermediate goal. That is why the Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ch'iao Kuan-hua, in a speech to the UN General Assembly in October last year, compared the Soviet proposals for a collective security system in Asia with John Forster Dulles' policy of containment [22].

Chinese foreign policy thinking now perceives Soviet strategy as a threat to China's national existence in the long run rather than as a short-term menace. Furthermore, this threat is perceived in terms of an encirclement, which once completed would force China inevitably into surrender. For it would create a situation in which Peking could only agree to negotiations or apply military force. Either way would lead to subordination under Soviet hegemony. Encirclement, therefore, appears as the most alarming danger to China's national existence [23] and it is understandable that Peking has devised *global strategies* rather than *regional* policies to counter it.

* * * * * * * *

THE relaxation of tensions with the United States, Western Europe and Japan, and unconditional accession to the United Nations are all attempts to counteract Soviet measures.

In contrast to the almost total reversal of former strategies and tactics in the area of world politics, China's policy towards its southern neighbours in South and South-East Asia appears rather vague and devoid of conceptual basis. Here, the Chinese leadership has mainly relied upon the effects of its *detente* with the United States. China tries to avoid the impression of competing with the Soviet Union as a substitute for the American shield. When the members of ASEAN indicated their readiness for a dialogue with China immediately after it joined the United Nations, Peking reacted with friendly caution. But it gave priority to the establishment of contacts with countries outside the region.

From the Chinese point of view this appears reasonable. While other countries are extremely interested in trade with China, and therefore willing to grant concessions in particular concerning the status of Taiwan, the South-East Asian countries are asking for Chinese concessions, because they have sensed their favourable position in a period of growing Sino-Soviet rivalry. Indeed, the new post-early-1969 stage in the Sino-Soviet conflict and American readiness to avoid an immediate and sudden withdrawal from the region, have greatly enhanced the diplomatic leverage of the countries of South-East Asia.

As in its dealings with the United States, China has employed athletic and informal diplomatic contacts in its approaches to South-East Asian governments. Before diplomatic relations were established between the PRC and Malaysia on 31 May 1974, a Chinese political presence in South-East Asia had come about only as a consequence of membership in the United Nations, particularly the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE). The first *diplomatic* contacts between China and the non-Communist countries of South-East Asia were thus initially pursued in the context of the PRC's entry to the United Nations. As early as November and December 1971 government spokesmen of Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines stated their governments' willingness of begin a dialogue with China [24]. Peking's requests to the Overseas Chinese that they accept the citizenship of their host countries, that they no longer regard China as their mother country and that they be loyal to their respective governments have helped to alleviate some of the old fears rampant in South-East Asia [25].

In the spring of 1972, China took the opportunity, as prospective host for the First Asian Table Tennis Championship to issue a first-ever invitation to a Thai team to visit Peking. (A 20-member team, with the then Commerce Minister Prasit Kanchanawat as "adviser", duly went to Peking during August and September). A similar invitation was extended to Indonesia

but was not accepted. Earlier, in February 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines sent his brother-in-law, Benjamin Romualdez, as a secret envoy to China[26]. But when, one month later, the President's wife wanted to travel to China, strictly in a private capacity, Peking refused on the official grounds of the existence of diplomatic relations between Manila and Taipei[27]. In May 1971 a delegation from the Malaysian Chamber of Commerce had been received in Peking[28] and there are indications that first contacts were established during the second half of 1972 between China and Indonesia.

Malaysia has become the first non-Communist country of South-East Asia to establish full diplomatic relations with China. The opening of Sino-Malaysian talks on the question of diplomatic relations had been publicized in June 1973. After 11 months of negotiations a Malaysian Foreign Ministry statement of 20 May 1974 announced that agreement in principle had been reached and that Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak would pay a visit to Peking from 28 May to 2 June so as to formalize the establishment of diplomatic relations[29].

During the long period of Sino-Malaysian talks officials from other South-East Asian countries had visited the PRC, in their capacities as sports and international trade officials[30]. But, in all cases, besides agreements on trade no further progress in the normalization of relations was achieved.

According to all the comments from ASEAN member countries, even Malaysia's action does not seem to have accelerated the speed at which Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore are moving towards formal relations with Peking. Although their comments have been sympathetic, none of these countries indicated that it would immediately follow Malaysia's example. It seems that three problems still impede full normalization.

(1) All South-East Asian countries consider a Chinese renunciation of political subversion and infiltration as a *sine qua non* for normalization[31]. All the envoys to Peking returned with the message that China was willing to do so, or that it had already ceased to support Communist terrorist movements [32]. Whenever such Chinese statements were reported there was no Chinese *dementi* but they were also not confirmed by Peking. Hence, these were mostly personal statements of Chou En-lai which need not necessarily bind the Chinese leadership as a whole.

The Sino-Malaysian communique of 31 May, which contains the formula that "all foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion" are considered "impermissible", appears hardly sufficient to overcome all misgivings within the South-East Asian region.

The credibility of China's foreign policy has never been a question of mutual understanding of the guiding principles of State-to-State relations, but rather a question of mutual understanding of the limits and the content of foreign policy itself. For the simple reason that proletarian internationalism and revolutionary solidarity with the "fighting people in all countries of the world" do not lend themselves to principles of inter-State relations between countries with different social systems, the crucial question of China's support for Communist terrorists in Malaysia remains, for practical purposes, unresolved.

According to non-Chinese reports, Chairman Mao told Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak during a reception on 29 May that the question of the terrorists in Malaysia was an internal matter for the Malaysian Government to deal with.

The Malaysian Prime Minister, like earlier South-East Asian visitors to China, obtained in other words a personal statement rather than an official guarantee of China's abstinence from proletarian internationalism and revolutionary solidarity with the Communist insurrectionists in his country. China did not abandon the dichotomous foreign policy characteristic of a "Socialist country".

(2) Another major obstacle has been the Taiwan problem. Although only the Philippines and Thailand have diplomatic relations with Taiwan, most other South-East Asian nations have established close economic and cultural contacts with the island-State. In a number of cases there has developed meaningful co-operation in the field of developmental politics. No South-East Asian country has been willing to relinquish these ties.

(Malaysia is no exception: when the Government on 31 May terminated consular relations with Taiwan it simultaneously announced that all trade relations, investments and tourism between Malaysia and Taiwan would be continued by private individuals based on people-to-people contacts and other local bases. This formula has in practice been accepted and confirmed by the Government in Taipei.) Besides practical political considerations there also seems to be a sense of moral responsibility offsetting Chinese attempts to isolate Taiwan politically and economically. When in September 1973 Nationalist China was ejected from the Asian Games Federation at a meeting in Bangkok the delegates of Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand demonstrated their sympathy for Taiwan with a joint protest [33]. While its delegation did not join in this protest, Singapore nevertheless reversed its decision to host the next Games [34].

Today, the Taiwan problem in itself is no longer so great an obstacle to the normalization of relations between China and South-East Asian countries. But this is a result not so much of successful Chinese diplomacy as of greater flexibility on the part of the Nationalist Chinese Government, which has learned to live with diplomatic isolation and to sustain its international contacts at the sub-diplomatic level. Whether or not China is willing to accept this remains an open question.

(3) As far as regional security in South-East Asia is concerned, Peking has so far failed to offer a workable solution. Chinese policies toward the region as a whole are still full of contradictions. Peking is so preoccupied with its anti-Soviet stance that it tends to spread a cold war atmosphere in the region rather than to promote a viable relaxation of tension. While it has ceased to attack the alliances which Thailand and the Philippines have concluded with the United States because these help to prevent an increase in the Soviet presence, and rhetorically supports regional claims within the South-East Asian area in the long run, it also tries to strengthen the position of its own Asian allies—North Vietnam, the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG)/Vietcong of South Vietnam, Sihanouk's "National United Front of Kampuchea (NUFK)", and North Korea—at the expense of their non-Communist rivals. While the Chinese representative at ECAFE may have been justified, after the Vietnam cease-fire and the opening of the Korean dialogue, in his demand that North Vietnam and North Korea should be allowed to join the Organization, his quest for the entry of the Vietcong, and the NUFK instead of the Lon Nol Government, was definitely not [35]. It indicated that China hopes to set precedents for the international recognition of later insurrectionary Communist counter-governments in the South-East Asian region.

Furthermore, the Chinese military attack on the Paracel Islands in January 1974 added to South-East Asian misgivings. Even more disquieting was the Chinese declaration at the 30th meeting of ECAFE in April that all rocks and reefs in the South China Sea belong to China [36]. Although the Chinese representative, Huang Ming-ta, indicated the possibility of consultations between China and its neighbours on this question, his unilateral claim did not contribute to further *detente* The Chinese declaration that any offending country would have to bear the responsibility for any action on islands claimed by China was evidently an open threat of force.

Unless and until the PRC is willing to grant concessions in the three areas outlined above, its credibility must remain doubtful to the countries of South-East Asia.

* * * * * * *

DESPITE the ambiguous attitudes of China, the Soviet concept of collective security has not yet drawn an unequivocably favourable response from any government in South and South-East Asia. In both areas, the governments pursue regionalist concepts. In South Asia China's support for Pakistan during the Bangladesh crisis more or less automatically strengthened the Soviet position on the Indian Sub-Continent. Earlier indications of a relaxation of tensions between India and China, therefore, disappeared in the autumn of 1971. India's Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, has nevertheless developed great interest in a dialogue with the Chinese neighbour. In this context the explosion of India's first atomic bomb on 18 May 1974 could be interpreted as a massive demonstration for China's benefit of the country's independence and strength, its willingness to promote the "Zone of Peace" concept for South Asia rather than the Soviet collective

security system, and hence its credibility as a self-reliant Power in the region.

The South-East Asian countries, which prefer an international guarantee for the neutrality of their region, are, on the other hand, painstaking in avoiding any suggestion that their interest in a dialogue with China could indicate a firm preference for Peking over Moscow. They have sedulously matched their new China policies with balancing approaches to the Soviet Union.

This first became clear when Malaysia, only a few days after the opening of official talks with Peking, announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with North Korea[37] —a move designed to balance the approach to China[38]. Indonesia, despite some improvement in relations with the Soviet Union, seems also to aim at equi-distance from Moscow and Peking in the long run. In the Philippines President Marcos has set any *rapprochement* with China within the framework of a general flexibility toward Communist-ruled countries[39]. The first official sports contacts between China and the Philippines in April 1974 were, therefore, preceded by the establishment of diplomatic relations with a number of East European countries and by diplomatic feelers towards Moscow. The Thai Government, which has been almost as active as Malaysia in its contacts with Peking, invited the USSR on 16 January 1974 through a statement by Foreign Minister Charunphan Isarangkun Na Ayuthaya to accept a key role in establishing peace in South-East Asia[40]. Only a few weeks earlier the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Maj. Gen. Chatichai Choonhavan had accompanied a trade delegation to China, and stated before his departure that Thailand would henceforward pursue a "one China policy" and regard the Taiwan issue as a domestic Chinese problem[41]. Immediately after the then Defence Minister Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chullasapya returned from his visit to Peking on 16 February 1974, Bangkok announced the impending establishment of diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia[42]. Agreement to exchange Ambassadors was formally announced on 15 March.

Within most of the South-East Asian countries, there is still dispute over the question of opening a dialogue with China[43]. Recent discoveries of incidents of Chinese espionage and infiltration have dampened any euphoria about the possibility of closer ties with China. Until China becomes willing to comply with the basic precondition not to interfere in the internal affairs of its southern neighbours, the scope for relaxation will remain limited. And even if Peking should decide to relinquish its ties with terrorist movements, 20 years experience of continuous change in the PRC's strategies and policies puts a question-mark against the value of Chinese guarantees. All governments in the region will have to live with this problem. In the final analysis their existence is not directly threatened by China but by internal political forces which look to China as a model for a political system and a "new society".

Strong and influential groups within the Chinese leadership consider these forces as their allies. As a counter to this threat even impressive material development will not be sufficient, because the attraction of China in Asia (as well as that of the USSR to certain political forces in Western Europe) does not rest upon real developmental efficiency or social progress. It rests rather upon a skilful and effective propaganda which insinuates a march towards new horizons, and it takes more than one Alexander Solzhenitsyn to wake the world up to the fact that beyond these horizons there lies just plain totalitarian dictatorship.

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FROM all available evidence it may be concluded that neither the Soviet Union nor China, nor even both together, will be able to substitute for the American umbrella in South-East Asia. Even if the South-East Asian governments could succeed in establishing a balance between both Communist rivals, this could at best produce a fragile equilibrium or a situation of protracted insecurity, which could go hand-in-glove with permanent domestic instability. The obvious Sino-Soviet rivalry over recent years for the allegiance of the Indonesian Communists is but one prominent example indicating the domestic impact of an increased Chinese and Russian political presence in the region.

China and the USSR can no longer be kept way from South-East Asia, but their growing involvement will complicate to a considerable degree the problem of regional security in the area.

Under the impact of escalating Sino-Soviet rivalry and conflict, America's obligations in South-East Asia have even increased, despite progressive military withdrawal. Notwithstanding the possibility of an international guarantee for South-East Asian neutrality, therefore, new arrangements can be expected which, on the basis of strong mutual interests, will intensify rather than diminish the ties between South-East Asia and the United States. There are no indications that America has tired of its international responsibility or that the South-East Asian countries have tired of their American friends, although there are certainly all sorts of criticisms and misgivings.

The Vietnam Peace Agreement of January 1973—imperfect as it has proved up to now—has to be viewed in the context of a new American approach towards world politics evident since the end of the 'sixties. America is now willing to apply its rather unique ability to talk to almost all countries in the world, and in particular to both Communist rivals, the Soviet Union and China. The United States, therefore, appears as the only Power able to create a genuine relaxation of tensions in South-East Asia as well as in the Middle East.

After their withdrawal from Vietnam, the Americans have become spectators rather than participants in the Cold War—which in the 'seventies is being waged between the USSR and China. This gives them quite some leverage in South-East Asia, and means that security prospects for the region are not unhopefully bleak.

Notes and References

1. In June 1973 the Soviet Union offered China a treaty of mutual renunciation of force, which was, however, ignored by the Peking Government.

2. The Chinese leadership has so far only claimed that the USSR is no longer a Socialist country, and, therefore, insists that relations with the Soviet Union have to be conducted on the basis of peaceful co-existence.

3. For the first Chinese reaction see: *Peking Review*, Peking, no. 27, 4 July 1969, p. 22 f.

4. "Nasuscennyi 'vakuum'", *Izvestya*, Moscow, 29 May 1969, p. 3.

5. Mr. Brezhnev's speech of 7 June 1969, *Pravda*, Moscow, 8 June 1969.

6. A.M. Rendell, "Russia's power in Indian Ocean", *Times*, London, 15 September 1970, p. 11.

7. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, Tokyo, 19 November 1969.

8. Communique on the visit of a Mongolian Party and Government delegation to the Soviet Union, *Pravda*, 1 November 1970, p. 2. Although the Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny referred extensively to the collective security system during his visit to Hanoi in October 1971, the North Vietnamese did not comment on it. The same happened with high-ranking Soviet visitors to Pyongyang, North Korea in 1970 and 1971.

9. *See:* D.R. Mannekar, Pakistan Cut to Size, New Delhi, March 1972.

10. In fact, the Government of Bangladesh seems less enthusiastic than Moscow may have expected. It kept cautiously aloof from the Soviet-sponsored Asian Peace Conference of May 1973 in Dacca.

11. Speech at the Trade Union Congress of March 1972 in Moscow, *Pravda*, 21 March 1972.

12. *Asian Almanac*, Singapore, vol. 10, No. 17, 29 April 1972, p. 5160 f.

13. *Asia Research Bulletin*, Singapore, vol. 2, No. 12, May 1973, p. 1767 A.

14. *ibid.*, vol. 2, No. 8, January 1973, p. 1481A.

15. *Ibid.*, vol. 3, No. 2, July 1973, p. 1913 A-B.

16. *Jen-min jih-pao*, Peking, 23 August 1968.

17. *c.f.* a series of articles and comments (in English) on world politics in the second half of 1971: *Peking Review*, and Mr. Huang Hua's speech at the U.N. General Assembly in early December 1971, (in English), *ibid.*, no. 50, 10 December 1971, pp. 7 -10.

18. For the English text of Mr. Chou's speech see: *ibid.*, no 35/36, 7 September 1973, pp. 17 - 25.

19. *ibid.*, p. 20

20. *Jen-min jih-pao* and *Chieh-fang jih-pao*, 4 March 1969.

21. For the Chinese comments on the Soviet activities in the Indian Ocean see: *Peking Review*, no. 48, 30 November 1973 and no. 52, 12 December 1973.

22. Mr. Ch'iao Kuan-hua's speech at the U.N. General Assembly, 2 October 1973, *ibid.*, no. 40, 5 October 1973, p. 13.

23. For the Chinese perception of encirclement see: a series of three lectures compiled by the Propaganda Section of the Political Department of the Kunming Military Area (4 April 1973), which has been released in Taipei. The lectures are entitled "Reference Material Concerning Education on the Situation" and deal with China's attitudes towards the Vietnam peace agreement, "Soviet revisionism's aggression and expansion", and President Nixon's visit to China. English translations appear in : *Background on China*, New York, 11, 12 and 13 April 1974; c.f. *New York Times*, 10 April 1974.

24. *Asian Almanac*, vol. 10, no. 5, 5 February 1972, p. 5017, and no. 7, 19 February 1972, p. 5041; *Asia Research Bulletin*, vol. 1, no. 8, January 1972, p. 565 A.

25. *New China News Agency*, Peking, (Engl.) 4 October 1970, and 15 May 1971.

26. *Asian Almanac*, vol. 10, No. 17, 29 April 1972, p. 5160.

27. *ibid.*

28. *United Press International*, Kuala Lumpur, 23 May 1971.

29. *Asia Research Bulletin*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 30 June 1974, pp. 2762-2764.

30. Among others: Wigberto Clavecilla (Philippines, July 1973); Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Maj. Gen. Chatichai Choonhavan (Thailand, December 1973) and the then Defence Minister, Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chullasapya (Thailand, February 1974).

31. President Suharto insists on three conditions for normal relations with China. Peking must (1) stop assisting the Kalimantan guerrillas; (2) eject

the Indonesian Communist Party remnant group from Peking; and (3) suspend radio propaganda against the Government. Tun Abdul Razak told the Malaysian Parliament on 6 July 1971 that diplomatic relations would be established if China agreed to the principle of peaceful co-existence, recognized Malaysia's independence and sovereignty and pledged non-interference in Malaysia's internal affairs. Similar statements were released by the Governments of Thailand and the Philippines.

32. This was reported by Benjamin Romualdez and by the Thai Defence Minister; *Asia Research Bulletin*, vol. 3, no. 1, June 1973, p. 1842 A/B; *Summary of World Broadcasts, Part III: The Far East (SWB/FE)*, London, no. 4531, 20 February 1974, p. A3/1.

33. *Asia Research Bulletin*, vol. 3, no. 5, October 1973, p. 2131B f.

34. *United Press International*, Singapore, 1 November 1973.

35. *Asian Almanac*, vol. 11, no. 23, 9 June 1973, p. 5845.

36. *Peking Review*, no. 15, 12 April 1974.

37. *Sunday Times*, Kuala Lumpur, 1 July 1973.

38. This move was consistent with official Chinese policy, and yet would not estrange the USSR.

39. In his State of the Nation Address on 24 January 1972, President Marcos said that the opening of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia and Romania "should be regarded ... only as a first step in a world-wide *rapprochement* with Socialist countries". In the same context, he referred to the prospects of *rapprochement* with China.

40. *Asia Research Bulletin*, vol. 3, no. 9, 28 February 1974, p. 2489 B/C.

41. *ibid.* no. 8, 31 January 1974, p. 2404 C.

42. *SWB/FE*, no. 4545, 3 March 1974, p. A2/4.

43. Up to now, their moves and declarations thus appear somewhat inconclusive, if not occasionally even contradictory. But there is a pattern behind these apparent contradictions: leadership members who are entrusted with domestic and international security tend towards scepticism and a slower pace of *detente*, while those in charge of diplomacy tend to promote a quicker pace of *rapprochement*.

INDIAN OCEAN: *"The Chinese Communists are essentially ideologues. Their whole course of policy is directed towards achieving the ends of their ideology, in some way, sooner or later"*

The People's Republic of China and the Indian Ocean Imbroglio:

AN INDICATOR OF THE NEED FOR A GESTALT APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF PEKING'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

Leslie R. Marchant

THE low-key tone which Chinese Communist officials have been using for their pronouncements on the Indian Ocean problem, compared with their high-key treatment for areas such as Indo-China, could well be taken to indicate that Peking either is not very interested or involved in the Indian Ocean, or that other areas and problems merit more attention in Peking. Chinese Communist comments on the Indian Ocean problem since Britain announced in January 1968 its intention to withdraw from East of Suez, and political changes occurred there, have been relatively few and spasmodic. There was some concern and elation when Britain's announcement was first made(1). The elation was widespread among cultural revolutionaries and "national liberation forces." Chinese Communists had been predicting the "downfall" of the imperialist "paper-tiger" giants since shortly after the formation of their Party in the 1920s, when they linked themselves to the world Communist revolutionary movement which had been steered in an anti-imperialist direction by Lenin. Britain's announcement appeared to be a fulfilment of this prophecy, and it served to reinforce the Chinese Communists' belief that their doctrine was scientific, and that the predictions they made from it were accurate and reliable. Cultural revolutionaries and national liberation fighters in consequence had their faith reinforced, and they received a new hope that their enemies, the "imperialists", would be soon vanquished, and that a new age for man would be commenced on earth. The *Tet* offensive in Vietnam at the time was in part associated with this sense of elation; stemming from the belief that the time was ripe for history to be given a push in the direction of "progress to Socialism and Communism." But the elation was qualified in the case of the Indian Ocean by concern expressed at the involvement of "revisionist Russia" and the USA in the area(2). Britain's withdrawal appeared to threaten the creation of a vacuum. The two major "super-Powers" appeared to be trying to fill this vacuum, either by conflict or by agreement(3). This, in Chinese Communist views, left two roads open for States in the area. They could suffer a new period of "domination", "exploitation" and "colonization" as a result of a new partition similar to the one made by the expanding European colonial Powers between the 16th and 19th centuries. Alternatively they could follow the road of "national liberation" and "independent sovereighty."

Although this choice, and the wisdom of taking the latter path were made known constantly to all peoples by Chinese Communists, the dangers in the Indian Ocean were not specially highlighted by Peking after Britain's initial announcement. Britain, as it happened, did not withdraw as announced. It kept a presence in the area. It was not until after the partition of Pakistan in November 1971, which appeared to be in Russia's favour; the signing of a new Soviet/Indian treaty which had apparent military provisions (4) and the existence of a permanent Soviet force in the area after the 1968 Kosygin

visit to the region; followed by an increase in American interest in the Indian Ocean evidenced by efforts to develop Diego Garcia, that more persistent comments were made(5). But these, although strong in tone, were not used by Peking to create a great issue out of the Indian Ocean problem.

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DESPITE the low-key treatment, however, it would be incorrect to conclude that Peking was indifferent and uninvolved. The Indian Ocean region has been an area of interest and concern for Peking since it moved onward from the democratic-proletarian stage of the Communist revolution and away from the subservience to the Socialist Soviet Union which this lesser stage of revolutionary growth implied, and leaped forward in 1956 to a new level of Socialist revolution, and independence in handling domestic and foreign policies as a fully fledged Socialist Power.

As a result of domestic ideological developments at home, reinforced by outside impressions from rural-inclined Communist Parties such as Indonesia's and Cuba's, Peking directed special attention to the "rural" States, or non-industrial developed areas of the world as it developed its own Socialist foreign policy to reflect its revolutionary leap forward. The Indian Ocean was bounded by two continents of these "rural" States — Africa and Asia, which was later in the 1960s added to by a third, Oceania, which implied the inclusion of Australia.

These continents were held to have special international revolutionary significance, meriting special attention. This attitude stemmed from Peking's analysis of the world situation made in accordance with the principles of dialectical materialism, historical materialism and materialist economics. Peking rejected the Rostowian classification of States into "lesser developed" and developed. This, Peking indicated, was made by measuring economic achievement, which amounted to the Chinese Communist heresy of "economism". This heresy was specially singled out for condemnation during and after the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The true yardstick, in Peking's view, was revolutionary consciousness or awareness. This in Peking's estimate, measured high in the rural States, especially in Africa. That continent and the other rural States in Asia, Latin America and Oceania were viewed as being oppressed and exploited. They were viewed as being aware of this situation. They were viewed to be taking action to change this situation, by opposing "imperialism" and "colonialism" to create "independence" for themselves. They were consequently regarded as vanguard fighters in the struggle against "imperialist forces", which Peking viewed as the major contradiction to the forces of "the people" in the modern world; and as models which demonstrated that in the context of this identified contradiction, "countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution"(6).

It was Peking's claim that a world-wide revolutionary crusade had broken out against the forces of "imperialism," which was viewed as the last Armageddon-like battle the proletarian forces would have to fight to achieve their promised paradise on Earth. (This, incidently, formed one of the causes of the Sino-Soviet split. Moscow was not convinced the world was in an unprecedented revolutionary wave that could be canalized to Communist advantage as the contradictions between the forces identified by Chinese Communists were resolved.)

For Peking the matter was absolutely clear. The world was held to be in the process of revolutionary change(7). The "capitalist-imperialist" Powers were held to be destroying themselves as a result of internal contradictions manifested by economic crises, demonstrations, divisions, riots and a general apparent failure of will and purpose. People in the rural States, in comparison, were viewed as having a firm spiritual purpose and clear goals. They wanted independence. This created the impression in Peking that a great potential existed for a world-wide united front against the conceived main enemy of "the people", led by Communist forces who believed they were destined to lead "the people" to victory and to a future Communist paradise(8). This apparent united front of rural Powers in turn created the impression that the industrial States were surrounded by rural areas held by their enemies. This led to the belief, as revolution surged forward in the revolutionary advanced areas of the rural world, that the industrial-capitalist-imperialist-neo-colonialist Powers would be engulfed in a prairie-fire that would mark their final destruction (9). The prairie-fire was not meant to be solely violent. Materialist economic beliefs held by Chinese Communists led them to conclude that the industrial western Powers were inevitably imperialistic, and that they needed to

exploit the resources of raw materials existing in the rural world so as to continue their wealth creation. The growth of political independence in territories such as the Indian Ocean area, which was rich in oil and mineral resources, and the development of national safeguards for resources, were regarded as part of the prairie-fire that would engulf the West. Local independence would highlight Western dependence on raw materials, and would highlight the West's "exploitation" policies. The price Western countries would have to pay for this independence would not only provide "economic justice" for the rural States previously "exploited", but would promote the decay of capitalist economies which were regarded as being on the brink of disintegration(10), and so weaken the headquarters of the forces opposed to the cause of proletarian progress. As the headquarters weakened, internal liberation revolutionary forces in the industrial-imperialist States would rise to help give the death knock to imperialism, and the engulfment of the "reactionary forces" who were holding back natural Communist man from inheriting his birthright would be completed.

Although Peking's leaders used the struggle in Vietnam as a model example of the anti-imperialist, pro-national liberation revolutionary situation in the world after Stalin's demise, they regarded Africa as the real epicentre of revolution. That continent, they believed, was the main front line in the battle between imperialist and "national salvation" forces. In the changing circumstances that followed Peking's set-backs in Africa on the eve of the outbreak of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution(11), the Indian Ocean area was still regarded as the main area of contradiction between the opposing forces in the world. As the Vietnam conflict became increasingly highlighted, Asia was conceived to be an epicentre of revolutionary struggle, though of a different quality to Africa. The contradictions in Asia were believed to be more complex. The struggle there was held to be not only between "national salvationists" and "imperialists", but also "liberators of the people" who sought to establish Socialism and Communism, and the "national bourgeoisie" who wanted to create and preserve a capitalistic livelihood in areas such as Vietnam. In more recent times the Middle East has been highlighted as a revolutionary centre. This is also regarded as an area of complex contradictions where liberation forces contest for power, where the hand of so-called "imperialism" or neo-colonialism is held to be evident, and where the "super-Powers" are believed to be battling for a supremacy(12).

In the circumstances, Maoists in Peking, whose doctrine is essentially universalist or internationalist in nature, felt they had a bounden duty to be concerned and involved (13). They believed they had the expert knowledge needed to resolve the contradictions in a correct way. They had used prairie-fire methods and rural-based united fronts at home to win victories over the nationalist forces, so as to take China along the road of Socialist progress.

They did not seek to act personally as the mid-wife for States abroad. They had no intention of going to the rural world to direct or act personally in revolutions. Maoist doctrine makes a virtue of self-reliance. People are meant to help themselves. All they need to help themselves in the proper way, in Maoist views, is correct guidance. This is supplied by the doctrines of Mao Tse-tung. His works were held to be blueprints for victory for proletarian forces. They serve as beacon lights to world revolutionaries(14) who, it is believed, are lacking clear guidance from Moscow. Mao's thoughts, if used correctly, offer opportunities for miracles. They do not promise these will be easily or harmoniously achieved. They recommend reliance on the barrel of a gun rather than the use of anaesthetizing acupuncture needles (15). They hold that the forces opposing the people and oppressing nations will not give up their historical role by their own volition. They have to be overthrown, and that promises to be no dinner party.

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THE nature of cognition of problems by Chinese Communists, in the sense outlined above, concerning the Indian Ocean, is different from cognitions of problems by many in the West(16). China does not necessarily single out special areas for attention as they appear, such as in the case of the Indian Ocean imbroglio. Its foreign policy is *gestaltet* in a different way. It stems more from universalist concepts and a comprehension of pervasive laws of motion and progress(17).

The current confusion about Peking's foreign policy, like the confusions which existed in the

past decades since the foundation of the People's Republic of China, when commentators and scholars moved into or were cast into apparently contradictory camps and groups, stems in great part from research and conceptional weaknesses. Some writers on Peking's foreign relations have often analysed the subject without reference or regard to Chinese Communist dialectical materialistic beliefs. They treat the People's Republic of China as if it was a liberal parliamentary democracy confronting problems as they arise, and offering reasoned solutions to them. This implies that Chinese Communists are reactionaries in the true sense of the word, reacting to outside stimuli. In fact they are not inclined in any way to this. They are essentially ideologues. Their whole course and policy is directed towards achieving the ends of their ideology, in some way, sooner or later. Their every action is either guided by their beliefs, or is rationalized according to them. Their role in the Indian Ocean affair .must consequently be seen in this context.

Yet other writers, following a method that often merits praise in Western research activities, make analyses of different parts or aspects of China's foreign policy, regarding these as aggregates of a conglomerate whole. Microcosmic studies, such as of Peking's role in Africa, or in Burma, or in Vietnam, do not give a necessarily true picture of Peking's general policy aims, nor a comprehensive account of its actions.

Studies of the policies of the Peoples Republic of China, like those of any ideological totalitarian State, must be macrocosmic. Maoist policy is *Gestalt* as a whole. It is derived from a theory of cognition that emphasizes the existence of universals, and the need to act according to universalist principles of law. Peking's foreign policy in both the spacial and time dimensions, cannot be treated as a conglomerate of separate parts, existing like a collection of poker chips each of which has its own value and existence, which can be separated from the pile and used or studied, without affecting either the quality of the whole pile or the inherent relationship of the parts. Maoist policy has an identity as a whole. The various parts of it have no meaningful independent identity. They are fused and interdependent, interacting in a specific structural manner. Peking's policy exists as an integral body rather than a pile of aggregates. It more resembles a total form such as a human frame rather than a pile of poker chips. It functions as an entity. In the circumstances it is unwise to take one section for study, just as it is unwise, in the case of a human body, to take off a finger and study this as a separate object. The finger is an integral part of the whole. It only functions when it is joined to the body.

Mao Tse-tung himself describes clearly the *Gestalt* principle conceived and used by Chinese Communist policy-makers. He likens policy to a ten-finger piano exercise. In making music, he claims, ten fingers are used separately to strike different keys. It is the total combination of these ten fingers which creates the theme or tune as a whole. It is possible to listen to one finger play, but that will not give the total tune. The whole work played with all ten fingers must be listened to. Thus it would be inconceivable for a Maoist to take one aspect or area of a matter for separate study. This would be alien to the Maoist theory of cognition of knowledge, and would not correctly describe the *Gestalt* of a revolutionary policy applied at home and abroad, anymore than a study of one finger used in playing a piano would give a clear analysis of a revolutionary tune.

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THE *Gestalt* of Communist Chinese foreign policy and indeed every aspect of its policy, is determined by dogma. Maoists believe they have an infallible set of beliefs based on universal laws which Marxist scientific enquiry has produced (18). It is these beliefs or universal truths or dogmas which they use to comprehend the nature of the world about them, and to determine the actions that must be taken in the circumstances existing at any one time, so as to achieve the end aims of their Communist ideological beliefs.

Briefly stated, Chinese Communists have three distinct sets of beliefs. *Dialectical materialism* describes for them the laws of progress. *Historical materialism* describes for them the course of man's progress on Earth, according to the laws of the dialectic, from the time of his lost paradise of primitive communism, to his regaining this paradise in the future after the age of capitalism. *Materialist economics* describes for them the principles of economic activity.

These beliefs have been derived from the past. They are essentially counter-enlightenment in nature. They do not stem from the empirical school of enquiry indigenous to China, and brought also from outside. They are teleological in nature, and stem from the tradition which believes in the supremacy of established tradition, the rule of orthodox dogma and the denial of a free spirit of enquiry associated with the empirical tradition(19).

The beliefs were brought to their present significance in China as a result of a correlative drive. Indigenous Chinese beliefs based on dialectical concepts were given a stimulus they had not experienced before, as a result of the introduction of sophisticated Western works based on dialectical concepts. It was this fusion, and these foreign links, incidentally, which helped create the impression for Maoists of the universality of Maoist laws of progress. There is often little difference between Chinese Communists' beliefs, and those of the "new church" and the "new left" and "the old left" in the West, with whom they share in part a common heritage, and more significantly a common inner core of beliefs about the world as a whole.

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THE key element in the Chinese Communist belief system is that all developments are made according to the *laws of the dialectic.* They believe all matter is in a state of motion. It is separated into two interdependent, contradictory parts — a thesis and an antithesis. Each of these struggles to dominate the other. The more progressive element, the antithesis, being progressive, always wins the struggle. This then becomes a new thesis which produces a new antithesis, which results in a new synthesis, proceeding in the same progressive way as before until a state of perfection is finally achieved after all of the contradictory elements have been eliminated(20).

The "universal truth" of dialectical progress serves present Chinese Communists like calendars of auspicious dates served imperial Chinese officials. They use it to determine the state of the world at any one time, and they act according to this dialectical appreciation.

In the case of the Indian Ocean, the dialectical view has led them to see a two-sided contradiction or struggle taking place since 1968. On the one hand two "imperialist super-Powers" are believed to be struggling for supremacy in their drive to fill the vacuum supposedly left by the withdrawal of Britain. On the other hand there is a struggle between the national States in the area, which seek independence, and the super-Powers, the Soviet Union and the U.S.A., which seek to "dominate" them. Chinese Communists have identified a third contradiction, though this is in general held to be of lesser significance at the present stage. This is between the "oppressed proletarian" forces who seek liberation, and the "imperialists" and "neo-colonialists" together with the indigenous "national bourgeoisie" who act as puppets for imperialism, who promise to inhibit the Communist liberation efforts of the proletarians. Chinese Communists do not see themselves or their country as being directly involved in the resolution of these contradictions. They are meant to be resolved by peoples in the area. If Chinese Communists were directly involved they would become, in their own view, one of the expansionist super-Powers they condemn.

The elements of the dialectic, however, are not viewed as being composed of a conglomerate of equal parts. One of the significant features of Maoist dialectical beliefs is that the two opposite elements are nucleated. Each is conceived to have a qualitative as well as a quantitive aspect. In other words some elements are more progressive than others, and some are more reactionary than others. It is this concept which supplies the theory for the existence of a vanguard. Qualitative elements are believed to have the knowledge, or characteristics necessary to show the way or lead the way for others. It is, in fact, the bounden duty of this "well-endowed" elect to act for the good of all.

Thus, although Peking does not have a direct involvement in the Indian Ocean problem, or an obvious physical presence in the area, it has, as spiritual leader of the Communist international movement, a duty to be concerned and involved.

Chinese Communists, since the split with Moscow, have taken for themselves the role of vanguard for the world proletariat, and have popularized the People's Republic of China as "the Mecca" for orthodox Marxist-Leninists. As such they have an international duty to lead the "oppressed proletariat" of the world. If they denied this obligation they would be "national-Socialists", whom they readily denounce. Peking

has therefore been active diplomatically, and in offering guidance to proletarians and other "liberation forces" who have been confronted with "contradictions" in the Indian Ocean since 1968. It is in these fields that Peking sees its real role, moulding and strengthening the "Third World" forces to ensure their victory over the "super-Powers", and supporting, where possible, "proletarians" so that progress, when it is made, will be made in the direction of Socialism and not capitalism(21).

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MAOIST *materialistic concept of history* in essence consists of six beliefs. Firstly Maoists are utopians. They believe a state of perfection for man existed in the prehistoric past, and they believe a further utopian state lies ahead in time. History is conceived to be the description of man's progress to his inevitable future utopia, not unlike sacred Christian historians picture man rising from the slough, to a state of Christian perfection, either in heaven or on earth in the future.

Secondly they have an eschatological sense of history. They believe time can be divided, universally, into determined stages of growth. All peoples, they believe, after their loss of an early utopia, pass through distinct periods of slavery, feudalism and capitalism, the collapse of which heralds the advent of man's Communist utopia on earth(22).

The struggle for "liberation", and to achieve Communism in the period of "cultural despair" that marks the end of the age of capitalism, is similarly held to progress through distinctive stages marked by "struggle for liberation", followed by a "democratic-proletarian" stage of growth, which is subsequently replaced by a "Socialist" stage of revolutionary growth, which is finally transformed into a Communist state. The slogans currently used to describe the struggle to resolve such contradictions in the Indian Ocean area, that is "countries want independence", "nations want liberation" and "people want revolution", are not summaries of the various types of wishes of the people in the "Third World", but a description of the form or *Gestalt* which their total struggle will take as they move from a state of colonialism to a state of "proletarian Communist liberation", by first achieving independence, and then Communist liberation.

These eschatological concepts lead Maoists to have a differential view of the different States on the littoral of the Indian Ocean, each of which, it is believed, must take different lines and use different strategies in accordance with its stage of revolutionary development. India, for instance, from 1968 to 1971 was considered to be in a high state of revolutionary consciousness. Palestine was viewed in a similar light. These and other areas with "people's liberation movements and people's liberation armies" were regarded as having the ability to establish "Socialist liberated areas" or "proletarian regimes." General Amin's Uganda, on the other hand, appeared to be a colonial puppet regime. South Africa and the Portuguese territories were viewed as colonial areas. These were viewed as being more capable of getting independence, rather than Communist liberation. If pressed to the point, Maoists no doubt would have had to view some of the Afro-Asian States as "bourgeois" or even "feudal." This has not been obviously done. It would inhibit Peking in its efforts to weld a broad united front in the Third World to oppose the super-Powers. Nevertheless the sense of feeling is there, as African and other leaders in emergent States have sensed. They have been viewed as temporary nationalist leaders securing the independence of their States, who will eventually be replaced by proletarian leaders.

Thirdly, Maoists believe in the idea of a chosen people. They believe that proletarians are destined to inherit the earth. Other classes, for them, will have as much chance of entering the proletarian paradise, as a camel will of passing through the eye of a needle. This marks Maoists off from Confucians. These have been condemned by Maoists for their humanism. They seek to cater for "humans," and not save "the class" Maoists identify as being "oppressed."

Fourthly, Maoists are elitists. They believe special groups play a leading role in history. They see themselves, and revolutionaries who believe in the orthodox doctrines of Marxist-Leninism which Maoists promote, as a specially equipped vanguard who alone have the knowledge and ability to lead the proletarian forces to victory, and to transform the world into its promised state of Communist utopia where "each will have according to his need"(23).

Fifthly, Maoists, unlike Confucians, believe

in the perfectibility of the society of man. They believe modern man is equipped with special scientific knowledge about the ways of progress. Thus equipped he does not have to live in a state of cultural despair, "oppression" and "depression." He has the ability, unlike previous men who lived before the age of scientific Socialism, to make progress through the course of history, to end his alienation from his true natural world, to live the life he is destined to lead in a perfect unpolluted proletarian environment.

The crux of the Maoist belief about materialist history is that man's nature is basically Communist. This, Maoists believe, has been subverted. This happened when man fell from his Communist paradise because he sinned by wanting to acquire things for himself, developing a "property-owning" instead of a Communist outlook. This fall caused man to become alienated from his true Communist self. Man's re-identification with the natural order of things, Maoists believe, can only come when he regains his lost Communist outlook. It is for this reason, in part, that Chinese Communists see promise for the future in the rural world in general, and in the Indian Ocean area in particular. That area is believed to contain suitable human material for the creation of a new Socialist type of man who can be fashioned by the process of proletarian cultural revolution to regain Communist perfection(24).

Finally, Maoists have not so much a sense of *chronos* as of *kairos*. They do not regard historical time as being regular in form. They believe it, and man's progress, moves by great leaps forward, marked by great events, and periods of pause. This sense of *kairos* adds to the flexibility of Maoist strategy. They can easily change tactics, rationalizing this with the belief that time is not yet ripe, or that the time for continued action has passed. Support for liberation wars can thus be replaced by support for non-proletarian governments in the same area, if circumstances demand this, although there is a continued awareness that history will eventually progress along its predetermined path in a series of leaps and halts.

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THE state of knowledge about *materialist economics,* or economic systems under Communism is somewhat the same as the state of knowledge about the early or primitive period of Communist utopia. Early Communist society is held to have existed in the pre-historic period, for which no written sources exist. Communist works thus contain references to it rather than descriptions of it. But even if historical records existed, the state of knowledge about early paradise would no doubt be the same. Being a paradise there would be nothing for inhabitants to record except the fact that today was just the same as yesterday, "perfect", with each person getting according to his need. Paradises do not promise historians a livelihood.

Communist economic systems similarly are not described in the works of the Communist apostles. Marx, Engels and even Lenin lived in a "capitalist" world. They were preoccupied with this world and the evils they believed existed in it; rather than with working models of Communist economic life. The models for economic control, selected by later Communist leaders after they took control in various States such as Russia, was German or Prussian-style command or planned economies, suited to capital and industrial development. There was little else they could do. Early Communist prophets gave no clear models that could be used. They provided only a list of virtues that Socialists and Communists were required to accept.

In any case, the regions over which Communists took control were invariably less-developed territories. Marx did not envisage these becoming Communist States. He meant developed States to first achieve Communism. But no advanced industrial State has been taken over by proletarian forces, as the Communist apostles predicted. Early Communist models for economic life after "liberation" thus would not be applicable. Instead economic systems and ideas suited to economic growth rather than to economic justice in distribution, which is emphasized by Communists, have had to be adopted. This has been the partial cause of the continued confrontations between spiritually inclined proletarian cultural revolutionaries in China, and those who take the road of "economism" to develop China economically.

Chinese Communists' beliefs about the economic situation in capitalist society, briefly stated, are three. They believe the system inhibits production and promotes the exploitation of one class, the proletarians, who have no ownership over the means of production, by classes who

have ownership. They believe that capitalist man, because of his acquisitive nature, will seek to increase his monopoly of control and wealth, and will not share this. They thus predict and oppose the growth of monopolies and multinational economic giants (25).

They also believe capitalist man does not create wealth. Real wealth, they believe, is created by workers whose labour they value. The removal of capitalists, they feel, will release productive forces and serve the creation of real wealth for the people.

They further believe that economic life, like society, progresses by means of stages. Capitalism, they believe, has a higher stage, imperialism. This is manifested by the acquisition of colonies by an industrial State, or quasi-colonies which are used as sources of raw materials.

This is not the place to make a critique of Chinese Communist economic beliefs, although it should be pointed out they were fashioned in 19th century Europe by Marx and others who lived before the coming of the motor car and modern trade unions and other elements that have made an impact on modern industrial life and development. Marx and the early Communist writers misinterpreted the birth pains of industrialism as its death throes. Their prediction that proletarians would become poorer and poorer, and that the wealth they created would fall into the hands of fewer and fewer monopolists, has not been fulfilled. Communists in industrial societies have in consequence had to turn to national minorities, such as Negroes in America and Aborigines in Australia, to make their points about wealth and poverty. Proletarians, under the system of trade unionism and fragmented ownership of complex industries, have not multiplied, nor have they become poorer and poorer as predicted. Trade unions have in general guaranteed workers higher wages and shares of profits in industrial States.

Peking's attitude to the Indian Ocean area in a sense has these suggested racial overtones in modern Marxism. Chinese Communists seek to help the oppressed and relatively backward coloured people to get independence from domination by the advanced white or European countries, whether they are British, Americans or Russians; although Peking has recently added nuclear-equipped India to the list of expansionists threatening independence and threatening to exploit. But in that case they take pains to point out that Mrs. Gandhi's Government is a puppet of Moscow "Tzarists", and is not itself an independent agent (26).

Peking's overall view of the Indian Ocean area is simple as far as the economic position is concerned. It believes it is an area rich in natural resources. A great part of the world's oil supplies, for instance, come from there. "Avaricious capitalist Powers", it believes, dominated and exploited these resources in the past, helping economically advanced countries to advance further economically. This age, it believes, is now over. Many of the nations on the littoral of the Indian Ocean have real or nominal independence, or the chance to get it. This independence is now believed to be threatened in a new way by the advance of United States "imperialism" and Soviet Russian "social imperialism", both of which, it is believed, require the resources of the area to feed their "empires of machines" (27). Peking's aim is to prevent this, or help the littoral Powers prevent this, so that the wealth they have in the way of resources, which they are creating by using or selling, will be theirs. Whether the independent States share this wealth or not among the people is a separate issue, which is specially prophesied about in Chinese Communist political eschatological writings. These state that a new contradiction will shortly emerge. Local capitalists will sooner or later be confronted by local proletarians. In this struggle the Socialist forces and "economic justice" will inevitably triumph, and "bourgeois national" leaders will fall like Chiang Kai-shek in China.

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ALTHOUGH there have been no changes in Peking's policy towards some of the Indian Ocean States since 1968, such as to Israel, Pakistan, India and Indonesia, its policy in the region in general has gone through two distinctive phases since the time Britain announced its intended withdrawal. The first phase, from 1968-1971, was that of national and class struggle; the second and continuing phase places emphasis on anti-hegemonism and anti-Socialist-imperialism.

The change from one phase to another was not a specific reaction to developments in the region. It was one facet of a general change

affecting Peking's domestic and global foreign policies.

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FROM 1968 until 1971, when Bangladesh was created, Peking's policy was relatively simplistic. It was guided primarily by the concept that two major contradictions dominated the Indian Ocean area and the world in general. Prime in significance was the confrontation between the USA which was believed to be expansionist-colonialist, and thus the main enemy of Socialist-nationalist forces; and the States seeking to emerge to independence. Less evident, though not necessarily of lesser importance was the contradiction between the emerged initial leaders in States in the Indian Ocean area, and revolutionary leaders of the people.

Peking's desire to play a part in helping resolve these two types of contradictions is demonstrated in part by a profile study of its links abroad (see appendix). In 1968 it had diplomatic links with 15 States in the area. It also recognized 12 revolutionary liberation wars which were given widespread publicity and approval by Chinese Communists. The ratio of these two types of recognition changed after 1971. Less emphasis was placed on class struggle and the resolution of class contradictions in the Indian Ocean area. Recognition was inclined to be offered to established States and leaders in the area, rather, than to "people's liberation army forces". In 1974, for instance, Peking had diplomatic links with 28 Powers and popularized only four liberation wars. This change is in essence a set-back for enthusiastic proletarian cultural revolutionaries who believe great steps have been taken in the cultural revolution to effect a spiritual change in the world.

Although some outside observers believed the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution weakened China at home and abroad, and on the African littoral of the Indian Ocean in particular, where a number of African States rejected relations with Peking, Chinese Communists believed they had strength and potential. Their sally into Africa in the early 1960s might have led to the severance of relations with non-proletarian leaders in Africa (28). But it also resulted, in their view, in the establishment of true people's democracies, and true people's democratic movements which had the potential to follow correctly the orthodox path of progress to true liberation, and the potential to become fraternal people's democratic States like Albania (29). Peking's feelings of confidence in this regard were reinforced by declarations of praise for the cultural revolution by various leaders and peoples, and by acknowledgements that Chairman Mao Tse-tung's works were the guiding beacon for all revolutionaries struggling for victory (30).

Peking's view in regard to guiding revolutionaries is not unlike that of earlier Protestant Christian missionaries in China. When the latter aimed to convert China, they sought to exercise an intellectual rather than permanent physical influence. Their policy was to develop local centres of Christian influence, controlled by committed indigenous inhabitants. These centres, once established, were expected to radiate messages of Christian truth to the areas about. The existence of people's democratic governments and people's liberation movements in the Indian Ocean area, promised to act as centres of dissemination for Maoist beliefs. Their existence gave Peking opportunities to use flexible tactics. Peking could stand in the background, apparently uninvolved, while local revolutionaries achieved goals set by Mao Tse-tung. The use of proxies would allow Peking to avoid the mistakes made by earlier ideologically orientated powers, such as National-Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy, who physically intervened in Spain and Ethiopia in the 1930s to achieve their aims. This led to charges of "intervention", and of "expansionism," and brought direct confrontation which resulted in victory for the allies in the Second World War. By avoiding such mistakes Peking would not only avoid being branded as "Socialist imperialist", but would also be acting in strict accordance with the Maoist principle of "self-reliance". People who are struggling to progress are meant primarily to help themselves. They are only expected by Peking to do this in the right way. Peking's role thus is to provide them with the necessary ideological guides and principles of revolutionary warfare which the Chinese Communists believed had led to their own successes at home.

Those revolutionaries abroad who accepted these, and acted in accordance with Peking's aims for the world and the future, thus placed themselves in the position of appearing to be China's "proxies", whether they were or not. Peking in consequence believed history in the In-

dian Ocean area was moving along in the direction outlined in the works of Mao Tse-tung, whether it was present in the area or not. In the circumstances Peking saw a chance for a two-fold advance. The new people's democracies and other new national States would serve to keep Americans at bay; and also the Soviet Union if it decided on penetration. People's democracies, apparently favourably inclined to Peking, strategically dominated the Red Sea and Gulf area to help ensure the latter. Ties with these States in particular were reinforced by visits, and reciprocal ties. However emphasis was placed on spiritual rather than purely material links. This was primarily because Peking was not inclined to a theory of "limited sovereignty" (31), nor did it accept the idea of an international division of labour which made States dependent on each other, nor did it believe in the value of aid for the sake of aid. Peking believed true wealth came from self-reliant efforts. Individual States were meant to develop and to exist as entities like the apparently independent communes at home.

Other places in the Indian Ocean, such as India, where Peking believed wrongful roads were being taken, offered another avenue of hope. When a Soviet-Indian *rapprochement* became evident, Peking placed great emphasis on the growth of people's revolutionary movements in India (32). A great deal was made of the Naxalbari rebels, and later on the creation of "liberation areas in Srikakulam", in the vicinity of the alleged Soviet naval base. This implied that while the Congress Government made links with Soviet revisionists, it was being eaten away below by people's revolutionary movements who would create "liberated areas" and later a people's democracy. In the circumstances of domestic troubles in India at the time, Peking made a lot of the fact that it was disintegrating and on the point of collapse, and that the time for the prophesied change to a people's government was near.

Elsewhere, Peking saw further hope in the existence of an anti-imperialist front. Peking had tried to foster this from 1964 to aid Vietnam revolutionaries and to condemn America. Peking's efforts, however, had never been successful. Much to Peking's disturbance President Johnson, instead, had appeared to have had more success in getting a united front of Powers to help South Vietnam. This particularly irked Peking, causing it to launch bitter denunciations, and to seek to isolate the USA from its "running dogs". However, anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist stances by Afro-Asian States, also evident elsewhere in the world, led Peking to believe that by 1968 headway was being made in the resolution of the contradiction between "imperialist", and "poor" or "dependent" Powers. However the possibility of widening this to create a general united front of Third World Powers to oppose America and the Soviet Union, was adversely affected by Peking's encouragement of class-conscious revolutionaries in India and in Africa and South-East Asian States. Peking's giving a priority to resolve the contradiction between proletarians and the national bourgeoisie in parts of the rural world, did not give it the opportunity to unite the independent Powers of the Third World to help it resolve the contradiction between the independent States and "imperialist" Russia and America which were making their presence felt in the Indian Ocean.

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A DIALECTICAL ANALYSIS of the world situation in the late 1960s and early in the 1970s, led Chinese Communists to conclude that the "liberation" forces they guided and encouraged, and the oppressed proletariat in the world in general, were confronted by a new main enemy force, Soviet revisionism and social imperialism, which now threatened more than the USA to hold them back from securing their birthright of Communist liberation. The United States was seen to suffer internal contradictions and crises. It was believed to have racial troubles, economic difficulties, and weaknesses stemming from its parliamentary system of democracy which Peking believed was marked for failure (33). The US, moreover, talked of and commenced to act to withdraw from direct involvement in the people's wars being waged in South-East Asia. More significantly, Peking observed what it interpreted to be a rise of "people" believing in "people's social and economic justice", who acted inside America to force a withdrawal of American forces and to check and subvert the will of the "capitalist dominated anti-proletarian" Government in Washington. America, in the circumstances, was regarded as a paper tiger, which, although it still had strong teeth, was relegated to the role of secondary or minor enemy of Socialism (34).

The Soviet Union, conversely, was viewed as a new nucleus of evil, posing a real threat to

the orthodox forces of Marxist-Leninism (35). A wide variety of events led to this belief. Chinese Communists continued to have strong feelings about the wrong beliefs held by Soviet "revisionists" who emphasized "economism", "a desire to satisfy consumers in the Soviet Union", "Socialist-imperialism" and other ideas viewed as heretical in Peking. Chinese Communists feared these beliefs would subvert revolutionaries in China and abroad. The cultural revolution which demonstrated the way to prevent such contradictions of orthodox Marxist-Leninism, and the way to lead people along the correct path of progress, was designed to check ideological subversion at home, and show revolutionaries abroad how it could be checked. The methods used were presented in Mao Tse-tung's article "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People", and propagated in China and about the world. This was meant to be a blueprint for Marxist-Leninists to use in revolutionary situations, to prevent further Hungaries from occurring, and to prevent Tito's "revisionists" and "capitalist roaders" from establishing themselves in power positions.

The bitter feelings about Soviet heresies, which are felt as deeply as Protestant-Catholic differences in the West, and Peking's fear that Russian heretical views would be propagated abroad in a Soviet missionary drive, were augmented by other causes of alarm. The invasion of Czechoslovakia and the declaration of the Brezhnev Doctrine of "limited sovereignty" indicated to Peking that the Soviet Union would not hesitate to invade and occupy a Socialist country it believed was taking a wrong road (36). In real conceived terms this posed a threat to Mongolia, North Korea, and other States about the People's Republic of China, such as North Vietnam, and in more distant areas in Africa and Latin America as well. This threat was made more real by a Soviet military build-up in East Asia in particular. From the early 1970s the Soviet Union became a significant world military Power. Its land and naval forces dominated the Asian area. It would have been no great task for it to apply the Brezhnev Doctrine of "limited sovereignty" to the People's Republic of China's Socialist neighbours and fraternal allies.

Added to the military threat was the fear that the Soviet Union would arrange a *detente* with its adversaries in the West (37), so it could concentrate more pressure in the East. The apparent settlement of the Berlin crisis and the divided Germany question, and the nuclear agreements and arms limitation talks between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union provided evidence to support the validity of this fear. China in these circumstances, it was felt in Peking, could be isolated to stand alone in the cold, with nothing to support it but the conviction that its Marxist-Leninist ideology was the correct one, and the one worth sacrificing for. To make matters worse, the Soviet Union expanded its military and political power outside the boundaries of its own State, to become a hegemonous, or social-imperialist State. This expansion was seen to threaten the very source of real revolutionary activity Peking saw develop in the rural States of the world, and threaten to subvert the sources of its ideological control Peking believed existed in areas of Africa, Asia and Latin America.

The Soviet Union was seen to be no mean threat. It had not only military power, and a variety of extensive channels it could use to get its way in the world, it also had few of the weaknesses Peking believed existed in the United States. The Soviet Union, in contrast to America's open democracy, was a closed, controlled State. Chinese Communists discovered anti-Soviet and anti-revisionist forces in the Soviet Union, and made something of these (38). But dissidents in the Soviet Union did not and could not act like demonstrators and anti-government elements in the parliamentary democracy of the USA. Dissidents in the Soviet Union were given short shrift. Thus, as far as Peking was concerned, if the Soviet Union was a paper tiger, then the paper was of better quality than America. It had been made in Socialist factories and promised to be more durable than other types.

The Indian Ocean area from 1970-1971, became a particular centre that highlighted Peking's fears and world views. The growing Russian naval presence there, Moscow's special links with India, the sudden division of Pakistan, and the Soviet Union's links with Bangladesh appeared to turn the Ocean into a Soviet lake.

Russian diplomacy, its offers of military aid and other pressures, were also believed to be leading to Soviet advances in people's demo-

cracies such as South Yemen, and revolutionary areas such as Somalia which Peking had previously viewed as reliable proxies and vanguard elements in the area. Soviet naval visits, the construction of bases and support facilities that could be used by the Soviet Union, and its general extension of links, often at the apparent expense of Peking, created the impression that the area was the centre of a major struggle between the dominating contradiction in the world, between real Socialist and anti-Socialist forces (39). Peking viewed itself to be the nucleus of the former. The Soviet extension in South Asia, its expansion in the Pacific and its attacks on China in the north over the question of the Heilungkiang (Amur) river region, were seen to be parts of a united effort by Russia to surround and attack and eliminate the headquarters of orthodox Marxist-Leninism, the People's Republic of China. Thus it was no longer the United States but Russia, which was believed to be "surrounding" China.

The changes observed in Peking's policy since the Ninth Communist Party Congress which ended the cultural revolution in 1969, and since 1970-1971 in particular, stem from this changed awareness of the world situation by Peking. The Chinese Communist appreciation that new types of contradictions exist, has led to the adoption of new tactics considered necessary to resolve them in favour of the forces of liberation.

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AS far as the Indian Ocean area is concerned, there have been four developments. Firstly, and most significantly, Peking has changed from the confusion creating policy of aiding liberation revolutionary forces while working with established nonproletarian governments, so as to resolve a variety of conceived contradictions, to a policy of emphasizing the latter, at the expense of the former. The "Malayan people's revolution," for instance, which was previously made much of, has now sunk in significance, and since May 1974 more is being made of Peking's links with the Government of Malaysia which helps control the Malacca Straits entrance to the Indian Ocean. Anti-Indonesian Government propaganda has also abated.

Peking's aim in this regard is to concentrate on developing and stimulating a united front of small Powers who will be anti-hegemonous and anti-imperialist (40). China's turn to lead the "third or uncommitted" world might seem strange in view of the intensity of the recent cultural revolution which placed an emphasis on the need for proletarian solidarity. The change, however, has been paralleled by the publication and release of theoretical ideological works (41). These describe Peking's past successes in using united fronts of broadly composed, disparate groups to overcome a general main enemy. They also indicate that the change does not mean revolution and the cause of liberation have been discarded. It means that the resolution of class contradictions has been temporarily set aside, or given less significance in most areas, while more pressing or significant contradictions are being resolved. In the present situation, Chinese Communists believe it preferable to work with established States in the Indian Ocean to meet what is believed to be a linked Russian and Indian expansionist threat, an expansionist threat by the USA, and to a lesser extent the threat of Japanese expansionism, rather than work with revolutionary forces who oppose established governments in the rural world and elsewhere.

Peking, secondly, has softened its hard attitude to the United States. It has not made a great issue of America seeking to build up support facilities on Diego Garcia. Such a base, and an American presence in the area, help balance the power of the Soviet Union, and promise to help a future settlement in the area favourable to China, by offering a potential for conflict between imperialist Powers which Peking believes will clash over the matter of supremacy.

Peking, however, does not see the Indian Ocean as a main area of conflict. It believes the main scene for struggle between imperialists is Europe (42). Thus, while the Indian Ocean problem has been developing, Peking has been shifting from its previous policy of ridiculing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Germany, and ignoring the European Economic Community (EEC), to promoting a strong independent Europe as a counter-balance to the super-Powers (43). A strong Europe is believed to have the potential of counter-balancing the forces of Russia and America, in the case of a *rapprochement* or alliance by the latter two Powers, such as hegemonous Stalin made with hegemonous Hitler in the 1930s.

In this sense, the continued presence of

Britain in the Indian Ocean, and the recent French build-up there, have resulted in no unfavourable comments by Peking. Nor have the decisions by those Powers, to link with and use the Cape of Good Hope, and conduct joint exercises with South Africa, raised Peking's ire. In fact Peking ironically is now, in the face of a global Soviet threat, linked with so-called "fascist" Spain and so-called "fascist" (pre-23 July) Greece which it denounced a short while ago, and has moderated its attacks on "oppressive" South Africa as part of its global efforts to weld a general united front against imperialism. This united front at present is more disparate than Peking desires. The elements in it are primarily anti-American, or anti-colonial. This, as far as Peking is concerned, represents an old attitude reflecting a previous situation, where America was viewed as the one main enemy to Chinese Communist forces. What is required now a new main enemy has appeared, is an anti-Soviet, anti-revisionist front, as well as an anti-American one. Peking is at present working in this direction. Results so far have not been impressive. The Third World Powers have not so far come out to condemn Moscow in the way Peking desires (44).

Thirdly, Peking has turned to support a variety of policies on the international level, aimed at checking the Soviet Union and other hegemonous Powers. It has used the United Nations forum to support local control over resources (45), condemning the Soviet view that resources do not belong to one country but are international. It has supported the extension of local claims to control the sea-bed, and local fishing rights. These not only will check the Soviet fishing industry which uses global resources (46), but will help keep straits such as the Malacca, and the Red Sea and the Gulf "closed" so they will not be "international waters" free for the use of all (47) and thus facilitate Soviet and other fleet movements into the Indian Ocean. It has also supported the oil-producing States' efforts to increase prices of their natural commodity. This, Peking believes, will not only offer economic and social justice for previously "exploited" States, but will create economic chaos in the imperialist States. This applies not only to the West but also to the Soviet Union (48). The latter was believed to have suffered by having to cut back oil supplies to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance — CMEA (COMECON), thus disrupting production, which Peking earlier predicted would result from revisionist Russia's drive to create an international division of labour in the Socialist bloc.

Fourthly, Peking has turned from concentrating on revolutionary models abroad, which can act as agents to spread orthodox Marxist-Leninism, to a reliance on new "proxies" suited to the new united front period. Whereas, in the 1960s, Peking believed that States such as the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Somalia and the Congo would act as beacon lights for revolutionaries of the rural world, Peking now has turned to be more closely identified with "nationalist" or "bourgeois" States which will help stem the drive of hegemonous Powers.

Australia has stood out in the Indian Ocean area in this regard. Since 1972 it has served consciously or unconsciously as a proxy for Peking. Some socialist leaders who have come to power there, for instance, are making more clear efforts at solving the contradictions in the Indian Ocean, conceived by Peking, than are the leaders in Peking. Australians, for instance, have taken unto themselves the fighting of the Chinese civil war, attacking and isolating Taiwan. Peking, in contrast, although it has helped keep the civil war alive, has offered inducements to Chinese republicans on Taiwan, and has been less open in its denunciation than Australians. Australia has also recognized and supported African and other revolutionary movements previously stimulated by Peking. It has also adopted an anti-American, pro-nationalist, anti-imperialist stance which makes it a good model for the united front against hegemonism. Its one fault is it has not adopted an anti-Soviet revisionist stance.

This does not mean Australia turned willingly to become Peking's proxy, any more than Somalia did in the 1960s. Australian policy is more complex than it appears on the surface level. The point is, however, that the impression had been unwittingly created that Mr. Whitlam was committed to the same cause as the Chinese of creating a new world outlook, and that the time had come when he was elected for China to let Australia play a leading part in this. The impression created in Australia by the media that a love affair had suddenly commenced with Peking, did nothing to dispel an impression in Peking that Australia would help in the task of resolving the complex contradictions in the world in the favour of the forces of national

liberation and of orthodox Marxist-Leninism. This impression, incidentally, has no doubt cost Australia a position of leadership among the real non-committed Powers who have not gone to such lengths in their relations with Peking, and could affect Australia's aim to send a peace-keeping force to the Middle East. Australia is likely to be no more wanted there now than the Yemen was in the 1960s. Neither Power seemed purely dispassionate and objective.

Peking's main centre of interest, however, is the Middle East. Oceania is of little concern. The Middle East is viewed as the real arena in which the variety of contradictions exists. It is, in miniature, the arena of world struggle. It is affected, in Peking's view, by all of the present contradictions in the world; it is the scene of a conflict between the two super-Powers who, it is believed, seek to dominate the area for its resources. It is the scene of conflict between oil-producing and other national States who seek independence, and the new colonialist super-Powers. And it is the scene of a class struggle led by class-conscious proletarian Palestinian forces who follow the ways of Chairman Mao, as they seek to overthrow non-proletarians and resolve correctly the contradictions confronting Socialist forces in the Arab world.

It is because of the complexities there, and the hopes of success for the course of permanent revolution being waged there that Peking places little emphasis on the Indian Ocean area as a whole. The problems arising there promise to be settled as a result of the resolution of contradictions elsewhere.

Appendix

Although China has trade and diplomatic links in the area, the Soviet Union has a more obvious presence and a stronger framework of establishments.

PEKING'S AND MOSCOW'S DIPLOMATIC LINKS WITH STATES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA.

	C. P. R.		Soviet Union	Soviet official naval visits
	1969	1974	1974	from 1969
Oceania				
Australia	–	x	x	–
South-East and South Asia				
Indonesia	–	–	x	–
Malaysia	–	x	x	–
Singapore	–	–	x	x
Thailand	–	–	x	–
Burma	x	x	x	–
Bangladesh	–	–	x	x
Nepal	x	x	x	–
Maldives	–	x	x	x
India	x	x	x	x
Sri Lanka	x	x	x	x
Pakistan	x	x	x	x
Afghanistan	x	x	x	–
Arabian Gulf and Red Sea				
Iran	–	x	x	x
Iraq	x	x	x	x
Kuwait	–	x	x	–
Saudi Arabia	–	–	x	–
Bahrein	–	–	–	x
Qatar	–	x	–	–
United Arab Emirates	–	x	–	–
Oman	–	–	–	–
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen	x	x	x	x
Yemen	–	x	x	x
Jordan	–	–	–	–
Israel	–	–	–	–
Egypt	x	x	x	x
Sudan	x	x	x	x
Ethiopia	–	x	x	x
Afars and Issas (France)	–	–	–	–
Somalia	x	x	x	x
Africa				
Kenya	x	x	x	x
Uganda	x	x	–	–
Rwanda	–	x	x	–
Burundi	–	x	–	–
Tanzania	x	x	x	x
Malawi	–	–	–	–
Zambia	x	x	x	–
Mozambique (Portugal)	–	–	–	–
Rhodesia	–	–	–	–
South Africa	–	–	–	–
Swaziland	–	–	–	–
Lesotho	–	–	–	–

Islands				
Madagascar	–	x	–	–
Mauritius	–	x	x	x
Seychelles (Britain)	–	–	–	–
Comoro, Reunion etc. (France)	–	–	–	–

THE CHANGING PATTERN OF PEKING'S RECOGNITION OF REVOLUTIONARY ARMED STRUGGLE IN INDIAN OCEAN STATES.

1968

Azania (South Africa)
Burma
India
Indonesia
Malaya
Mozambique
Namibia (S.W. Africa)
North Kalimantan
Palestine (Israel)
Thailand
West Kalimantan
Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)

1974

Azania (South Africa)
Mozambique
Palestine (Israel)
Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)

PRC AND SOVIET TRADE WITH INDIAN OCEAN STATES 1968 (US $ million)

	P.R.C.		*Soviet Union*	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
South-East Asia and Oceania				
Australia	30.5	89.3	1.0	36.0
Indonesia	–	–	5.0	17.0
Singapore	150.3	26.5	6.0	2.0
Malaysia	57.2	23.9	–	90.0
Burma	0.8	–	2.0	–
South Asia and Middle East				
India	–	–	164.0	164.0
Sri Lanka	41.2	32.7	–	15.0
Pakistan	29.6	25.5	33.0	10.0
Iran	2.3	1.5	79.0	36.0
Iraq	16.9	5.9	46.0	4.0
Kuwait	20.9	0.3	–	13.0
P.D.R. of Yemen (South)	2.7	–	–	–
Saudi Arabia	–	–	3.0	–
Jordan	4.6	0.5	–	–
Egypt	20.4	16.5	–	–
Ethiopia	2.6	0.5	2.0	2.0
Africa				
Kenya	4.5	1.2	1.0	–
Uganda	2.9	4.9	–	–
Tanzania	12.1	7.7	1.0	1.0

Notes and References

1. "British Imperialism on its Last Legs," *Jen Min Jih Pao*, 20 January 1968.

2. See e.g. "U.S. Imperialism Steps up its Aggression to turn Indonesia into its Colony"; "Soviet Revisionism's Towering Crimes Against the Indonesian Revolution" in *Peking Review*, no. 11, 15 March 1968, pp. 29-31; "Vorster U.S. Hatchetman in Southern Africa" in *Peking Review*, no. 51, 20 December 1968, pp. 25-27; "Soviet Revisionists Intensifying Collaboration with Asian, African and Latin American Reactionaries" in *Peking Review*, no. 20, 17 May 1968, pp. 24-26; "What Kosygin is up to in India," *Jen Min Jih Pao*, 5 February 1968.

3. "What Kosygin is up to in India," *Jen Min Jih Pao*, 5 February 1968; Two Big Powers Talk Peace for their own Interests, *New China News Agency (N.C.N.A.)* Peking, 14 July 1973.

4. Article 9, Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Republic of India, 9 August 1971.

5. See e.g. "U.S. Soviet Scramble for Hegemony in South Asian Continent and Indian Ocean" in *Peking Review*, no, 2, 14 January 1972, pp. 16-17.

6. This slogan was used as a headline for foreign news round-ups after Peking turned to promote an anti-imperialist united front in the "Third World": see e.g. *Peking Review*, no. 2,14 January 1972, pp. 13-15.

7. See e.g. "At present the world revolution has entered a new great era. The struggle of the black people in the United States for emancipation is a component part of the general struggle of all the peoples of the world against U.S. imperialism, a component part of world revolution" in Statement by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in Support of the Afro-American Struggle Against Violent Repression. *N.C.N.A.*Peking, 16 April 1968; also New Year Message 1974, *Jen Min Jih Pao*, 1 January 1974.

8. See e.g. "The third world has become stronger and more united, playing an ever more significant role in international affairs. Imperialism, modern revisionism and all reaction are in decline and riddled with crises" in New Year Message 1974, *Jen Min Jih Pao*, 1 January 1974.

9. "Most Powerful Ideological Weapon Against U.S. Imperialism and Soviet Revisionism" in Peking Review no. 49, 6 December 1968, pp. 17-18, 28.

10. Rapid Fall of the Dollar Empire, *N.C.N.A.* Peking, 1 January 1972; Chang Chien "Behind the So-Called Energy Crisis" in *Peking Review*, no. 11, 15 March 1974, pp. 5-7.

11. "Disappointments and Setbacks" in B.D. Larkin, *China and Africa 1949-1970* (University of California, Berkeley, 1971), chapter 6.

12. New Year Message 1974, *Jen Min Jih Pao*, 1 January 1974.

13. See e.g. "Our Internationalist Duty is to Support the the Revolutionary Struggle of the World's People" in "Soviet Revisionists' Plot" in *Peking Review*, no. 2, 12 January 1968, pp. 25-27; "New Era with Mao Tse-tung's Thought as its Great Banner Acclaimed" in *Peking Review*, no. 2, 12 January 1968, pp. 12-14, 27.

14. Adulation of Mao Tse-tung by overseas political activists has been given frequent notice in the Chinese Communist Press since the cultural revolution began. See e.g. the poem *The Red Book* by the Pakistani Talib Jullandri:

    The Red Book of Mao Tse-tung sheds its rays everywhere,
    The proletarians read it and draw courage
    To fight the oppressors
    And settle accounts with them.

    Peking Review, no, 1, 3 January 1968, p. 38.

15. See e.g. "Transform the World with Guns" in "Chairman Mao Always Sides with the Oppressed People" in *Peking Review*, no. 19, 10 May 1968, p. 17.

16. See e.g. Mao Tse-tung, *Where Do Correct Ideas Come From?* (Peking 1963).

17. For the theory see Mao Tse-tung *On Contradiction*, 1937. For recent articles on the *Gestalt* nature of Chinese Communist practice see Hung Yuan "Grasp the General Trend of Historical Development" in *Hung Ch'i*, no. 7, July 1972; Hung Yuan "Learn and Master the Dialectics of General and Individual Character: a Study of On Contradiction" in *Hung Ch'i*, no. 4, April 1973; Hung Yuan "Learn to Observe Problems with the Law of the Unity of Opposites" in *Hung Ch'i*, no. 4, April 1974; Nan Yu "It is Necessary to Look at the Problem in its Totality" in *Hung Ch'i*, no. 1, January 1973.

18. See e.g. "Developments on the world scene give eloquent proof of the validity of Chairman Mao's scientific theses on the international situation", in New Year Message 1974, *Jen Min Jih Pao*, 1 January 1974.

19. For a recent critique of empiricism see Ni Chih-fu "Overcome Empiricism" in *Hung Ch'i*, no. 10, October 1972.

20. For the theory see Mao Tse-tung *On Contradiction*, 1937; *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People*, 1957. For a recent comment see

"Use Dialectical Materialism to Take the Initiative in Revolution" in *Hung Ch'i*, no. 8, August 1972.

21. See e.g. "Under the Guidance of Mao Tse-tung's Invincible Thought, Asian, African and Latin American People make Surging Advances in their Revolutionary Armed Struggle" in *Peking Review*, no. 1, 3 January 1968, pp. 33–37. See also the words of the song "Sailing the Seas Depends on the Helmsman", popularized in 1968.

> Fish can't live without water,
> Melons can't thrive off the vine,
> The revolutionary masses cannot do
> without the Communist Party,
> Mao Tse-tung's Thought is the never setting sun.

22. For recent Chinese Communist articles see Ch'iang Ch'ien "Imperialism is the Eve of the Social Revolution of the Proletariat" in *Hung Ch'i*, no. 9, September 1973; Kuo Mo-jo "The Question of Dividing Ancient Chinese History into Stages" in *Hung Ch'i*, no. 7, July 1972; Shih Chih "More on Reading Some World History" in Hung Ch'i, no. 5, May 1972; "Reading Some History of Imperialism" in *Hung Ch'i*, no. 6, June 1972. For a recent prophetic statement see Soong Ching-ling "The Beginning of a New Era," *China Reconstructs*, 1 January 1972.

23. See e.g. "Bring into Full Play the Leading Role of the Vanguard of the Proletariat" in *Hung Ch'i*, no. 9, September 1973; "Give Full Scope to the Vanguard: Exemplary Role of Communist Party Members" in *Hung Ch'i*, no. 7, July 1972; Hsueh Lun "Communist Party Members Must Forever be the Advanced Element of the Proletariat" in *Hung Ch'i*, no. 8, August 1973; see also "Sailing the Seas Depends on the Helmsman" in note 21 above.

24. See e.g. "New Era with Mao Tse-tung's Thought as its Banner Acclaimed" in *Peking Review*, no. 2, 12 January 1968, p. 12.

25. For a recent model Western view on this see R. Jenkins, *Exploitation*, Paladin Books, London, 1971.

26. "What Kosygin is Up to in India", *Jen Min Jih Pao*, 5 February 1968; "The Soviet Revisionist Clique is the Vicious Enemy of the Asian People" *Jen Men Jih Pao*, 17 February 1968, where India is described as Russia's hatchetman in the area; "Soviet Revisionists Intensify Collaboration with Asian, African and Latin American Reactionaries" in *Peking Review*, no. 20, 17 May 1968, pp. 24–26; "Soviet Social-Imperialism is Behind-the-Scenes Boss of Indian Expansionists," *N.C.N.A.*, Peking, 11 December 1971.

27. See e.g. "Reports on the Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly, 10–24 April 1974, to Discuss the Problems of Raw Materials and Development", *N.C.N.A.*, Peking, 28 April 1974. Reports were also made in *Peking Review*, nos 17-18, April-May 1974.

28. B.D. Larkin, *China and Africa 1949–1970* (University of California, Berkeley, 1971), Chapter 6.

29. These were in particular the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, 1967; and the Revolutionary Government of the Somali Democratic Republic, 1969.

30. See e.g. "Mao Tse-tung's Thought Lights the Whole World" in *Peking Review*, no. 2, 12 January 1968, pp. 10–12. Praise for Mao from different parts of the world was featured constantly in the Chinese Press; e.g. a Mozambique guerrilla was reported to say "We are grateful to the great revolutionary leader Chairman Mao Tse-tung because it is his teachings that have changed our spiritual outlook, reinforced our will to fight and make us proficient in fighting." *Peking Review*, no. 1, 3 January 1968, pp. 35–36.

31. "Theories of Limited Sovereignty and International Dictatorship are Soviet Revisionist Social-Imperialist Gangster Theories" in *Peking Review*, no. 13, 28 March 1969, pp. 23–25.

32. "Red Revolutionary Area in India Shines Like a Beacon: the Revolutionary Armed Struggle in Srikakulam under the Leadership of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) is Expanding" in *Peking Review*, no. 1, 2 January 1970, pp. 30–31; "Indian Peasant Armed Struggle Intensifies" in *Peking Review*, no. 7, 13 February 1970, pp. 15–16.

33. See e.g. "Parliamentary Cretinism Refuted" in *Peking Review*, no. 45, 8 November 1968, pp. 19–22.

34. "New Confessions of U.S. Imperialism Impasse and Rapid Decline: Nixon's State of the Union Message Bemoans Serious Financial Crisis and Unprecedented Sharpening of Class Contradictions at Home" in *Peking Review*, no. 6, 6 February 1970, pp. 24–26.

35. "Wanton Expansion and Aggression Abroad by Soviet Revisionist Social-Imperialism" in *Peking Review*, no. 22, 30 May 1969, pp. 16–18; "Down with the New Tsars" in *Peking Review*, no. 23, 6 June 1969; "Kremlin's New Tsars Rig Up Anti-China Encirclement" in *Peking Review*, no. 14, 4 April 1969, pp. 25–27.

36. Chi Hsiang-yang "Smash the New Tsar's Theory of Limited Sovereignty" in *Hung Ch'i*, no. 5, May 1969; for fears about Mongolia and East Europe see *Peking Review*, no. 24, 13 June 1969, pp. 22–24.

37. Two Big Powers Talk Peace for their own Interests, *N.C.N.A.* Peking, 14 July 1973.

38. "Revolutionary Soviet People will Rise Up to Overthrow Reactionary Rule of Kremlin's New Tsars" in *Peking Review*, no. 6, 9 February 1969, pp. 21–23; "Revolutionary Soviet People Ardently Love Chairman Mao" in *Peking Review*, no. 14, April 1969, pp. 21–22; "Soviet Revisionism Heavily Besieged by Soviet and World's Revolutionary People" in *Peking Review*, no. 24, 13 June 1969, pp. 22–24.

39. For an appreciation of the contradictions see "Victorious Years and Bright Prospects" in *Peking Review*, no. 2, 9 January 1970, pp. 18–22; and *Reports*

of 9th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, April 1969.

40. Mao Tse-tung *People of the World, Unite and Defeat the U.S. Aggressors and all their Running Dogs*, Peking, 20 May 1970. This document was later claimed to be a turning point in the struggle to resolve new contradictions: see "A Programme for Anti-Imperialist Struggle" *Jen Min Jih Pao*, 20 May 1971. The Soviet Union was regarded as a running dog of imperialism. The Lusaka Conference of non-aligned Powers was regarded as a success for the anti-imperialist united front forces of the Third World: see *Jen Min Jih Pao*, 14 September 1970.

41. See e.g. "Unite with all Forces that can be United to Win Still Greater Victories" in *Peking Review*, no. 21, 23 May 1969; Hsieh To "It is Necessary to Unite with the Vast Majority" in *Hung Ch'i*, no. 4, April 1974; Shen Chun "The Great Victory of Chairman Mao's Strategic Thinking" in *Hung Ch'i*. no. 8, August 1972.

42. "Detente Smoke Screen Cannot Cover up Military Ambitions in Europe" in *Peking Review*, no. 51, 21 December 1973, pp. 4-5; New Year Message 1974 *Jen Min Jih Pao*, 1 January 1974.

43. Profound Friendship Between Peoples of Western Europe and China, *N.C.N.A.*, Peking, 25 February 1972; Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Fetes European Diplomatic Envoys, *N.C.N.A.*, Peking, 22 March 1972; "Superpower Rivalry in Middle East Expedites West European Unity" in *Peking Review*, no. 49, 7 December 1973, pp. 13-14.

44. Several minor reactions have been publicized: see e.g. Kuwaiti Paper Exposes Soviet Infiltration into Gulf Area in Collaboration with India, *N.C.N.A.*, Peking, 30 July 1973; Zairian Paper Condemns Certain Socialist Country for Sabotaging Relations with China, *N.C.N.A.* Peking, 4 July 1973.

45. See e.g. "Representatives of Third World Countries Condemn Superpowers Plunder and Control: Report of 6th Special Session of U.N. General Assembly on Resources" in *Peking Review*, no. 17, 26 April 1974, pp. 18-22.

46. Two Super-powers: Fishing Overlords on the Sea, *N.C.N.A.*, Peking, 21 March 1973; Soviet Plunder of Pakistan Fishing Resources Denounced, *N.C.N.A.*, Peking, 23 February 1973; "Who's Fishing in Troubled Waters?" *Peking Review*, no. 21, 24 May 1974, pp. 20-21.

47. "Strange Agreements for Maritime Expansion" in *Peking Review*, no. 24, 14 June 1974, p. 19.

48. Chang Chien, "Behind the So-Called Energy Crisis" in *Peking Review*, no. 11, 15 March 1974, pp. 5-7; "Energy Crisis and Scramble for Energy Resources" in *Peking Review*, no. 39, 22 September 1973, pp. 12-14.

HONG KONG: *Stability in this British Colony rests on a "tripod of consents": those of the British and Chinese Governments (which are unlikely to be withdrawn in the foreseeable future, not at any rate until there is a change of leaders in Peking); and that of the local Chinese population – a society psychologically attached to the status quo and seemingly resilient enough to absorb present destabilizing pressures.*

Sources of Stability and Instability in Hong Kong

P.B. Harris

HONG KONG is of course an apparent anachronism. In the post-colonial era it is a continuing source of amazement to many observers that "Capitalism" and "Communism" can exist cheek by jowl and, it would appear, operate to the benefit of both. In fact it would be much better to regard Hong Kong as a city-State in its own right on the lines of Singapore with which it is so very frequently compared and contrasted. The notion that Hong Kong is to be dismissed, with a sneer, as a "colony" fails to grasp the simple fact that Hong Kong's colonial status is a mere shell of a status, a facade, under which the reality is the Hong Kong dollar, one of the world's hardest currencies.

Hong Kong has been technically a British colony since 1842 but its end is, equally technically, in law, in sight. In 1997 the lease on the largest portion of the "colony", the area described as the New Territories, will expire. Unless there is some renegotiation of the lease the greater portion of Hong Kong, about five-sixths in all, is due to revert to China. The island of Hong Kong and the Kowloon peninsula were ceded *in perpetuity* to the British Crown (itself a legal fiction used to describe the British Government) in 1842 and 1860 respectively. In those years no one could have foreseen either the dynamic economic growth or the strange "frozen" politics of Hong Kong (1). The business of Hong Kong has always been business, beginning with opium. In 1800, Britain supplied 4,000 chests of opium to China; by 1839 (just prior to the occupation of Hong Kong) this figure had increased tenfold to about 40,000 chests. Hong Kong has therefore progressed from opium mart to a premier world trading centre in terms of its manifold economic and financial activities.

By 1973, the economy of Hong Kong, a tiny area where business energy reached frenetic proportions, was producing a total gross domestic product of HK$28,335 at current market prices and Hong Kong was about eighteenth in measured trade performance. Its major concern was in manufacturing, particularly of textiles, which accounted for a figure approaching one-half of the total output. Hong Kong's financial sector has of course always been of central importance, and 73 licensed banks operate there. Land is also a major activity and the Hong Kong Land Company is the world's biggest land concern. The USA and Great Britain were Hong Kong's largest export markets taking, in the period January to September 1973, HK$4,999 million and HK$1,896 million respectively (2).

Hong Kong keeps its formidable reserves of international currency in London by an agreement with the British Government which guarantees them at a level pegged to the US dollar. The reserves amount to about £736 million sterling, of which about 11 per cent is kept in Deutschmarks, yen, Dutch florins, Malaysian dollars and Belgian francs. The other 89 per cent

is kept in sterling, a fact which causes some considerable resentment in Hong Kong. A common feeling is that "our money" is being handed over to Britain, though such an unsophisticated view is simplistic. Yet of all matters designated as economic and financial, the question of Hong Kong's reserves is perhaps the most sensitive and delicate. China's own dependence upon Hong Kong is also a matter of some interest. China's foreign currency acquisitions are believed to be gained largely through Hong Kong. These may amount to £350 million to £400 million per annum. In other words, every day that the colony survives in its present form, China gains a further £1 million (or about HK$12 million). If China is prepared to conduct its foreign economic policy on the basis of economic rationality then it would clearly not wish to foreclose on its lease with undue haste. However, economic rationality does not always prevail, and it must be stressed that, in the case of Hong Kong and the options for its future, China's decision on the matter is likely to be final (3).

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How strong is the economy?

Laissez-faire is "anarchy plus the constable".

(Carlyle)

There is a need to consider something of the very reason for Hong Kong's continuing existence - that of trade. Singapore's economy might be described, not unfairly, as "dirigiste", compared with that of Hong Kong, and an indication of this description may be seen in the increase in expenditure on defence from 2.1 per cent of its Gross National Product (GNP) in 1968, to 9.4 per cent in 1972. Hong Kong "watchers", however, see the city-State as something closer to *laissez-faire* than to any other conceivable "system" (though one could debate the proposition that *laissez-faire* comprised a "system"). The Governor, in his speech of 17 October 1973, indicated his opposition to government intervention by "the introduction of disciplines having the force of law" (4). Hong Kong's "ideology" is a non-ideology, to which it holds in almost aggressive fashion.

The Financial Secretary, Mr. C.P. Haddon-Cave underlined the Governor's policies in his speech to a conference of managers on 13 November 1973. Mr. Haddon-Cave argued that an "objective description" of government policies would be "realistic pragmatism" (5). Mr. Haddon-Cave objected to a "bureaucratic sprawl", "that disease so common elsewhere", presumably as the price to be paid for abandoning "realistic pragmatism".

Most revealingly of all, however, Mr. Haddon-Cave put forward the view that "the rate of growth of the economy is what life is really all about in Hong Kong". Circumstances in Hong Kong are "unusual", hence "Government is, and will remain, conscious of how easy it would be to damage the ability of market forces to bring about rapid adjustments of costs, prices and the pattern of output and thereby slow down the rate of growth without any compensatory gains" (6).

There is likely to be some greater degree of government intervention in Hong Kong affairs but fundamentally the "directors" of Hong Kong's economy do not want to be "directors". The economy does not call for "direction" and the "system" is one "we could not even contemplate tampering with" (7).

The economy therefore operates according to "free market forces", duly modified by the scrutiny of the Finance Branch. If new controls need to be imposed, however, they are applied with considerable reluctance, but imposed they often are. The new *laissez-faire* means leaving the new controls intact, because removing them could be a disturbing factor. Possibly the clue to the understanding of Hong Kong's economic system (and here I write rather as a political scientist than an economist) lies less in the extent of the presence or absence of *laissez-faire* but rather more in the absence of hasty and unpredictable change. The test is stability, whether economic or political. Indeed what Business, Trade, and Finance resent is unpredictable change or inexplicable regulation. No enterprise or economic activity in Hong Kong has ever protested against any government "interference" which operated to its benefit. *Laissez-faire* should not always be equated with *laissez-passer.* In any case *laissez-faire* economics should logically co-exist with *laissez-faire* politics. There is no market politics to complement market economics in Hong Kong. There are at

the most networks of political interests. Indeed Hong Kong's particular ruling *elite* operates in close association with the manifold economic interest groups in the city. The strength of the economy therefore lies only in part in the admitted presence of Adam Smith's "invisible hand" but also in the increasing constabulary presence of governmental controls.

The discussion about *laissez-faire* has however made obscure a rather different but essential point, namely that economic forces in Hong Kong do not have predictable political outcomes. The argument suggests that Hong Kong has flourished in the past because people made "calculations" (in the time-honoured tradition of the Chinese fashion), regarding their present prospects without worrying unduly about the future. Yet in fact, Hong Kong does not have a capitalist *laissez-faire* culture. It has a disciplined culture, a legatee of the Chinese Confucian tradition still prevalent in Hong Kong. The Chinese tradition has always stressed the family unit, one of the classical requirements of Confucius. The Confucian tradition still appears to be strong enough to sustain a society under stress. Self-discipline in Chinese society is still strong enough to provide an anchor in a rapidly changing world. The economy represents a sub-system in Hong Kong society. The common belief about Hong Kong is that the economy is the community's driving force or that society maintains its impetus because of the economy. The truth is exactly the opposite, and the economy derives its strength from the society rather than the other way around. This is the underlying hidden source of economic strength in Hong Kong.

* * * * * * *

How secure is the government?

"I am as much for government by consent as any man but if you ask me how it is to be done I confess I do not know."

(Oliver Cromwell)

The Government of Hong Kong is perhaps as "legitimate" as any in Asia, despite the fact that it is "colonial". The Hong Kong Government operates in terms of permanency despite the fear of the terminal date of 1997. It is a tolerated government because although many Chinese feel justifiably affronted by the British presence in Hong Kong, they tolerate this presence for perhaps two reasons. In the first place, the Chinese by tradition have tended to avoid entanglements with authority, bureaucracy and government, so that if the power-that-be does its job fairly effectively and unobtrusively, then they tend to accept ruling entities which in the West are called "governments".

In the second place, the British presence in Hong Kong is an old one dating back to 1841. After such a long time, British rule has become habitual, surely poised in the confident expectation of continuing rule. The psychological climate which this 133-year period has created is suggestive of stability and continuity.

There has been a tendency for visiting British parliamentarians and local administrators to draw excessively unjustified conclusions about Hong Kong on the lines of government by consent. The MPs normally contribute little to the debate but the local officials have views which, as the following extract shows, suggest that the *status quo* can be explained, or explained away, in sophisticated terms.

> Fundamental changes in the nature of the central government seem to me to be ruled out because they would destroy the stability of Hong Kong. In most territories a government will stay in power so long, but only so long as it retains the consent of the people. Hong Kong's stability rests not on one leg but on a tripod of consents, each one of which is essential for continuation of anything like the present way of life. These three consents are the consent of Hong Kong people, the consent of China and the consent of Britain. The withdrawal of any one of these three consents will endanger the whole structure (8).

The official view of the Hong Kong Government, then, is that Hong Kong can remain stable only as long as the "tripod of consents" holds firm. "The necessity to retain the stability of this tripod of consents sets quite severe limits to what is practical in the way of political reform and this is generally known and appreciated throughout the Colony" (9). What therefore exists in Hong Kong is bureaucratic politics. The franchise is restricted to Urban Council elections (a body essentially concerned with relatively non-controversial environmental functions); hence many government policies tend to be made to suit the convenience of the administrators of the colony.

In some respects the Hong Kong Government, which employs about 200,000 people, suggests an Hobbesian Leviathan figure or a bureaucratic octopus. The government machine in Hong Kong is clearly a "bureaucratic phenomenon", on Cobden's terminology a "thing", an "it" which has massive ramifications throughout the entire community. The vast mass of Hong Kong citizens is likely to wish to avoid it (a possible harkening back to the older Chinese mentality), as it suggests delay, trouble and unimaginable difficulties. As for so many peoples throughout Asia, government for the mass of Hong Kong people is mysterious, unfathomable and unpleasant. "In your whole life-time", the old saying ran, "never put your foot inside the house of the Mandarin."

At the top levels, government may seek to do its best, but the top levels of government are remote indeed from the struggling lower parts. At the mid and lower levels there does indeed exist an obscure and privileged mandarinate. The concept of the dedicated public servant, giving of his best with dignity has been sadly neglected if not abandoned in much of the bureaucracy.

* * * * * * *

PUBLIC officials including the police in Hong Kong have collapsed under the strain of the temptations of corruption and have experienced a period of collective guilt as far as the Great Debate on Corruption is concerned. The present agonized exchanges came to the surface with the disappearance from Hong Kong of a senior European police officer, Mr. Peter Godber in June 1973, in conditions which indicated that he was making an illegal departure from Hong Kong with corruptly acquired assets. Under Hong Kong law, public officers are not permitted to "be in control of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to present or past official emoluments". Godber had assets of approximately US$900,000 or nearly six times his total net salary for the period of his employment as a police officer (10 August 1952 - 31 May 1973). He was in all probability a sterling millionaire if all his assets, including property, were counted.

Under British law, Godber was guilty of no offence and so he could remain safely ensconced on British soil while he could not be removed to a British colony. The case was thoroughly investigated by a judge deputed for the purpose, Sir Alastair Blair-Karr, in two reports produced in 1973. He pointed out that English law as applied to public service corruption, "was making no real impact on the problem of corruption in Hong Kong". As a result of the enquiry the Governor decided to separate the previous Anti-Corruption Branch from the police and create a new Independent Commission against Corruption.

As a result, police morale was no more than passable, certainly not good. During 1973-74, as the rate of detection dropped, reported crime in Hong Kong rose by 18 per cent, of which the majority of cases were sexual offences or robberies. Less than half of the crimes were solved. Hong Kong had become a less safe community in which to live despite a "Fight Violent Crime Campaign" inaugurated during 1973. There were also difficult continuing problems, which appear to be insoluble, regarding hawkers and their activities, legal and illegal, and drug addicts. The existence of secret societies or "triads" whose often criminal activities extended into many of the "submerged" portions of Hong Kong life, further contributes to the development of a form of commercial trinity. One might envisage three circles touching each other, each standing respectively for hawkers, drug addicts and triads with the police squeezed in between them. Despite many brave attempts to grapple with the criminal tangle, it is unlikely that the police can make much impact upon the intricacies of the criminal web. Even if the spirit were willing, the flesh is clearly weak, and morale in the Royal Hong Kong Police Force is unlikely to pick up until better relations have been established with the community.

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ON the surface there are many reasons why one might expect instability in Hong Kong. These may perhaps be summarized in a series of points for special analysis.

Economic disparities: In Hong Kong there are huge disparities of wealth. At one extreme one discovers the excessively rich groups who have made fortunes in Hong Kong in ways legal and illegal. (It was revealed that, outside Europe, Hong Kong was perhaps the largest single market for *Rolls-Royce* motorcars.) At the other extreme are the very poor, living a squalid hand-to-mouth existence in squatter huts or early-built resettle-

ment estates. Such disparities are often starkly displayed against a background of a strident, jarringly unacceptable face of capitalism of which Hong Kong is perhaps the foremost temple. The disparities themselves have not yet been translated into political action.

Political juxtaposition to Communist China: Hong Kong's position as a stronghold of *laissez-faire* in close proximity to revolutionary mainland China has for long been a source of speculation if not amazement. The Soviet Union has frequently commented, in caustic fashion, upon the peaceful co-existence, and, indeed, of co-operation as between the two supposedly antithetical systems of Chinese Communism and British commercial capitalism. The incongruity can only be explained from China's side from the proposition that Hong Kong is already "part of China", to be reabsorbed (formally) "when the time is ripe". Britain's argument is based upon law as set out in the treaties by which China ceded Hong Kong to Britain during the 19th century. Chinese "politics" thus talk across British "law", as it were, so that neither party speaks directly to the other.

Free exchange of ideas: John Stuart Mill once argued that it was only "by the collision of adverse opinions" that "truth can be supplied". There is no restriction in Hong Kong of the liberty of the Press, of speech or of lawful demonstration, though the Special Branch of the police hold a tight rein so as to restrain any groups which seek to disturb Hong Kong's delicate balance of opinions. It is generally assumed that the interest of most people in the "colony" is served by restraint. Hence most newspaper comment is appropriately moderate. If Hong Kong is not a parliamentary democracy, it is at least an "open society" in which the expression of responsible opinion is not condemned *per se,* though of course at the same time those whose economic and social position is secure are much more likely to feel free to articulate their views than the poorer less-educated sections of society.

The presence of a Western overlord: British presence in Hong Kong is clearly regarded a necessary evil, but there are surprisingly few demonstrations directed against the presence of the British authorities themselves. There are of course outbursts of anger and these appear to be directed particularly against the holding of Hong Kong's reserve deposits in London. These have been guaranteed as against the U.S. dollar by the British Government on condition that Hong Kong keeps its reserves in the United Kingdom. Yet these reserves appear to symbolize more than anything else the British presence. Indeed there is little actual annoyance at British military presence.

The mood of youth: The mood of Hong Kong's youth is not easy to assess, largely because it has never sufficiently been explored, although it is relentlessly exploited by the media and by the crushing burdens of the examination system. Some attempts have been made to discover the aspirations of the two million persons under the age of 21 but largely without success. A less rigorously quantitative analysis, but one based on observation suggests that even articulate "post-secondary" students (who are admittedly only a small minority) are unlikely to be radical other than in a purely rhetorical sense. What they are really concerned about is their own feeling of identity with China, China's standing and status in the world, and their overwhelming emotional orientation is in the direction of China itself. A certain idealistic patriotism predominates and the entry of the People's Republic into full membership of the United Nations was greeted by students at the University of Hong Kong with considerable delight. On many other occasions the more vociferous and articulate university students have stressed their kinship with and patriotism to China. Whereas the views of many students on political and constitutional matters have frequently been equivocal, the expression of their patriotic zeal has shown no bounds.

It has proved difficult moreover for young people to clarify their thinking on these difficult issues. They are enthusiastically patriotic towards China and hostile or apathetic about British rule in Hong Kong. Apart from those who support Taiwan's cause, they are not so clear regarding their personal acceptance of mainland China and all that implies. Half of Hong Kong's population is under 21 and, for them, unlike so many of their parents, Hong Kong is "home". The generation gap syndrome is particularly evident in the post-Confucian society which is so much a part of Hong Kong's culture. One student writing in a magazine, *The Voice,* put the problem as follows:

> Whilst in Hong Kong, a place where Oriental and Western civilizations meet, youngsters are exposed to Western style of living in schools and society and subject to Oriental customs at home. Therefore,

their minds are packed with both filial piety and liberty, the two ideas are in constant "civil war". Further, the young generation is in general much better educated than their parents, they feel what their fathers and mothers think and do are out-dated and parents are ignorant, yet they do not want to hurt their feelings very much or to be called ungrateful, so the only thing they can do is to pretend to be obedient but ignoring any comment from their parents.

The dilemma here posed is clearly a very real one, and could, in any less stable non-Chinese society, produce stress or even perhaps disturbance.

As Hong Kong's young people move towards the West, so at the same time they appear to resent its dominance and to respond by stressing the very qualities of China which they see as marking them off from the West. Such a situation is a recipe for confusion rather than direct action, and people in Hong Kong constantly note how "patriotic" issues surface, appear to collect opinion but quickly disappear. Most of these issues have been concerned with Chinese boundary or territorial disputes. Young people in Hong Kong naturally but very readily take up China's cause in marginal issues of international politics. The absence of official Soviet diplomatic representation in Hong Kong is clearly an absence of necessity. Such a presence might be an invitation to demonstration, though the United States Consulate-General survives unscathed (or indeed as a source of exit visas).

Inflation: The particular problem of inflation in Hong Kong in mid-1974 has clearly become the most delicate matter and a potential source of instability, particularly as levels of employment have been falling. Approximately 70 per cent of the population of Hong Kong earn less than HK$1,000 per month. At the other end of the scale, those who earn more than HK$4,500 constitute 1.7 per cent of the total population. Contrasts between rich and poor are everywhere apparent in Hong Kong. These disparities in income have produced considerable comment from the "liberal" Press, perhaps best summarized in the suggestion that it may not be too long, "before the weight of discontent makes the whole structure come crashing down" (10).

The summer of 1974 was seen by some as providing a clear test of the stability of the city-State if the question of inflation, then of the order of 10 per cent, were seen to be the touchstone. A rally was held, reputedly the largest in Hong Kong's history, on May Day under the auspices of the Workers' Commission and the Hong Kong Anti-Inflation Action Committee. Inflation may be seen as an infinitely exploitable issue which the most radical supporters of the Shanghai group, led by Chiang Ching, may be prepared to develop into confrontation. The rally produced a number of predictable demands, particularly that of a call for Hong Kong to use its reserves held in London to support those suffering from the effects of inflation. The economic reasons against such a move were quickly detailed by the Acting Financial Secretary, in a well-publicized speech.

The wages of workers in Hong Kong cannot be increased with the same automatic regularity which is seen in Western European countries as the acceptable norm. Employers in Hong Kong are either reluctant or unaccustomed to think in terms of regular and agreed increases, with the result that a considerable delay between price increases and subsequent wage increases may result. In the intervening period, considerable hardship may result. Only 50 firms out of 21,386 had effective joint consultative councils. The result of this was that wage negotiation procedures hardly existed. If workers did not like the wages offered they could go elsewhere to seek for more.

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THE official attitude of China towards Hong Kong is basically simple and may be reduced to the proposition that Hong Kong is Chinese territory and that China will take occupancy of Hong Kong "sooner or later" or when the time is ripe (11). The year 1997, the terminal date of the New Territories lease, therefore, may or may not be significant.

This official view does not take sufficient account of the complexities of the situation. While it is of course true that Hong Kong is predominantly Chinese in population, Hong Kong is at the same time a great international city. China has never ruled Hong Kong as it now is, a cosmopolitan world-State. When Hong Kong was given to the British in 1842 it was literally true, to use Lord Palmerston's notorious aphorism that it was "a barren island with hardly a house upon it". China would have to digest Hong Kong with all its banks, finance houses, factories, port facilities and myriad places of entertainment, shops and service industries. It would be neces-

sary to feed a population of four million westernized overseas Chinese long accustomed to foreign influences. It would be moreover necessary to relinquish something approaching US$900 million in trade and foreign exchange earnings (12). Finally, many States would regard China as an unstable Power — a most unhelpful development as far as China was concerned.

As of June 1974 no evidence could be discerned that either Britain or China envisaged a change in the *status quo*. Despite its determination to reduce defence expenditure, the British Labour Government did not seem to have immediate plans to curtail its Hong Kong garrison. Britain maintained a force of about 9,000 men in Hong Kong, a strength of five infantry battalions with artillery support, a few small warships and Royal Air Force helicopters. Doubts were cast regarding the future of the Gurkha force which rotated between Singapore, Brunei and Hong Kong.

As far as China was concerned the Chinese authorities announced in May 1974 at the time of the visit of the British Leader of the Opposition, Edward Heath, that there were no difficulties between Britain and China regarding Hong Kong. This statement should be enough to satisfy local Hong Kong Chinese Communists that their activities should not be directed towards creating such difficulties.

The coup in Portugal (25 April 1974) appeared to pass by Macao without immediately undue difficulty and Macao experienced no more than a temporary dislocation, despite the dismissal, in June, of the military head of Macao and his deputy. Lisbon's attitude to Macao was reformist rather than revolutionary, merely wishing to remedy abuses and create more political opportunities for the province.

There appeared, from the perspective of mid-1974 to be no overwhelming source of instability in Hong Kong apart from the worldwide problem of inflation. The solution of inflation could not be found in the practices of collective bargaining despite the pious exhortations of visiting Labour MPs from London. At time of writing however (June 1974) there is now "no conflict" between Britain and China over the role and status of Hong Kong. The Chinese were prepared, so it seemed, to take a "long-term view" of Hong Kong (13). China's trade projects with the United Kingdom appear to have made progress and no immediate points of conflict troubled Sino-British relationships. Edward Heath has been given clear letters of credit in China as a good European (i.e. anti-Soviet) and was seen by the Chinese as the potential Prime Minister. Such an assessment may not have provided much comfort for the incumbent Prime Minister, Mr. Wilson, but perhaps Mr. Heath was to be seen as a special envoy for Britain, accompanied as he was by the British Ambassador to Peking (rather than as a Leader of the Opposition — no doubt a strange concept in China's way of thinking).

We may therefore conclude that under present conditions the external stability of Hong Kong, as far as China is concerned, is well preserved. Indeed, China may be looked upon as Hong Kong's protector, issuing "orders" to the United Nations not to interfere in the question of the status of the city-State.

But what sort of China is this which seeks to protect the *status quo* as far as Hong Kong is concerned? It is, of course, none other than the China of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai. Ever since the Chinese Communists came to power in 1949, Hong Kong has not really had a moment of insecurity as far as the Peking leadership has been concerned. However in 1967, riots threatened this security, but it was widely accepted that these were essentially local in inspiration.

Therefore since the present Peking authorities have been in power, a period of 25 years, Hong Kong has been "safe". When the present rulers are finally removed, however, the future may be less secure, only because the predictable mainland supports of Hong Kong will then have been removed. What follows Mao is likely to be of concern to Hong Kong should this new authority decide that the approval of the present Chinese gerontocracy as regards Hong Kong is no longer tenable. The difficult date for Hong Kong is not then 1997, 23 years hence, but whenever Mao dies, say about 1977, to choose a date at random, when he will be 88. In 1997 he would be 104.

The final question relates to the ultimate possibility of an all-out attack on Hong Kong from mainland China. Such an attack is extremely unlikely but there are, of course, contingency plans for a military response, the details of which are not revealed to the British or Hong Kong publics. The last time Hong Kong was invaded, by the Japanese, in 1941, Hong Kong survived after stubborn resistance for no more than 17

days (14). However, China is likely to contemplate such an invasion only on one or more of the following conditions:

- Total breakdown of communications at present carefully and assiduously established and maintained over a very long period with Imperial, Republican and Communist China.
- The advent of a highly radical group to power in Peking without any restrictions upon its objectives which might include the liquidation of capitalist Hong Kong.
- At or about the year 1997 if Britain were to refuse to accept what China regarded as its essential conditions to renew the lease.
- Total irrationality in China's thinking and actions in which it totally rejected all impulses except those of irredentism and xenophobia.

In the event of such an invasion the question to be asked is: what could the British garrison do? The answer may be taken by analogy from the theorists of war in Europe. The term "broken-backed war" is used to describe a war which would follow the initial nuclear onslaught (15). Similarly, a Chinese invasion would presumably be a massive operation which 9,000 British forces could do little to forestall. In the event it might be expected that the British garrison could "break the back" of the invasion while diplomatic activities brought hostilities to a close. The maximum hope of the Commander of British Forces, Hong Kong, would therefore be to break the back of the invading force.

The defence of Hong Kong is always a subject of considerable interest and concern to those who live in the city of Hong Kong ever since the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced in the House of Commons on 16 January 1968 that Britain would withdraw its presence East of Suez, effectively signifying the end of British active involvement in Singapore, Malaysia and the Persian Gulf. It was announced then, however, that Hong Kong would be staffed and retained. Nevertheless it is always possible that considerations of economy and financial stringency could lead to the withdrawal of more forces from Hong Kong including Gurkha troops, the question of whose survival is always a matter of frenzied debate and strikes deep emotional chords in the British military psyche. It is not a question, strategically speaking, of *reculer pour mieux sauter* but of withdrawal for ever: Hong Kong lost can never be regained.

There has often been a tendency to consider that Hong Kong, given the illogicality of its position, was at or near its end. True, the British Empire has passed into history, though its ghost lingers unconscionably and unaccountably on; Hong Kong's end has been, like the notice of Mark Twain's death, "much exaggerated". Most of the people in Hong Kong have in a sense voted for it, albeit unenthusiastically, literally "with their feet". They stay because Hong Kong provides them with some sort of home, illogical, anachronistic and uncomfortable though it may be. From the mere fact of apathetic acceptance, Hong Kong residents become, to use the unlovely terminology of the lawyers, "belongers", and the system acquires its own bizarre legitimacy. Stability exists not because the people of Hong Kong positively want it to exist, but rather because they cannot see what to do should it die. Lord Palmerston, the great 19th century Foreign Secretary who was so uncomplimentary about the barrenness of Hong Kong, probably expressed the most appropriate summary of Hong Kong's future in remarking to his doctor upon his own imminent demise: "Die, my dear doctor! That's the last thing I shall do." When Hong Kong does succumb to its destiny, it is likely to have become exhausted with its own frenetic endeavours. Hong Kong meanwhile moves on into its uncharted future. The outcome remains unknown and unrevealed. Hence there exists in Hong Kong a strange combination of stability with uncertainty. The elements of stability probably just outweigh those promoting uncertainty and, as such, can be regarded as Hong Kong's political formula.

Notes and References

1. P.B. Harris, "The Frozen Politics of Hong Kong," *The World Today*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, May 1974.

2. The figures given here are taken from: *The 1974-75 Budget, Economic Background* (Government Printer, Hong Kong, January 1974).

3. See P.B. Harris, "The International Future of Hong Kong," *International Affairs*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, January 1972, pp. 60-71.

4. Governor's Speech, 17 October 1973, (Hong Kong Government Printer).

5. C.P. Haddon-Cave, "Hong Kong's Economic Growth: the Next Stage," Speech to Hong Kong Management Association, 13 November 1973, p. 2.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 4, and see p. 17, "I see no reason for the Government to depart from the basic philosophy to which it has so far adhered."

8. D.C. Bray, Speech at United College, 12 November 1971. Mr. Bray subsequently became Secretary for Home Affairs.

9. *Ibid.*

10. Alan Chalkley and Rene Q. Bas, "Hong Kong at the Crossroads, Part I: Thirteen decades of innovation and enterprise", *Insight*, Hong Kong, April, 1974.

11. A typical example is to be found in Peking's letter to the United Nations Committee on Decolonization which directed that committee to remove both Macao and Hong Kong from their deliberations on the grounds, as Mr. Huang Hua, the representative of the People's Republic of China put it, that the "settlement of the questions of Hong Kong and Macao is entirely within China's sovereign right and does not fall at all under the ordinary category of colonial territories".

12. *Current Scene*, (US Information Service, Hong Kong), Vol. XI, No. 10, October 1973, p. 5.

13. Clare Hollingworth, "Heath and Chou agree on Hong Kong," *Daily Telegraph* (London), 30 May 1974.

14. G.B. Endacott, *Government and People in Hong Kong 1841-1962, A Constitutional History*, (Hong Kong University Press, 1964), p. 179.

15. A paper produced in 1952 by the UK Chiefs of Staff and inspired by Sir John Slessor, then Chief of Air Staff, believed that a nuclear war would be followed by a "broken-backed" war in which presumably both sides would have to fight with broken backs. See also C.J. Bartlett, *The Long Retreat, A Short History of British Defence Policy 1945-1970*, (Macmillan, London, 1972) pp. 97 and 273.

BURMA: *On 2 March this year – 12 years to the day after the military coup – Burma returned to constitutionalism. This paper, originally read at a seminar at the Asia Society, New York on 4 March, discusses whether or not this move can contribute towards solving the longstanding problems of the country. A slightly different version of the paper has been published in a monograph on Burma by Ohio University, Athens, Ohio.*

Change or the Same: The New Constitution of Burma in Action

Josef Silverstein

THE problems facing Burma on 2 March 1974 * were not very different from those facing the people in that country for the past quarter of a century: national unity, economic and social improvement for the common man, political participation, peace and security. The civilian dress of the leaders, the new constitution the flag and the national seal are all symbols which suggest that today, Burma is different than it was yesterday. But beneath the symbols and the euphoria of the return to constitutionalism lies the nagging question: will this road, the constitutional way to socialism, lead to the solution of the perennial problems and improve the quality of life in Burma? To find clues which suggest answers to this question it will be useful to look behind, as well as to examine the new symbols and the constitution for their full meaning.

The new constitution was a long time in development. Thinking about it began with the coup in 1962 and the displacement of the old fundamental law. Many of the institutions gradually took shape during the past 12 years as the military experimented with new ideas and new ways to achieve political harmony and economic and social improvement. The new constitution is the work of the military rulers who used the vehicle of the Burma Socialist Programme Party to achieve their ends. Beginning in 1971, the Party formed a 97-member Constitutional Drafting Commission to prepare a first draft. Following a period in which the people were consulted and their advice was solicited, the Commission in April 1972 published its first version of the basic law. It then invited public criticism and recommendations; in October of the same year, a second draft appeared and again the people were invited to comment, criticize and recommend changes. Finally, a third version of the constitution was made public in November 1973, following its adoption by the Second Congress of the Party. A referendum was held during the last two weeks of the year and 90 per cent of the people eligible to vote approved the law (1). Thus, for nearly two years, the people had an opportunity to comment, criticize and suggest alternations. As a result, the content was widely known and the people could feel that they had a hand in the drafting.

The men in power changed their costumes almost two years before the implementation of the constitution (2). At the time they retired from the military it was said officially that their ac-

* *Editorial Note:* The 451-member People's Assembly, elected under the new constitution together with lower-level councils throughout the country between 27 January and 10 February 1974, met for the first time on 2 March. Among its first actions, after Ne Win announced the end of the Revolutionary Council which had ruled by decree since the 1962 military coup, was the election of the Council of State with Ne Win as Chairman. The constitution had become effective on 4 January–the 26th anniversary of Burmese independence–after the draft had been submitted to a popular referendum from 15 to 31 December 1973. According to official returns, 12.5 million of the electoral turn-out of almost 13.3 million had voted in favour *(See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1973–74,*, pp. 26311 A, 26444A).

tion was taken "to serve the country more effectively." The act of retiring from the military reflected a view Ne Win and others have argued for a long time: that he and his closest senior officers were civilians transformed into soldiers by the circumstances of the Second World War and that they remained on station while a few of their colleagues, such as Aung San, were given the civilian task to lead the nation to independence (3). Despite their professionalism, their years of service and their popular identity as soldiers, they would like to be seen—as they see themselves—as one with the people doing their duty either as the defenders of the nation or as its political leaders. They emerged from the nationalist independence tradition and never lost faith with its ideals or its goals. The return to civilian dress thus symbolized the return to their basic identity and the exercise of leadership reflected their keeping faith with their comrades in that earlier movement.

But a quarter of a century of habit does not fall away as easily as a military tunic. A close examination of their rule from 1962 to 1974 and the new constitution, with its emphasis upon a well-organized and regulated society, a single command structure through the vehicle of the political party, a concern for duties as the other half of liberties and a strong link between the State and the military in the choice of Ne Win as the new President and U Sein Win as Prime Minister—both were senior military officers and part of the group who seized power in 1962—suggests that it is too early to predict whether or not the civilian leaders are anything more than soldiers in mufti and the new era will prove to be a sharp break with the immediate past. A look at some of the other symbols might shed some light on this proposition.

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CONSIDER the new flag: 14 stars have replaced the original five stars, and paddy in a cluster superimposed upon a cogwheel has replaced the large central star of the old federal union. These new symbols suggest a significant change in the form of the State and the people's relationship to it.

The old five stars flag reminded the viewer that Burma was a federation which grew out of (a) the political divisions amongst the people both before and during the colonial era; (b) the agreement between Aung San and British Prime Minister Attlee to unite the Frontier Areas with Ministerial Burma on the basis of free consent of the inhabitants (4) and (c) the agreement reached at Panglong in 1947 between Burmese nationalists and leaders of some of the Frontier Areas people to guarantee the minorities fundamental democratic rights, full autonomy in internal affairs and financial assistance after the formation of an independent union (5).

But it reminded Ne Win and those who share his view of something else: of the "divide and rule" policy which institutionalized the ethnic and geographical separation of the people of Burma. It certainly must have reminded him in 1969 of the need to bargain with the traditional leaders of the Shans and grant them 25 seats in the Chamber of Nationalities to the exclusion of all other peoples in their State (6); it reminded him also of the peculiar federal structure which linked the Prime Minister's Cabinet with the leaders in the several States and created problems both in and out of the State.(7); it reminded him, no doubt, of his earlier effort in 1959 to change the feudal system in the Shan and Kayah States to a democratic one by paying the hereditary leaders to give up their traditional administrative powers only to see some of them use their funds and influence to lead secessionist and insurgent movements.

The 14 stars in a circle symbolize a new and different kind of union. Ne Win gave a clue to what he had in mind, back in 1969, when he addressed the Fourth Party Congress; his remarks embodied two propositions: that the territory of the Union of the future must be open to all to live and settle where they will regardless of race, language or historical origin; that the Burmans and the minorities must grow closer to one another and help each other (8). Implicit in his remarks was the idea of a unitary State with a happy and harmonious multi-racial population.

The new flag reflects the fact that Burma today is a unitary State with 14 administrative or political units. Burma proper has been broken up. Each of the major ethnic groups now has a State in its own name: Kachin, Kayah, Karen, Chin, Shan, Mon and Arakan. The latter two were carved out of Burma proper; the remainder of that former State has been divided into seven administrative and/or political divisions. Whether a State or a division, all are equal in their

relationship to each other and to the central government in Rangoon. All States and divisions are organized identically and all are subject to the elected People's Assembly, the highest organ of power in the nation. Gone are the separate State and union legislative lists reflecting the principle of reserved or transferred powers; gone is the right of secession for some of the States (9); gone, in fact, is the federal union despite the retention of the word in the formal name of the nation, the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma.

But the problems of the past were not the result of promises and forms alone. Many among the minorities feared the policies and pressures emanating from Burma proper which they saw as threats to their languages and cultures, religions and customs. Despite the protection of their cultures and traditions afforded them under the new Articles 21 and 153b, they continue to be concerned. Under the new constitution, the State is responsible for the promotion of unity among the national groups. It also guarantees them the rights of religious, linguistic, literary and cultural freedom, the right to follow their traditions and customs provided that they do not infringe the laws and oppose the public interest. While Article 152 declares that every citizen has a right to an education, it also declares that Burmese is the common language and says that "languages of the rest of the national groups *may* be learned" (author's italics). It also says that the use of one's language and literature "shall not infringe national solidarity and the socialist social order." If their use undermines unity and solidarity of the national groups or interferes with the security of the State and the socialist order, it is prohibited (Article 153c). These guarantees seek to defuse the long-standing explosive situation in the former States. They imply that Burma is a multi-racial nation whose culture is a mosaic composed of many elements and that this is a source of strength and richness for the nation. If they are added to the steps taken during the period of Military Rule—the prominence given to Union Day, the 1964 Declaration on the place and importance of the minorities to Burma, the establishment of a multi-racial centre in upper Burma where young leaders and teachers representing all racial groups can come together and learn new skills while learning about each other and then return to their homes to impart both skills and knowledge to their people, the encouragement of research and publication about all the peoples of Burma so that everyone could become acquainted with the character and contributions of Burma's many racial groups—they suggest a new relationship between groups in Burma. A man may be a Shan or a Karen and be proud of it; at the same time, he is also a Burmese, a member of a multi-racial nation where all can co-exist and benefit from union. It is his membership in a political community, made up of all the people of Burma regardless of race, religion or location, which must command his primary loyalty.

Is the symbol of the new flag and all that it represents accepted by the minorities as the basis of a new relationship between themselves and the Burman majority? Are they ready to accept the new unitary State as a better basis for achieving their goal of preserving their identity and culture? If measured by the referendum on the new constitution, the positive vote in every State and division would indicate that they and the Burman majority accept the change. However, comparing the vote in the Shan, Kachin and Kayah States—66.4 per cent, 68.8 per cent and 71 per cent—with the national average of 90 per cent, there appears to be less enthusiasm in these States. Given that the voters were asked to approve and not to choose between alternatives, the voting differences in the States and the union at large take on more important meaning. However the vote is interpreted, it means that the people of Burma have opted for a new kind of State which no longer rests on the same foundations and guarantees of its predecessor. That, together with the idea that the territory of Burma is open to all, creates a two-pronged threat to the minorities which may prove greater than the policies and practices undertaken earlier on the basis of the first constitution. The common fear of the past was Burmanization—the gradual acquisition of the language, customs and traditions of the Burmans through closer intermingling, education and jobs. This provoked antagonism, hostility and open revolt. There is no indication that those in revolt among the minorities have returned to society because they see the new constitution as the basis for solving the problems of racial relations. Despite the nearly two years of drafts and discussion of the new constitution, the struggle between the central government and some of the minorities continues. Unless the benefits of the new basic law in other areas outweigh the loss of protection federalism was

supposed to afford, the struggle for national unity is likely to continue.

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THE central symbol of the paddy and cogwheel represents several things: the basis of society is the worker and the peasant; they are joined together to achieve socialism; their political vehicle is socialist democracy; leadership is in the hands of the Party, whose symbol is the paddy on the cogwheel. These ideas deserve further consideration.

A constant criticism of the old order made by the military leaders as well as many in the society at large was the fact that the State gave neither sufficient recognition nor protection to the true social basis of the society, the peasants and the workers. Instead, as Ne Win said in 1969, the old constitution protected foreign investors, feudal rulers, landlords, criminals, politicians and lawyers before anyone else (10). During the 12 years between the coup and the new constitution, efforts were made to return power to the peasants and workers by expelling or encouraging the voluntary departure of some, expropriating the property of others and removing still others from positions of power. During this same period, efforts were made to awaken, educate and involve peasants and workers in the building of a new Burma. Hierarchies of peasant and worker councils were formed throughout the nation to act as the means for uniting the members of these classes and providing them with a forum for discussion and a mechanism for taking action. During the coup period the military acted for the people and enshrined them in the centre of the new State.

The paddy and the cogwheel also symbolize socialism in the new Burma. It, like national unity, is a long sought-after goal. The directive principles of the old constitution called for the eventual planning of economic life, the development of co-operative and other economic forms to replace the capitalist system the people inherited at the time of independence. The State, the old constitution declared, was the ultimate owner of the land. It promised to improve the social welfare of the nation. The socialist goal, as Ne Win once reminded his listeners, was pledged by Burma's President on the day of independence. Failure on the part of the old Party leaders to use the constitutional power and work for the socialist goal during the first 14 years of independence was an important factor in the military seizure of power in 1962. The past 12 years have seen the soldiers-in-power strive to transform the nation to socialism. Thus it is hardly a surprise to find that the constitution sets forth the fact that "a Socialist Society is the goal of the State." The basis for the realization of that goal is to be found in the commitment to the development of a socialist economy, in the re-statement that the State is the ultimate owner of the land (extended to include all natural resources) and the declaration that the State is responsible for their development. The State also is commanded to nationalize the means of production. These and other provisions for the establishment of a socialist State are protected by a difficult constitutional amending process. If the authors of the coup and the new constitution had one idea in mind, it was to convert Burma to a socialist State with the power and benefits accruing to the peasants and workers. If, during the past 12 years, the standard of living of the people declined and the people suffered some privations and hardships, many could take heart that the suffering was felt by all the people and that it represented the elimination of much of the private sector of the economy and foreign control. Hopefully, the return to constitutional rule, together with the elimination of the exploiting classes finally will reverse this trend. The decline or elimination of the influences of such men as Brigadier Tin Pe and U Ba Nyein suggest that a new economic leadership is emerging and it may provide sounder policies which, in the long run, may mean better times for the people.

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IT is in the area of politics that the new constitution will find its third and most important challenge. The new politics of socialist democracy, in theory, give power to the people. In fact, it means that a narrow elite continues to control the political system. This, however, may not work out exactly as decreed in the constitution, once the process begins to work. On the level of theory, the people, through the People's Assembly—at the national level—and the People's Councils—at the State or division, township, ward and village tract—are the controllers of power in the new Burma. Each level is composed of elected representatives. Each legislature, at the several levels, controls the

executive and judiciary at its level. The people—the voters—ultimately retain their original power by having the right of recall. Since the lower levels of government reproduce the forms and institutions of the higher, a brief examination of the national institutions will suggest how the new politics will work.

The people vote for their representatives to the People's Assembly; the People's Assembly elects 28 of its members, representing both States and divisions as well as members at large, to the Council of State; the Chairman of the Council is designated as President of the Socialist Republic. The Council acts in the absence of the People's Assembly and carries out other policies and administrative tasks assigned by the constitution. The 29th member of the Council is the Prime Minister. He is elected by a second executive body, the Council of Ministers. This Council is the highest administrative organ in the State. It too, is elected from amongst the members of the People's Assembly.

Just as there is no separation of power between the legislative and executive branches, so there is no separation between the legislature and the judiciary. The People's Assembly elects, from among its members, a Council of People's Justices—the highest judicial organ of the State. Gone, therefore, is the judiciary as the preserve of the professional lawyer and judge—a failing in the old system that Ne Win noted in his address to the Party in 1969. The People's Assembly also elects from among its members a Council of People's Attorneys to protect and safeguard the socialist system, the rights and privileges of the working people and to advise the Councils of State and the Ministers on legal matters. Finally, the People's Assembly elects from among its members a Council of Inspectors. Its function is to investigate all public undertakings. Somewhat similar in form to the classical Chinese censorate, this council checks on the working of the system and is empowered to call attention to wrong-doing in government, wherever it may be found.

The pattern of legislative supremacy and its derivative executive, judicial, legal and censorial councils is duplicated at the lower levels of government. All are interrelated in hierarchical fashion with the principle of democratic centralism ensuring uniformity, and collective leadership ensuring the appearances of democratic procedure. In form then, the new constitution ensures popular control of the government, and the people—through the right of recall—control their representatives.

In reality, there is a concentration of power in the hands of the Burma Socialist Programme Party. The constitution declares that it is the only party and it is commanded to lead the nation. The genesis of the Party and its role in drafting the constitution is incorporated in the preamble. Both in the preamble, where "We the working people..." are determined to follow faithfully the leadership of the Party, and in the body of the constitution, where it is declared that there is only one party and it is in command of the nation, this extra-legal body is established as the most important agency of government. The Party together with its own mass and class organizations and electorate of the constituency concerned, screen and approve the lists of candidates for all elective offices. The Party also is permitted to submit suggestions and advise all organs of State power on matters of law, economic planning and annual budget. Nowhere in the constitution is there any limitations or control over the Party. Neither its constitution and rules nor its leaders and members are limited by the basic law. Like the Communist Parties of China and the Soviet Union, it is recognized as the author of the constitution and therefore stands beyond the control it theoretically exercises over the people and the State. As it is the political organization of the military leaders who made the coup in 1962 and who still hold the most important offices in the Party, there appears to be no real transfer of power to the people. So long as the Party is above the State, it is difficult to see how the return to constitutional government marks a significant step back to real popular control.

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WILL this new constitution produce peace and political harmony? Certainly, if measured by the continued existence of dissidents in open and secret revolt, it may not. The new system allows no avenue for alternative ideology and leadership. It assumes a unity both in the assumptions underlying the unitary State and its socialist objectives - assumptions yet to be demonstrated as those of the people. There is and has been open revolt by political parties, ethnic

groups and displaced political leaders of the earlier period. The military tried to bring all these dissidents back into the society under its leadership as early as 1963, when it held negotiations with many in open opposition (11). That movement failed and internal warfare has been as much a fact of life during the military period as it was during the earlier constitutional period.

In 1974, the new Government is faced with its greatest challenge by the White Flag Communists in the Shan State and elsewhere in upper Burma where the dissidents hold vast areas under their control. With the new constitution closing all avenues for alternative ideologies and leadership, it is hard to see how the new fundamental law will produce peace unless an unrealistic assumption is made that all dissidents are now ready to give up what they have been fighting for and accept the ideas and leadership of the soldiers in mufti. Despite the 90 per cent approval of the constitution, it is not that certain that, if the people had been given a choice between two different constitutional systems, that they would have given such overwhelming support to the version of the constitution now in effect.

There is a second problem to consider. The constitution seems to rest on the proposition that society can be mobilized and kept involved through the hierarchy of councils and kept informed of the work of their representatives at all levels. Given the poor state of communications, this is a dubious proposition at best. While the new system has as its goal the admirable objective of developing an interested and concerned citizenry, actively watching everything done by its representatives, there is nothing in Burma's immediate past to suggest that this will, in fact, be the case. It is far more likely that an oligarchy of Party officials and key representatives from the nation at large will hold and exercise real power with the backing of the military, and the people will be called upon to ratify, to approve and to debate as directed by the Party. Despite the brave words, there is little to suggest that the people can both discuss and alter the goals of the society and the rules of the game, if they so desire. The new system does not allow room for open organized criticism and opposition. There is no reason to believe that the Burmese, from village to city, have not realized that the area open for their participation is to vote—when directed; approve—when called upon; and debate—when a forum is organized. Given the heavy hand of the Government and the powerful Party, the level of political participation in Burma will probably be about what it always has been—active through dissidence when legal channels are blocked.

And there is a third problem. What about the military? It left the barracks once to take power, set aside the constitution and move the nation along a course of its own design. There is nothing in the constitution to restrain the armed forces from seizing power again. Granted that the Party is in their hands already and the men who hold power are out of their ranks or in close association with them; thus there appears to be no immediate threat to their interests and ideas. But, how united is the military leadership? Twelve years out of the field and in political office may have weakened or broken the unity which once marked Burma's military. There is little or no information about the thinking of field-grade and junior officers about the new Government and the character of the ruling Party. With its admixture of civilian politicians, the unity between the military and the Party may not be as close as it appears. What if the people really begin to believe that they can govern themselves and desire to alter the nation's course of direction? Will the military, in the barracks, accept this? There is nothing in the constitution to restrain the armed forces from interfering in political life once again, if they believe that the nation is moving in a dangerous direction. The preamble to the constitution praises the work of the Revolutionary Council for having saved the nation. The implication seems to be clear—that the military might again have to take over if it believes that such an action is necessary. The military is thus a second extra-constitutional body which stands as guardian over the nation while, at the same time being—in theory—under the control of the legal Government. There are many in Burma who did not approve of or enjoy the rule of "big brother"; who did not believe that only the military was faithful to the ideas of the early nationalist and independence movement; who did not think that the nation was in peril in March 1962; and who fear that the military, having once left their barracks for government office, may do so again.

To sum up, Burma has returned to constitutional government; the State is federal in name but unitary in fact; the political process is in the hands of the people but in the control of an extra-constitutional Party; the system is inhospitable to alternative ideologies and ways of accomplishing common ends; the hope of the people is that the socialist goals of improved livelihood and quality of life will be reached and shared by all. The only question is the one asked at the outset: will this road, the constitutional way to socialism, lead to the solution of the perennial problems and improve the quality of life in Burma? The signs are not hopeful; however, they may be offset by the nature of the Burmese, who through good times and bad, manage to cope, survive and maintain their dignity.

Notes and References

1. *Guardian* (Rangoon, daily), 5 January 1974.

2. *Ibid.*, 21 April 1972.

3. U Ba Than, *The Roots of the Revolution* (Director of Information, Government Printing Press, Rangoon, 1962) p. 59.

4. *Burma's Fight for Freedom* (Government Printing Office, Rangoon, 1948) pp. 44-48.

5. *Frontier Areas Committee of Iquiry. Part I: Report* (Supdt. Government Printing and Stationery, Rangoon 1947) pp. 16-17.

6. *Address Delivered by General Ne Win, Chairman of the Burma Socialist Programme Party at the Opening Session of the Fourth Party Congress on 6 November 1969.* (Burma Socialist Programme Party, Rangoon, 1969) p. 7. Hereafter called Ne Win 1969 Address.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

9. For these and other aspects of the former Burmese federal union, see the Constitution of the Union of Burma, 1948.

10. Ne Win 1969 Address. pp. 7ff.

11. *Internal Peace Parley. Historical Documents, No. 1.* (Rangoon, 1963) mimeo.

REVOLUTIONARY THEORY: *A clear pro-Soviet versus pro-Chinese split is not suggested by this study of the recorded statements of the four top Hanoi leaders on various critical occasions. Soviet-inspired principles seem to predominate uniformly in their thinking, while Maoist doctrine appears uninfluential.*

Doctrinal Perceptions of the Hanoi Leadership

Robert F. Rogers

REVOLUTION in Vietnam has derived from the two great imperatives of eliminating colonialism and modernizing the traditional, predominantly rural Vietnamese society. From their organizational beginnings in the 1920s until the present, the Vietnamese revolutionaries who embraced Marxism-Leninism as a solution to those two needs have recurrently argued over ideological versus national requirements to attain their goals. In the development of the revolutionary struggle, the Vietnamese Communist leaders, like most leaders everywhere, tended to place national interests first, but within the framework of doctrinal perceptions. Their long-term goals in order of priority might thus be roughly ranked and summarized as:

- The elimination of all foreign control and the unification of the society under a national Vietnamese government led by the Communist Party (the *Lao Dong Dang*, or Vietnam Workers Party in North Vietnam, the People's Revolutionary Party or PRP, in the South):

- The modernization of the nation into a one-party Socialist State.

In pursuance of both aims under the overall doctrinal precepts of Marxism-Leninism, the Vietnamese Communists had adapted both Chinese and Soviet experiences to their policy making, notably in the tactics and strategy of wars of national liberation and in managing their economy. But one of the most enduring factors, among many others, in policy-making has been the individual doctrinal outlooks of each of the chief Party leaders. These personal doctrinal perceptions have helped to shape the collective decisions of the Communist organizations in Vietnam, especially in the context of major crisis events. The consequent actions of Communist-led political and military forces impelled the massive counter measures by the South Vietnamese non-Communists and their allies which have characterized the Vietnam War.

In Vietnam, therefore, the anti-Communists have not been merely fighting Viet-Cong (VC) guerrillas and North Vietnamese soldiers in resistance to purely military aggression from the North. Rather, they have been fighting an *idea;* a complex idea of revolutionary action based doctrinally on Marxism-Leninism, applied pragmatically according to military concepts of people's wars freely adapted to Vietnamese conditions, and motivated primarily by nationalism. The idea manifests itself as a dynamic political cause as well as the particular military strategy of "People's Wars of National Liberation," and is influenced to a considerable degree by the doctrinal perceptions of the leaders of the Vietnam Workers Party.

Despite the significance of doctrinal attitudes (as distinct from policy orientations) of the Vietnamese Communist leadership, little research has been devoted to the subject. It has been argued that because there have never been purges in the Hanoi leadership there are no real divisions among the top Party leaders, only rather subtle differences over tactics (1). Most observers who have studied Hanoi politics for a number of years disagree. They usually differentiate various factions within the Party Politburo along ideological (hard-liners versus moderates) or pro-Peking versus pro-Moscow dichotomies (2). What are the doctrinal differences among the Hanoi leaders, and are there clear factions favouring pro-Soviet or pro-Chinese outlooks? The question is relevant because the continuing conflict in South-East Asia is still largely a function of policies initiated in Hanoi. The following study differentiates and assesses, through both quantitative and qualitative analyses, some of the doctrinal perceptions of the key decision makers of the Vietnam Workers Party in the context of major crisis situations.

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IN the analysis of doctrinal perceptions a "belief system" can be defined as the totality of personally experienced and other learned behaviour and perceptions

which a person brings to decision-making. For the Marxist-Leninist, belief systems embody an ideology as the aggregate of political, legal, moral, religious, aesthetic and philosophical views which express the interests of one or another class (3). Ideology, especially in its more restricted form as doctrine, remains relevant to a Communist involved in official policy-making, even though he may only pay lip-service to it while acting on the basis of personal ambition, bureaucratic self-preservation or other pragmatic considerations, much as would his non-Communist counterpart.

Within the Marxist-Leninist belief system, doctrine can be defined as a particular cluster of specific propositions which define values and phenomena through an objective description of the relationships of forces in human society and of their predictable development. The theory of Marxism-Leninism therefore provides the epistomological foundation required in any attribution of significance to observed occurrences.

Doctrine, in this respect, serves as a cognitive influence on the Marxist-Leninist. It also functions as an affective influence, a guide to action. In both these aspects Marxism-Leninism acts as a legitimization device, justifying the exercise of authority and shaping the formulation of goals and viability of perceived alternatives to achieve them, notably in revolutionary action.

Hanoi's leaders, however - and here Ho Chi Minh's leadership perhaps made its most significant impact - have been particularly effective in relating Marxism-Leninism to the distinct cultural and psychological outlook of the Vietnamese consciousness. Hanoi developed the goal of replacing anachronistic legacies of the traditional Vietnamese Confucian system of society, which allowed status and mobility only to a small educated elite, with a system which redistributes the sharing of power and increases social mobility. This socio-political focus, along with the growth of nationalistic sentiment among the Vietnamese, made the cause of the Communists popular enough to mobilize segments of the normally apathetic rural masses and instil respect among them (4).

Even though limited and often enlarged by brutally violent methods, popular mobilization around a revolutionary cause appears to have imparted a new "virtue" to the Communists. In the traditional Vietnamese symbolism this virtue gives legitimacy, the new mandate of heaven, to wield power as a governmental authority(5). The same virtue and its Marxist-Leninist overlay are basic factors in the perceptions of the Hanoi leadership. The highest level of the North Vietnamese leadership is the Political Bureau (Politburo) of the Vietnam Workers Party. Those whose statements were analysed, their present titles, and their precedence in the Politburo are:

Le Duan	: First Secretary of the Party; first in the Politburo.
Truong Chinh	: Chairman, National Assembly Standing Committee; second in the Politburo.
Pham Van Dong	: Prime Minister; third in the Politburo.
Vo Nguyen Giap	: Minister of National Defence; Commander-in-Chief of the NVA (the official title is the People's Army of Vietnam or PAVN); Deputy Prime Minister; fifth in the Politburo (after Pham Hung).

Since the death of Ho Chi Minh in 1969, the above four have formed a collective leadership, with Le Duan generally treated as first among equals. These men were selected for study of doctrinal perceptions because of their supreme rank in actual policy-making (within the Politburo, which is the highest policy-making element in the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam—the DRV, combining both Party and governmental decisions), the continuity of their authority (each has been a member of the Politburo since the founding of the DRV in 1954), and the availability of their relevant public statements for analysis. Ho Chi Minh was not included because his position appears to have been more as supreme arbiter than as governmental policy formulator, and his official statements are sparse and olympian in their generality, rarely advocating specific strategies or priorities.

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CONTENT ANALYSIS of the statements of each of the four Politburo leaders is one method of assessing their doctrinal perceptions. It provides a rough measure of their Marxist-Leninist cognitive or affective orientation as expressed in a "Doctrinal Stereotype Quotient," or DSQ, which is the number of doctrinally loaded terms divided by the total number of words analysed. A comprehensive word-phrase list of doctrinally loaded Marxist-Leninist terminology was developed to include terminology derived from Maoist and Vietnamese (predominantly Ho Chi Minh's) theoretical formulations, and was used as the basis for the word counts.

As an additional aspect of doctrinal orientations and also of policy tendencies, a breakdown was also made in the content analysis, wherever clearly possible, between domestic policy and foreign policy formulations. A word count was also made of references to the Soviet Union (or Russia) and to China in any context (geographically, doctrinally, culturally, etc.). Such references are invariably complementary; therefore qualitative evaluation was not particularly useful, but a quantitative count provides at least partial evidence of the predilection of each leader to one or the other of the great Power Socialist rivals.

The primary sources utilized were all authoritative presentations by each of the top four North Vietnamese leaders used as subjects. Their speeches and writings invariably relate doctrinal and policy issues, as is common in Marxist-Leninist formulations. The statements were taken principally from the Vietnam Workers Party's theoretical journal *Hoc Tap*. The journal is the single most authoritative and consistent source on both doctrinal and policy questions in Hanoi, more so than the newspapers (*Nhan Dan*, which is the *Pravda* of North Vietnam, and *Quan Doi Nhan Dan*, which is the army paper) and the other Party journals, mainly *Tuyen Huan* (Propaganda and Training) and *Thoi Su Pho Thong* (Current Events).

Thirty-five primary source statements between 1955 and 1973, broken down into at least one or more for each leader, in the context of five crisis events between 1954 and 1972, were analysed. Five events were selected as meeting the characteristics of a "crisis" for North Vietnam: they introduced threats or opportunities and generated major decisions on national policies. Although other events could also be utilized, the five were judged to be among the most historically salient to Hanoi in terms of the fundamental question of reunifying Vietnam. The five events were:

* The election of Diem as President of South Vietnam in 1955 and his rejection of elections on the issue of reunifying Vietnam.
* The 1963 Buddhist crisis and the murder of Diem in South Vietnam.
* The 1965 entry of US combat units into the war, and the initiation of heavy bombing of the North.
* The 1968 Tet offensive and its consequent military failure.
* The 1972 NVA offensive and its military failure.

Ten statements by Le Duan were studied, eight by Truong Chinh, ten by Pham Van Dong, and seven by Vo Nguyen Giap. In each statement are references to the issues in the crisis event under consideration and to the relevant Marxist-Leninist doctrinal justifications for any policy advocated. The statements vary in length, but provide adequate base for content analysis techniques to differentiate individual perceptions from the material. All of the Vietnamese material was in the form of English or French translations, either by the North Vietnamese Foreign Languages Publishing House, or by the US Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS).

A collection of translated documents inevitably raises the question whether one can make any realistic assessment of a leader's attitudes through his public utterances, since these are often included to project an image and to conceal reality. Certainly the statements convey a picture of the situation and each leader's thinking. But obviously one needs to know about the historical and institutional context and the environmental situation within which each was working. However, the *Lao Dong* leadership has also to inform its cadres of the Party line, the Party's policy at any given period, and this function relies heavily on printed material, notably *Hoc Tap*. But because tonal and stylistic qualities are lost in translations, coding was limited to descriptive assertions for frequencies (which reflect original source frequencies) and not more complex intensity or tonal content analyses which are sometimes ineffective (despite their sophistication) when applied to translations. Much of the emphasis and inferences of formal statements can still be gained from qualitative interpretations of the historical situation.

The data used in the content analysis is fairly comprehensive for the four leaders, and constitutes a thorough collection of their available statements in the period studied. Robert North has pointed out the many pitfalls of content analysis, but he notes that it is a valid way to gain systematic information concerning the cognitive and evaluative or affective states of those persons whose decisions are binding upon the nations they represent (6). Since the leaders are not available for systematic polling, interviewing or psychological testing, analysis of their behaviour is generally constrained to event-interaction data concerning their actions and to study of the content of their statements and writings, despite the weaknesses of such methods of analysis.

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THE quantitative results of the content analysis for the Doctrinal Stereotype Quotient for each leader are summarized in chart-form (See appendix). Chart A totals the figures, and Chart B graphs the changes in DSQ per crisis. An unexpectedly uniform pattern emerges from the DSQ's for the four Politburo leaders. Chart B shows the common pattern most clearly: the DSQ's for all four men fall slightly from crisis one to crisis two and then all rise through three to a high point at four (the 1968 Tet offensive, which clearly caused the most concern in Hanoi) before falling to an intermediate point at crisis five.

Chart A also shows that of the four leaders Truong Chinh is the most concerned with doctrine, confirming his reputation as the leading theoretician of the North Vietnamese Politburo. Pham Van Dong is by far the least doctrinaire. An unexpected result of the analysis was the higher doctrinal preoccupation of Vo Nguyen Giap, the military expert, over Le Duan, the First Secretary of the Party and the man responsible for overall doctrinal leadership. From the doctrinal view, qualitative analysis shows Vo Nguyen Giap as something of a repetitive propagandist and less incisive than either Truong Chinh or Le Duan in relating doctrinal theory to practice in the conduct of people's wars or national policy.

In the comparison of doctrinal references to domestic topics with those to foreign or war policy issues, the domestic DSQ is consistently lower than the foreign DSQ for all four leaders. Statements on domestic policy topics rely much less on doctrinal justification than do statements on foreign policy issues. In this respect Pham Van Dong and Le Duan most clearly and consistently differentiate domestic from foreign policy issues, as would be expected from their governmental and Party responsibilities.

An interesting result of the content analysis is that doctrinal authorities cited by the Politburo leaders are overwhelmingly the "classics": Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Stalin and Ho Chi Minh are treated as secondary authorities, and Mao or other contemporaries are practically never mentioned. Citations of doctrinal authorities are generally conceptual rationalizations, not prescriptive guides to specific courses of action. The doctrinal formulations are predominantly conservative and related to Soviet orthodoxy. The common substantive doctrinal outlook of the four men, plus the uniformity of doctrinal reactions per crisis, suggest the four leaders are close in ideological orientations. In this respect, analysis of other doctrinal statements, notably those in *Hoc Tap*, conform to the same style and general outlook of the Politburo leaders.

Also in this respect, the uniformity of career backgrounds of Politburo members is noted: all early joined the Party; three of the four came from middle-class families; and spent their entire adult lives in Party work, making them elite Party *apparatchiki* (but true revolu-

tionary *apparatchiki* as differentiated from the post-revolutionary bureaucratic *apparatchiki* of the USSR). Truong Chinh and Vo Nguyen Giap appear to be the ideologues while Le Duan and, especially, Pham Van Dong are the policy pragmatists.

The consistency of orthodox, Soviet-related doctrinal orientations rather than Chinese formulations (whether orthodox or not) applies even in discussions of people's wars. Maoism, Mao Tse-tung and Chinese statements on revolutionary wars are rarely mentioned, although statement by Truong Chinh sometimes appear to be paraphrases of Mao's words. Le Duan, who has long been identified as pro-Soviet, has a USSR to China quotient of 4.4 to 1. On the other hand, Truong Chinh who is thought of as pro-Chinese by most Western observers, has a USSR to China quotient of 11.6 to 1, a distinctly higher pro-Soviet public stance than Le Duan's. Pham Van Dong's quotient is the most even-handed and neutral in substance at 1.5 to 1, while Vo Nguyen Giap's quotient is a moderate 3.2 to 1.

In sum, all four leaders in their public statements are decidedly pro-Soviet and conservative doctrinally, and all manifest a strong nationalistic tendency. The evidence revealed by quantitative references to either Russia or China is, of course, hardly conclusive and may to an unknown degree be based simply on pragmatic recognition of Hanoi's greater dependence on Moscow and fear of their powerful Chinese neighbour. But when viewed with the tone and style of the statements, which are firmly Soviet-related interpretations and almost casual with respect to Communist China throughout the entire period of review, there is enough evidence to state that a clear pro-Soviet versus pro-Chinese dichotomy in the Hanoi Politburo is not manifested in public statements, even indirectly.

The data suggest ideological or other divisions between pro-Moscow and pro-Peking factions in the Politburo may be less significant in decision-making than cleavages over policy issues, such as how societal resources should be allocated or how and toward what goals the population should be mobilized.

One implication of the qualitative and the quantitative analyses is that for the Vietnamese Communists Maoist doctrine may be a distinctly subordinate facet of Marxism-Leninism. Maoism for them appears to be not so much a blueprint for action as a conceptual framework of shared myths, procedural traditions and agreed goals which are indispensable to legitimize their one-party revolutionary ideology in the Asian scene with China as an immediate neighbour. For the North Vietnamese Politburo leaders Maoism thus seems to be primarily a useful enlargement of traditional Marxist-Leninist theory, which they in turn are also expanding creatively in carrying on the Vietnam War against "imperialism" led by the US. Many of the more recent official statements and general propaganda by the North Vietnamese place their contributions to the theory of people's wars as equal, or, by implication, perhaps superior to other Socialist countries because of Hanoi's "defeat" of the US (7).

Throughout the Hanoi leaders' formulations on people's wars, and those by Vo Nguyen Giap in particular, the bedrock of their doctrine, not only for general theoretical concepts but also for the methodology of wars of liberation, is the Soviet interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. The repeated references to Marx, Engels, Lenin, and to Stalin, are surely more than just ritualistic. Such devotion must owe at least some genuine allegiance to Soviet-inspired principles.

It might also be noted that the leaders' doctrinal formulations on revolutionary war strategy and tactics of the North Vietnamese and their Viet-Cong surrogates in creating a politically oriented guerrilla elite as a vanguard cadre (the People's Revolutionary Party in the Viet-Cong) supported by outside military forces (the North Vietnamese Army) resemble in many ways the experience of Fidelismo and the theories of Che Guevara. The resemblance of North Vietnam's viewpoint to the Cuban revolutionary outlook is often closer than to the Maoist model which in the Chinese Revolution actually depended on huge and predominantly military operations over vast areas among a massive peasant population-independent factors which do not apply in Vietnam or elsewhere for that matter. The Cuban-North Vietnamese affinity has been noted by some observers (8). Many American writers, however, automatically equate Maoist military doctrine with Hanoi's and the VC's revolutionary warfare, despite evidence that Hanoi is perhaps developing an independent strategic model along an essentially pro-Soviet orientation (9).

How much of the public adherence of Hanoi's leaders to Soviet doctrinal interpretations (as distinct from foreign *policy* considerations, in which Hanoi has remained consistently neutral between Mascow and Peking since at least the early 1960s) is due to Ho Chi Minh's long training and association with the Soviet Union is not discernible, but would appear to be significant. Ho's formative experiences with Communism were under Soviet tutelage, which lends support to the view that at least until his death in 1969 his decisive voice tended to support a pro-Soviet line in doctrinal as well as policy matters.

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ONE fundamental doctrinal principle repeatedly stressed by all the Politburo leaders (and by all lower echelons) in nearly every statement is that the Party is responsible for leadership and socialization of the State. The Party's role is thus clearly defined for the present and the future, and there have been no significant modifications of that role, either incipiently as in the USSR or more dramatically as in China's Cultural Revolution, by the Vietnamese military or managerial-technical elites. This clear Party dominance in doctrinal concerns carries over and has important impact on programmatic policy concerns, in that there appear to be few cleavages between Party *apparatchiki* and specialist elites in North Vietnam. Therefore Hanoi has been spared the troublesome question of specialists demanding larger participatory roles in policy-making, as has been the case in the USSR (10).

Doctrine for the North Vietnamese leaders thus appears to be: (a) a modifier of perceptions of events; and (b) a rationalizing or legitimizing element for policy decisions rather than a prescriptive component of policy formulation. It appears, however, that it is not just Marxist-Leninist perception of events which most clearly sets the basis of North Vietnamese attitudes. Perhaps the leadership's

uniform personal allegiance to the guiding conceptual framework of Marxist-Leninist doctrine (i.e., the process and stages of revolution, the underlying ethos of the collectivist, industrializing impetus in social transformation) also heavily influences their orientations.

The qualitative analysis also indicates that the five crisis events tended to be interpreted by the Hanoi leadership through strong nationalistic perceptions, even by a Marxist-Leninist ideologue such as Le Duan whose nationalistic bias sometimes exceeds his commitment to the doctrinal belief system. The Marxist-Leninist methodology of dialectical analysis through identification of contradictions was often used by North Vietnamese leaders as a means to express the best solution for specific *national* purposes, not necessarily for higher doctrinal or ideological reasons. Hence it would seem reasonable to infer that nationalistic interpretations of events ("protection of the fatherland," "unification of the nation," etc.) may be as significant a doctrinal aspect (if "nationalism" is considered a form of doctrine) in the Hanoi leadership outlook as are Marxist-Leninist interpretations of the same events. The methods of analysis of this brief study (and any other study the author has read on the subject) could not confidently delineate between doctrinal and nationalistic motivations in the formulation of policy or interpretations of events by the Vietnamese leadership. It is an area which needs considerably more attention if the influences on decision-making by Communist leaderships are to be realistically assessed.

Appendix

CHART A: Summary of Content Analysis for Doctrinal Stereotype Quotients*

	Total Words	Stereotypes	USSR	China	Domestic DSQ	Foreign DSQ	Overall DSQ
Le Duan:							
Crisis 1	46,275	1,950	34	10	.033	.052	.042
" 2	10,791	351	7	6	-	.033	.033
" 3	27,144	1,315	61	6	.054	.061	.048
" 4	47,152	2,307	14	4	.034	.064	.049
" 5	15,488	742	1	1	-	-	.041
Totals:	159,367	6,665	117	27	-	-	.042
Truong Chinh:							
Crisis 1	10,434	450	6	2	-	-	.043
" 2	11,618	397	6	2	-	-	.034
" 3	11,193	884	97	9	.017	.031	.078
" 4	37,905	3,582	47	6	-	-	.094
" 5	11,853	745	7	4	-	-	.063
Totals:	83,003	6,058	163	14	-	-	.073
Pham Van Dong:							
Crisis 1	43,843	1,196	45	21	.023	.033	.026
" 2	17,920	417	1	1	.018	.035	.022
" 3	36,081	1,076	10	8	.024	.032	.030
" 4	33,937	1,308	8	10	.038	.039	.039
" 5	14,553	324	2	2	.013	.026	.022
Totals:	146,334	4,321	66	42	-	-	.029
Vo Nguyen Giap:							
Crisis 1	7,342	329	13	11	-	-	.045
" 2	20,153	719	2	1	-	-	.035
" 3	10,276	472	-	-	-	-	.046
" 4	43,025	2,168	10	5	.026	.046	.050
" 5	53,088	2,530	44	4	-	-	.048
Totals:	133,885	6,218	69	21	-	-	.046

*Doctrinal Stereotype Quotient (DSQ) "is the number of doctrinally loaded terms divided by the total number of words analysed" (see p. 59).

CHART B: Graph of Doctrinal Stereotype Quotients



		Overall DSQ	Ranges
Truong Chinh	—·—·—·—	.073	.034 - .094
Vo Nguyen Giap	—/—/—/—	.046	.035 - .050
Le Duan	·····A·····	.042	.033 - .049
Pham Van Dong	————	.030	.022 - .039

Notes and References

1. For example, C. Gareth Porter, "What Split in North Vietnam?" *Washington Post*, 26 November 1972, p. B2.

2. P.J. Honey *Communism in North Vietnam* (Ampersand Books, Holywell Press, London, 1963); and Nguyen Tien Hung, "Hanoi: Peace as a Pause," *Washington Post*, 29 October 1972, pp. B1-B2. Also many articles by Victor Zorza on the North Vietnamese are based on evidence of doctrinal and policy divergencies within the DRV Politburo.

3. B.N. Ponomarev, Ed., *Politicheskii Slovar*, 2nd ed. (Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, Moskow, 1958), p. 337.

4. For a more detailed analysis of this aspect see John T. McAlister, Jr., *Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution* (Doubleday Anchor Books, Garden City, New York, 1971), p. 335.

5. For a discussion of Vietnamese perceptions of authority, see Paul Mus and John T. McAlister, Jr., *The Vietnamese and Their Revolution* (Harper & Row, New York, 1970), pp. 55-69, 111-127.

6. Robert C. North, M. George Zaninovich, and Dina A. Zinnes, *Content Analysis, A Handbook with Applications for the Study of International Crisis* (Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1963), p. 38.

7. For example, see *Hoc Tap* No. 2, 1973, which is devoted to victorious statements on the conclusion of the 1973 cease-fire agreements.

8. Georges Boudarel, in his introduction to Vo Nguyen Giap's *Banner of People's Wars, the Party's Military Line* (Praeger, New York, 1970) p. xxii.

9. An example of American attribution of Vietnamese revolutionary warfare to Maoist influence is Roger Hilsman's introduction of the Praeger edition of Vo Nguyen Giap's *People's War, People's Army* (Praeger, New York, 1962) p. xviii.

10. Milton Lodge, "Attitudinal Cleavages Within the Soviet Political Leadership," in Carl Beck, *et. al.*, Eds. *Comparative Communist Political Leadership* (David McKay Company, Inc., New York, 1973). Lodge concluded there are significant attitudinal cleavages within the Soviet leadership between the central *apparatchiki* and specialist elites; p. 223.

EDUCATION: *For the Philippines "the major and immediate problem area in education (is) those who are 'little educated, little employed and little paid' but who make up the majority of the population". As therefore the strategic focus of government development efforts, this group is the target of programmes of non-formal education. But these, Professor Castillo argues, are not yet sufficient to work as a development function, nor are they as related as they could be to the formal education system.*

The Philippines. The Case for Non-Formal Education

Gelia T. Castillo

FILIPINOS place a high value on education - particularly higher education. The dream of every Filipino parent is to see his child obtain a college degree. It is regarded as a passport to upward social mobility; a hope for the future among the lower class. It is believed to be an avenue to a good job and a badge of status. It is the poor man's source of social equality with the rich, for the man who has a college education is seldom lower class.

The educational system catering to the popular dream manifests some peculiarities which have emerged through the years as a result of historical, cultural and socio-economic forces — "peculiarities" in some respects because one does not usually expect to find these characteristics in a developing agrarian economy. The most salient features are described in the following eight sections. The concluding two sections offer a description and critique of the programmes of non-formal education currently being pursued in the Philippines.

* * * * * * *

A HIGH level of participation in the school system. Within the developing world, the Philippines had the third highest (internationally adjusted) school enrolment of 83 for both sexes in 1965; Puerto Rico was first with 97 and Singapore second at 85. The Philippine ratio was higher than Hungary and USSR which had 82; Yugoslavia, 79; Canada, 76; Spain, 75; and Italy, 70. Within Asia, the Philippine school enrolment ratio for both sexes is second only to Singapore but the Philippines has the largest proportion of females enrolled in school (1). The literacy rate as of 1970 was 83.4 per cent for both sexes (84.6 per cent for males and 82.2 per cent for females). This is a substantial increase over the 1960 rates of 72.0, 73.6 and 70.6 per cent for both sexes, males, and females, respectively.

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SIDE by side with the high level of participation in the school system is the high drop-out rate. By the time 100 Grade I enrollees reach Grade V there are only half of them left. Only 16 survive to finish high school and 11 complete a college degree (see Appendix, Table I). Besides the high drop-out rate, there is the accompanying phenomenon of rural-urban differentials in educational attainment and the even more disadvantaged position of agricultural manpower in this respect (Appendix, Tables 2, 3, and 4). Predictably, the Manila employed have the highest educational attainment in the country. The median highest grade completed for urban areas is Grade VI while it is only Grade IV for the rural areas. In the agricultural sector, particularly in Regions III, IX and X made up of Cagayan Valley and Batanes, South-West Mindanao and Sulu and Northeastern Mindanao, about half of those employed in agriculture have no schooling. The implications of the latter observation for the process of transcending from traditional to modern agriculture, which demands higher levels of management, skills, scientific understanding and expertise, are obvious. A second important implication is the great disadvantage of these three regions with respect to educational attainment.

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THE phenomenon of teacher surplus and the prominent role of women in the educational system. In 1968 the number of unemployed teachers totalled 70,000. In 1967-68, a total of 39,000 new teachers were produced by 290 teacher-training institutions. Out of this crop of graduates, only about 22,000 may expect to be fully employed and about 7,000 may expect to find only partial employment as substitute teachers - hence, a surplus of 10,000. Add to this the carry-over surplus for the last six years and the unemployment figure swells to 70,000 or more. The breakdown of the need for teachers is as follows:

Extension classes in Grade I	12,000
Vacancies as a result of promotion of old teachers to principals and head teachers	2,000
Vacancies created by old teachers who retire, die or go abroad	4,000
Temporary vacancies created by female teachers who go on maternity or sick leave	6,000
	24,000

The public schools can take 24,000, while the private schools can take 5,000. Hence a total of 29,000 teachers is needed. The Philippines has an exportable surplus of teachers but only an insignificant number go abroad. If results of teacher examination are any indication of quality, only 4,616 out of 31,798 or 14 per cent who took the exam in Manila passed. More than 172,000 took the exams over the whole country.

Another feature is that 90 per cent of teachers at the elementary level and 80 per cent in high schools are female, which explains the high incidence of maternity leaves. At the college level, the ratio is 70 : 30 in favour of males. Apparently men prefer to be professors rather than teachers (2). The predominance of female teachers also accounts for the higher proportion of professionals among females than among males (9.7 per cent against 3.5 per cent for 1970). And it also explains the higher collegiate enrolment of females (55.5 per cent) than males (44.5 per cent). Figures for 1968-69 show that 31.4 per cent of the total college enrolment is accounted for by teacher-training students. There were then 149,669 females and 46,137 males in teacher-training colleges. This means that 76.5 per cent of teacher-trainees are females and 23.5 per cent males. Of the total female collegiate enrolment in the country, 43.2 per cent are in teacher-training while only 16.6 per cent of the males are preparing to be teachers.

Yet while there are more women than men at college and special vocational school level, total enrolment by sex and school level shows a higher male enrolment in preschool, elementary and secondary schools (Appendix, Table 5). As Table 6 shows there is a higher drop-out rate among males (20.8 per cent) than among females (15.4 per cent) at the secondary level, leaving fewer men to proceed to college. The most likely explanation for this is the greater pressure on men than on women to take on jobs. Since the latter have a pronounced tendency to enroll in teaching-training courses, and since there is a surplus of teachers, the unemployment rate among graduates is affected by this particular group of women.

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M*ARKED Attractiveness of Higher Education.* For a developing country, the proportion of the population enrolled in higher education is extremely high. International comparative education ratios from the *UNESCO Yearbook* show that the Philippines is second only to the United States in terms of higher education enrolment per 100,000 population:

	1950	1965-66
United States	1,508	2,840
Philippines	902	1,560
Israel	1,400	1,488
Australia	441	1,159
Japan	471	1,140
Sweden	241	903
Taiwan	87	687
Germany	216	632
England and Wales	242	579
Italy	310	583
Spain	198	417
Mexico	136	312
India	113	235
Thailand	141	166

The great number of colleges and universities clearly plays a part in this. There are 601 of which 576 or almost 96 per cent are private schools. Of the 576, there are 216 sectarian (mostly Catholic but 30 are non-Catholic, of which 6 are Muslim) and 315 non-sectarian schools. Of the latter, 86 per cent are privately owned by stockholders and the rest are non-stock. The organization of schools as a business of private enterprise is a unique feature of the Philippine education system. Numerically, these schools are distributed across the ten regions of the country, but the "prestige" schools are concentrated in the Greater Manila Area with no more than a handful of less luminous institutions located in the other big cities. The distribution of colleges and universities in the country is:

REGION	AREA	NUMBER
I.	Greater Manila and Rizal	116
II.	Ilocos Region and Mountain Province	45
III.	Cagayan Valley	18
IV.	Central Luzon	72
V.	Southern Luzon	59
VI.	Bicol	8
VII.	Western Visayas	46
VIII.	Eastern Visayas	59
IX.	Northern Mindanao	62
X.	Southern Mindanao and Sulu	86
		601

Source: Presidential Commission to Survey Philippine Education, A report on Higher Education in the Philippines, 1970.

Because of the predominance of private colleges, more than 90 per cent of college enrollees are found in this sector (Appendix, Table 7).

The Presidential Commission to Survey Philippine Education took special note that the Philippines invests "an average of 34.28 per cent or more than one-third of its total national budget for education and spends approximately 14.3 per cent of its total national educational

expenditures for higher education". In view of this high investment, the Commissioners believe that the country should be deriving maximum returns in terms of a more rapid pace of economic development. Citing a 1961 study by the Department of Labor which reported that 18.2 per cent of persons with higher education were unemployed and looking for work and the 1965 Board of Census and Statistics (BCS) labour force survey which found 11.7 per cent of college graduates were out of work, the Commission underscored the irony of a country characterized by a well developed system of higher education but with the gross national product of an under-developed country; in other words, "over-developed" education in an "under-developed" economy. However, the education market was not viewed as saturated but as suggestive of imbalances and unresponsiveness to national economic needs. One of the major policy recommendations of the Commission is for institutions of higher learning to adopt stricter admission policies and for the Government to adopt a national testing system to provide means for directing students to areas where their abilities are best suited and where national needs are uppermost. In response to this recommendation, Presidential Decree No. 146 was promulgated on 9 March 1973, declaring it to be "a policy of the State to maintain the highest quality of education for purposes of national development. To achieve this policy, all high school graduates shall be required to pass a national entrance examination as a pre-requisite for admission to any post-secondary academic or professional degree programme necessitating a minimum of four years study in any private or public institution of higher learning, whether chartered or unchartered." Although the Decree did not explicitly say so, the net result of its implementation would eventually be a reduction in college enrolment. This has important social and income- distribution implications, particularly if one asks the question as to which students would be mostly likely to pass the national college entrance examinations. Obviously, the higher income groups who have access to the better elementary and secondary schools would have a decided advantage over the lower income categories. Rural-urban and regional disparities in the accessibility of "good" pre-college educational facilities would also affect the outcome of these exams and therefore determine who gains entry into university. The implication of the college entrance examination for occupational mobility depends upon the function which higher education performs in this respect.

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AGRICULTURAL education is a large enterprise but farming is mostly in the hands of people who have low educational attainment. The country boasts of 100 agricultural high schools and about 70 institutions which grant college degrees in agriculture. But the majority of agricultural high school graduates proceed to college and are subsequently employed mostly by the government and by educational institutions. In the meantime persons engaged in agriculture make up about 49 per cent of the labour force. The median highest grade completed for persons in the rural labour force is Grade IV but 15.2 per cent of the rural labour force have had no formal schooling, and those in farming and related occupation have the lowest educational attainment of the various occupational groups. For the agricultural education system to make an impact on agriculture, the agriculturally-educated must be linked with the farmer-producer. There are at least two avenues for establishing such links - one is through the products of agricultural research and the second is via agricultural extension or other strategies designed to bring the results of research to the farmer. Unless these links are forged, agricultural education will enjoy only a marginal relationship to agricultural development. So far, the greatest contribution of agricultural education lies in the results of research — results which unfortunately will not affect agricultural development unless they reach the farmers and their adoption is made possible.

To illustrate this point: the national average yield for corn (maize) is 14.5 cavans per hectare*; the average yield in applied research plots in farmers' fields is 43; and the average yield in purely experimental plots in 65. Although the scientists have produced high-yielding varieties and improved cultural practices, a study of farmers in predominantly corn-growing areas reported "very low physical productivity. Pest and disease control problems were aggravated by the little impact of functional extension services, assistance or information on corn production at the farm level. The farmers possessed negligible expertise to cope with technological problems". About 150 out of 200 farmers interviewed confessed ignorance about innovative farm practices. On the other hand another study showed a significant relationship between frequency of contact with corn expertise and the adoption of recommended production practices. These findings suggest a crucial role for agricultural extension.

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SIMULTANEOUS occurrence of "surplus" and shortage of highly trained manpower. As of 1971 there were 39,328 registered nurses, 16,633 midwives, and 31,886 physicians and yet it was deemed necessary to use paramedics and auxiliary health workers to meet medical and health needs, particularly in rural areas. The annual exodus of doctors, nurses and midwives to the US, Canada, and Europe is well-known. This phenomenon is often labelled as brain drain (some call it overflow) but those who work abroad send remittances to their families in the Philippines and therefore earn foreign exchange for the country, not to mention their families.

There were 39,395 engineers of different kinds in 1971 but the Philippines is supposed to be in need of middle-level manpower. This state of affairs suggests that the educational system is producing highly trained manpower which does not meet current needs.

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THE Problem of unemployment among Filipino professionals. A study by Raymundo, using data from the 1968 National Demographic Survey, offers insights on the nature and magnitude of this problem (3). Table 8

** 1 cavan - 75 litres; 2.062 imperial bushels (44 kg. paddy, 57.7 kg. milled rice).*
1 hectare - 2.471 acres.

gives the impression that if a man wants to improve his chances of employment, he should either have little or no schooling or he should be a college graduate (although the latter has a higher probability of being unemployed). This impression, however, is fallacious because it does not take into account the fields of specialization with higher employment prospects than others. Secondly, it does not consider the nature of the occupations which the different educational groups found. Thirdly, it does not indicate how long a college graduate remains unemployed before he eventually finds a job.

Raymundo's study provides us data on these questions. Table 9 shows that engineering and technology, liberal arts, social sciences, business and education are the fields reporting high unemployment rates. The medical and paramedical sciences register the lowest. Table 10 indicates that although only just over a half of the degree-holders found occupations in the professional category, 82 per cent of them have white-collar jobs. It is also significant to note that those which showed the least success in making it to the professional occupations (44.8) are graduates in liberal arts, business, education, etc, and they also contributed most to degree-holders among clerical workers.

From the point of view of the individual, is this a wastage? The likely answer is "NO" because he would have had lesser chances of obtaining even that clerical job if he had less education. Despite the high unemployment rate among engineering and technology graduates, almost 80 per cent found professional and managerial jobs. It is not, of course, surprising that the graduates of medical and paramedical sciences exhibited the highest absorption into the professional and managerial occupations.

It is more significant to note that the Raymundo survey showed that 70 per cent of the unemployed professionals spent less than five weeks looking for work before they found a job. In other words, the unemployment is a temporary state.

When Raymundo's survey looked at visible under-employment, it found that only 21 per cent of professionals were working below a 40-hour week frame of reference and would like additional work. Of the under-employed wanting more work 79 per cent were already working 40 and more hours per week. Furthermore, total visible and invisible under-employment amounted to only about 18 per cent. The rest reported no under-employment. That even those working beyond 40 hours a week still want additional work is probably a reflection of a desire for more income rather than for more work.

Given the evidence from the Raymundo study, one cannot conclude that the decision to aspire for and spend for a college education is an irrational one. From all indications, it is worth it. Unless the educational qualifications required for employment in different jobs change, it is difficult to talk parents and their children out of their dreams for college education. However, as the data indicate, he has to be a degree-holder and not just a man or a woman with some college education. The degree makes a great deal of difference to his chances for employment.

* * * * * * *

HIGHER education is a reinforcer of social class structure as well as an avenue for upward social mobility. Although the relationship between the magnitude of investment in higher education and Gross National Produce (GNP) is less than encouraging, the function which higher education performs with respect to occupational mobility cannot be ignored. This probably accounts for the great social demand for higher education.

A study by Melinda M. Bacol (4), using data from the National Demographic Survey of 1968 (conducted jointly with the BCS Survey of that year), illustrates the role of higher education in occupational mobility. This study of married males between 25-64 years of age compared the occupational status of father and son and related this to the son's educational attainment. The author used six occupational categories on the basis of income, education, and prestige attached to the occupation.* More than 75 per cent of the sons in the first Occupational Category (the Elite) — i.e. regardless of the occupational status of their fathers — have college education. Among the different occupational categories to which the fathers belong there is a declining proportion of sons who have college education, from 63.1 per cent for the Elite occupations to 1.5 per cent for the farm tenants and farm labourers (category VI). Although college-educated sons of elite fathers did not all end up in the Elite and Middle class occupations, 87 per cent of them did and not one of them landed in category VI.

Having less than college schooling has contributed to the son's downward mobility relative to his father's occupational status. In other words, while college education does not guarantee high occupational status for the son, it serves as a cushion against long distance downward fall from his father's position. But lack of college education for sons who have elite fathers contributes to a fall in their own occupational status. Despite the anecdotal reports of graduates who become clerks, taxi-drivers, labourers, janitors, barbers, etc., Bacol's data indicate that 81 per cent of the sons who had college education were able to obtain jobs in the elite and middle class categories. Only 1.9 per cent became farm labourers and tenants, 4.6 per cent obtained lower level blue-collar jobs and 6.4 per cent got higher level skilled jobs (upper working class). For college graduates there is a very high probability of obtaining higher level occupations.

Undoubtedly social origin, i.e. father's occupation, has a reinforcing effect on the status of the son in the sense that it determines to a large extent how much education the son will have. In this sense, college education reinforces the existing social structure and strengthens the position of those in the upper and middle class. But if one were looking for break-throughs in the stratification system, college education acts as a wedge for the lower class. For example, among the children of farm tenants and farm labourers, only 1.5 per cent had college education but among these, 73 per cent made it to the elite and middle class categories, no one became a farm owner

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* The categories were (1) Elite, (2) Middle Class, (3) Upper Working Class, (4) Lower Working Class, (5) Farm Owners, Fishermen and Loggers, (6) Farm Tenants and Farm Labourers.

and 6.7 per cent became tenants and farm labourers like their fathers. Their performance as far as occupational mobility is concerned is better than the sons of the upper class, and almost as good as the college-educated sons of the lower working class and farm owners.

Bacol's comparative sample of Manila indicates the following:

(1) For every category of father's occupation, more of the Manila sons have been able to go to college than in the country as a whole (34.5 against 8.3 per cent). The tendency for elite and middle class occupation fathers in Manila to have more college-educated sons than the lower level occupations is as evident as for the entire country. However, a higher proportion of the Manila college-educated sons has been able to find jobs in the elite and middle class occupational categories (86 against 81 per cent).

(2) The performance of tenant farmers' and farm labourers' sons in Manila is of particular interest because they are migrants to the city. Only 3.7 per cent of them remained in the occupational category of their fathers. Less than 1 per cent became farmer-owners but 72 per cent of those who were college-educated made it to the two upper-level occupations. No college son returned to his father's occupation. Obviously those who had only elementary education ended up mainly in the lower-level and upper-level working classes. Although those with secondary schooling were also in the working class categories, more of them than of those with elementary education went on to the middle class occupations. Higher levels of education have certainly taken them out of the farm.

(3) Among the children of farm owners, only 3.8 per cent returned to their fathers' occupation and this happened more with those who had elementary education only. In other words, the chances that a farm owner's son would go back to the farm are nil if the son gets a college education. So for the children of farm owners, tenants and farm labourers, a college education is a passport out of the farm. This therefore represents the fulfilment of farmers' aspirations. Findings of studies on farmers' educational and occupational aspirations for their children are oriented away from the farm and toward college education and white-collar work.

* * * * * * *

THE major and immediate problem area in education does not seem to be the educated unemployed but rather those who are "little educated, little employed and little paid" but who make up the majority of the population, especially in the rural areas. Regardless of what reforms are introduced into the educational system, the youth and adults who are no longer at school can only benefit indirectly, marginally or even remotely. Yet they are the people of today who are the most strategic targets of development efforts - whether it is in terms of increasing productivity, improving job-prospects, enhancing their opportunity to enjoy more of life's amenities or of increasing their life chances in general.

It is toward them that educational inputs other than that of the school system have been directed. Such inputs have been labelled differently depending on who baptizes them. Programmes in agricultural extension, family planning, applied nutrition, co-operatives, farmers' associations whether in *seldas, damayan,* compact farms or *samahan nayon* (5), land reform, community organization, health and environmental sanitation and even the new social discipline considered so crucial to the New Society, are examples. Because they share certain common characteristics they can all be fruitfully conceptualized as "education" of a special kind - non-formal education for development.

This is a deliberate, organized effort to bring specific "messages" (information, skills, attitudes, etc.) to a particular target population, with the object of bringing about those attitudinal and behavioural changes defined as desirable by society if development goals are to be achieved. This effort may be organized by established institutions and agencies (government, private or voluntary) but its peculiar characteristic is that it is conducted outside the formal school system although the facilities and resources of the school may be harnessed in reaching the target population.

Non-formal education deals with the "here and now" problems, solutions to which shape the future. It is education for getting things done. The ultimate test of its success, unlike conventional schooling, lies in whether or not knowledge gained and favourable attitudes acquired are put into practice. Large doses of the first two without inroads into the third lead to no reduction in population, no improvement in nutrition, no increment in exports, and finally a verdict of *no learning.*

Unlike under the conventional school system also, participation is very much dependent on the willingness of the intended "learners" to be involved and on their recognition of the accruing benefits. The value of non-formal education has to be "demonstrated" to be appreciated. Its value is judged on its direct and immediate applicability to the life of the recipients ("what's in it for me which is worth my time and energy"? is an inevitable question every non-formal educator is asked when he attempts to "recruit" participants). It is not a preparation for life as formal schooling is often described. Non-formal education is life itself. The attainment of relevant attitudinal and behavioural changes mean taking real-life, not simulated, risks. As one farmer put it: "If a pupil makes a mistake in his arithmetical calculations, he can always erase and start all over again or at worse. he could get a low grade. But if a farmer makes a mistake in his decisions on farming operations, it will cost his family their livelihood and food supply".

In reality, all attempts at non-formal education wittingly or unwittingly aim to increase the potential recipient's repertoire of alternative courses of action. Without recognized and meaningful alternatives, there is no decision-making for there are no choices.

For example, while formerly a farmer only had to use seeds from his existing rice crop, an agricultural extension worker can now offer him three or four other types of seeds with varying characteristics. The couple who have always accepted children as God's Will now have a choice of intervening and there is a further choice as to how to intervene. While before, a man had no recourse

but to use credit from the traditional money lender, it is now possible for him to borrow money from other sources, provided he complies with certain requirements.

But available alternatives are not viable and real for an individual unless they are brought into his de ision-making framework and become actual choices for him. The task of non-formal education in this regard is therefore to present these alternatives in such a way that the benefits expected from their choice outweigh those accruing from the traditional means of solving problems. The old-age dictum of "to see is to believe" is still as potent now as it has ever been.

Unfortunately, some of the desired outcomes of non-formal education are not readily and immediately visible and are, therefore, more difficult to put across. The effects of applying a nutrition programme, for example, are not as obvious as the performance of a new rice or corn seed. Even the concept of family planning as a "negative production" process is not easy to grasp. What would a family gain by not having children or not having as many children? The incorporation of population education in the regular school curriculum is a laudable move, but it is not likely to affect the fertility and family behaviour of those who are currently at the reproductive age but are not at school. Other means of effectively reaching them must be employed. Emancipating a tenant from his bondage to a landlord, too, is not a simple matter of cutting his chains but of finding for him new ways of relating to the factors of production so that he may benefit not only psychologically but materially from his emancipation. On the other hand, the landlord too needs a "re-education" so he can find a new role in society without his land and his tenant. In many ways, this could be a more difficult adjustment to make and the dispossessed landlord perhaps deserves as much attention as the emancipated tenant.

The strategies and tactics applied in the various programmes of non-formal education for development range from the employment of full-time paid workers to the use of posters, leaflets, radio and television programmes. They vary in effectiveness.

Because the requirements for effective non-formal education are more demanding of the "educator's" imagination, creativity in adapting to idiosyncratic situations and dependable presence during the risk-taking process, these programmes are not aimed only at those with low-level education. Change quite often requires changes in the change-agent himself. For example, on the assumption that a man cannot teach what he does not know, the rice-production programme has included an indispensable component of learning how to grow rice from land preparation to harvesting. This was introduced when it was discovered that college graduates in agriculture have never grown rice. Expertise in one's subject is as highly respected in the world of farmers, housewives. and villagers as it is in the academic community. So personnel of agencies engaged in non-formal education need not only to possess expertise but also to upgrade basic knowledge and skills, and non-formal education for highly educated manpower plays a major role in the programmes.

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NON-FORMAL EDUCATION cannot result in behavioural change unless the wherewithal for change is present. Awareness of and favourable attitude toward family planning cannot lead to adoption if the services are not available. All empirical evidence in the Philippines as elsewhere points to the gap between knowledge, attitudes and practice with an inverted pyramid from knowledge to practice (and this observation holds regardless of the subject matter: family planning, rice production, land reform and so forth).

And despite the plethora in the Philippines today of activities in non-formal education as defined above, evaluation studies indicate that these efforts are not nearly sufficient. Nor are they as effective, as sustained and as systematic as they could be.

For example, while contact with expertise in rice and corn production has positive influences on farmers' adoption of improved practices the amount and quality of these "educational" inputs are far from satisfactory.

Such programmes should be recognized as legitimate educational inputs meriting sustained and substantial support from all quarters and should not be left to chance and sporadic initiative from partially interested sectors of society. They should be treated as a development function - not as welfare and charity.

Because also of the distributive implications of non-formal education, there should be deliberate attempts to locate as many programmes as is feasible in relatively disadvantaged places and among the less privileged population, even though the gains from these sectors may not be substantial. At the moment, there is a pronounced tendency to concentrate programmes in areas most likely to respond positively. Usually, agricultural extension, for example, is focused on the more progressive farmers because they respond better. This is understandable in terms of productivity and "success" objectives but less justifiable on income distribution grounds.

Furthermore, formal schooling needs to profit from the experiences in non-formal education. Lessons learned could be fed into the school curricula, paving the way for a more relevant content in formal education and eventually a diminished role for the non-formal variety (the offerings of the school system would suffice). As a start, the existing 601 colleges and universities could embark on non-formal education programmes (for example, an agricultural extension programme for a College of Agriculture and a Comprehensive Community Health programme for a College of Medicine).

But the feedback from the experiences in non-formal to the formal school system has yet to be maximized so as to have a significant impact on curricula, courses and faculties. The flow, as it has always been, is from academic institutions to the "real world" but seldom the other way around. Research and evaluation studies, and experimental programmes using a variety of strategies for the different subjects of non-formal education, are called for. More important than the before-after or input-output evaluation designs are studies which focus on "process" and the nature of the stimulus which moves a target reci-

pient of non-formal education from Point A to Point B with respect to a specific objective. What accounts for the change in behaviour or how the change was brought about is as important (if not more so) than the question of what and how much change has taken place.

Since most programmes in non-formal education, moreover, utilize college graduates, their expansion and intensification would create more productive employment for the latter and might help re-define the functions of college education.

Appendix

Statistics on the Philippine Education System

TABLE 1. Percentage Survival of Pupils from Grade I to Fourth - Year College for School Year 1957/58 to 1967/68.

	Per Cent Survival
Grade I	100
Grade II	80.3
Grade III	73.43
Grade IV	66.15
Grade V	50.92
Grade VI	42.25
High School - 1	27.71
High School - 2	20.57
High School - 3	18.24
High School - 4	16.92
College - 1	18.17
College - 2	13.99
College - 3	12.12
College - 4	11.46

Source: School Statistics, Board of National Education, Statistical Bulletin, Bureau of Public Schools, Statistical Bulletin, Bureau of Prival Schools.

TABLE 3. Household Population, 10 Years Old and Over, Highest Grade Completed, October, 1965 (Percentages).

EDUCATION	PHILIPPINES	RURAL	URBAN
No grade completed	12.3	6.2	15.2
Grades I - V	45.4	31.9	51.8
Grades VI and VII	18.5	18.8	18.4
1st to 3rd yr. - High School	11.0	16.4	8.4
Completed High School	5.8	11.0	3.3
1st to 3rd Yr. College	3.8	8.4	1.6
4th year college plus	3.1	7.3	1.11

Source: Board of Census and Statistics (BCS) Survey of Households Bulletin, Series No. 19, Labour Force Including Educational Attainment Data, October 1965.

TABLE 2. Employed Married Males, 25 to 64 Years by Highest Grade Completed (Percentages-May 1968).

GRADE COMPLETED	MANILA	PHILIPPINES
Elementary	29.4	60.1
Grade I	0.5	2.7
II	1.5	6.7
III	2.8	7.9
IV	4.6	15.2
V	4.1	8.5
VI or VII	15.9	19.1
High School	35.7	16.7
First Year	4.5	2.9
Second Year	6.4	3.1
Third Year	3.9	2.4
Fourth Year	20.9	8.3
College	34.1	8.7
One-Year	2.4	0.8
Two-Year	5.6	1.5
Three-Year	3.5	0.7
Four-Year	15.0	4.1
Five-Year	7.6	1.6
No grade completed	0.8	14.5

Source: Melinda M. Bacol, "A Study of Inter-Generational Occupational Mobility in the Philippines," unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of the Philippines Graduate School, August 1971. Data based on National Demographic Survey, 1968.

TABLE 4. Educational Attainment of Males Employed In Agriculture

REGION	PRESENT EMPLOYED IN AGRICULTURAL	PER CENT EMPLOYED WITH NO SCHOOLING
I. Manila	1.0	5.2
IV, V & VI: Central Luzon Mindoro, Marinduque & Palawan	62.4	16.4
III, IX & X. Cagayan Valley and Batanes, Southeast Mindanao and Sulu and Northeastern Mindanao	89.1	49.4

Source: Darmosuvito Sookajat, "The Structure of the Philippines Labour Force," *The Philippine Statistician,* Vol. 14, No. 4, December 1965, pp. 282 - 300

TABLE 5: Total Enrolment by Sex and School Level, 1968-69

	ENROLMENT (1,000s)			COLUMN (Per cent)			ROW (Per cent)		
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total
Pre-School	24	22	46	0.5	0.5	0.5	52.2	47.8	100
Elementary	3456	3245	6701	75.8	73.7	74.7	51.6	48.4	100
Secondary	768	738	1506	16.9	16.8	16.8	51.0	49.0	100
College	274	338	612	6.0	7.6	6.8	44.6	55.4	100
Graduate studies	5	9	14	0.1	0.2	0.2	35.6	64.4	100
Special Vocational	33	55	88	0.7	1.2	1.0	37.5	62.5	100
Total	4561	4407	8968	100	100	100	50.8	49.2	100

Source: Journal of Philippine Statistics, Vol. 23, No. 3 Third Quarter, 1972, p. 24

TABLE 6. Public School Enrolment and Percentage of Drop-Outs By Sex and Educational Level, School Year 1967-1968 (Not including Private Schools)

	ANNUAL ENROLMENT			DROP-OUTS		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Pre-School	479	466	945			
Elementary	3,157,700	2,959,037	6,116,470	210.230 6.6%	160,473 5.5%	370,723 6.0%
Secondary	226,408	226,363	452,771	46,949 20.8%	34,716 15.4%	81,665 18.1%
College	1,831	6,999	8,830	18 0.1%	38 0.6%	56 0.6%
Graduate Studies	22	44	66	-	-	-
Total	3,386,400 3,386,414	3,192,909	6,579,349	257,698 7.6%	195,757 6.2%	433,455 6.9%

Source: Journal of Philippine Statistics, Vol. 23, No. 3 Third Quarter, 1972

TABLE 7. Data on Collegiate Enrolment by Sector and by Sex, 1967-68

SECTOR	Male	Female	Total	Per cent
Bureau of Public Schools	1,831	6,999	8,830	1.51
Bureau of Education	N.A.	N.A.	9.070	1.55
State Universities and Colleges	11,511	15,187	26,803	4.59
Bureau of Private Schools	242,182	297,296	539,478	92.35
Total	255,524	319,482	584,181	100.00

Source: School Statistics 1967-1968

TABLE 8. Numbers (in hundred) of the Unemployed and of Persons in the Labour Force and Unemployment Rates by Educational Level, May, 1968

EDUCATIONAL LEVEL	Number Unemployed	Number in The Labour Force	Rate of Unemployment
No Schooling	772	17,604	4.4
Primary	1,756	39,316	4.5
Intermediate	2,768	40,776	6.8
High School 1-3	2,100	15,368	13.7
High School Graduate	1,456	9,512	15.3
College 1-3	1,248	7,156	17.4
College Graduate	408	5,640	7.2
TOTAL	10,508	135,368	7.8

Source: C.G. Mejia - Raymundo, "The Twin Problem of Unemployment and Underemployment. How They Affect the Philippine Professional Manpower". Univers of the Philippines Population Institute, January 1973.

TABLE 9. Percentages Of The Unemployed And Of Persons In The Labour Force And Unemployment Rates By Field Of Specialization, 1968.

Fields of Specialization	Distribution of Unemployed	Distribution of Persons in the Labour Force	Rate of Unemployment
All Diploma Holders	100.0	100.0	7.1
Engineering and Technology	10.2	9.3	7.9
Natural, Physical and Related Sciences	2.5	2.2	6.4
Medical and Para-medical Sciences	2.5	8.6	1.6
Liberal Arts, Social Sciences, Business & Education	85.7	79.8	7.8

Source: C.G. Raymundo, *op. cit.*

TABLE 10. Percentage Distribution Of Employed Degree Holders In Most Commonly-Reported Occupations By Field Of Specialization, May 1968.

Fields of Specialization	OCCUPATIONS					
	Professionals	Proprietors, Managers etc.	Clerical Workers	Farmers	Crafts Men	Other
Engineering & Technology	65.7	13.9	5.6	2.8	3.7	8.3
Natural, Physical & Related Sciences	71.4	4.8	9.5	14.3	-	-
Medical and Paramedical Sciences	72.7	14.5	3.6	1.8	-	7.4
Liberal Arts Humanities, Social Sciences, Business & Education	44.8	13.7	22.2	6.9	1.3	11.1
All Fields	51.6	13.5	17.3	6.0	1.6	10.0

Source: C.G. Raymundo, *op. cit.*

Notes and References

1. From Dorothy Nortman, *Population and Family Planning Programs; A Factbook,* Reports on Population/ Family Planning issued by the Population Council and the International Institute for the Study of Human Reproduction (Columbia University, New York, December 1969).

2. R.M. del Castillo, "Unemployed Teachers: Bureau Brass Discuss Issues", *Manila Times,* 3 July 1968, p. 3B. Figures for 1969-70 for the private schools alone reported a total of 67,371 teachers, 42,394 (63 per cent) of whom were women. At the college level 50.7 per cent of the teachers and at the graduate level 57.3 per cent, were male.

3. C.G. Mejia - Raymundo, *The Twin Problem of Unemployment and Under-Employment. How they affect the Philippine Professional Manpower* (University of the Philippines Population Institute, January 1973).

4. Melinda M. Bacol, *A Study of Inter-Generational Occupational Mobility in the Philippines* (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of the Philippines Graduate School, August 1971).

5. *Editorial Note:* A *Samahan Nayon* is a barrio-level co-operative with a minimum membership of 25 people - a half-way stage to the full-scale co-operatives planned for the whole country. Under the Government's Land Reform programme, membership of a *Samahan Nayon* is a pre-requisite for the grant of leasehold ownership of the land tilled by a tenant farmer. After two years experience under the guidance of trained officials in the running of a barrio co-operative, the villagers can combine with at least nine other *Samahan Nayons* to form a municipal co-operative, so long as their combined capital is at least 25,000 pesos (US$3,880).

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